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Abstract 
Stepfamilies are culturally significant in Britain on account of their media and mythical 
profile. Through increased rates in separation, divorce and repartnering they have also 
become increasingly socially significant. Yet this significance is only partially reflected 
in the research literature. Public versions of stepfamily life have tended to construct the 
ties of stepkinship in terms of fragility and contingency, assuming they cannot be 
counted upon in ways that arise 'naturally' through ties of blood. By talking directly to 
parents in stepfamilies this project seeks to understand how they themselves understand 
these issues. The research question is: how do parents refon-nulate their family 
relationships in the light of separation, divorce and repartnering, and what implications 
does this have for their handling of contact and inheritance? Central to its concerns are 
parents' understandings of the qualitative differences in their relationships with their 
biological and stepchildren, and how these differences maybe accounted for. 
The study used qualitative research methods and was based on semi-structured 
interviews with thirty parents living in married and cohabiting couple stepfamilies. 
Respondents were chosen using theoretical sampling methods. The aim was to select a 
sample with a range of characteristics and experiences which would enable key 
comparisons to be made about how stepfwnily life 'works' under different social 
conditions. Although interviews focussed specifically on issues of 'contact' and 
inheritance, respondents were also able to discuss issues of most importance to them. 
Analysis showed clearly that ties and solidarities between stepparents and stepchildren 
can be strong and enduring. Concerns were expressed by almost all stepparents that 
their stepchildren and biological children should be treated equally - whether this be on 
a day-to-day basis or in more lasting terms of inheritance. It also emerged that the 
experience of growing up as a stepchild provided a useful resource for those who, as 
adults, themselves moved into the role of stepparent. 
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Chapter 1 
The Social Significance of Stepfamilies 
'Even after I remarried, some people always made us fccl we were a 
broken family. Which is amazing, because I don't feel like that at 
all ... And that bothers me about the divorce. Is that how other people see 
us? Something broken? A breakdown? But I did kind of think like that 
until I reached my forties. But how did we come to think of it like that? 
Part of me understands it and part of me is mystified. We're just a 
family' (Dcb Casson, aged forty-cight). 
Up until very recently, 'public stories' (Jamieson, 1998) or discourses - whether 
emanating from academic, political, religious or media sources - have tended to 
construct processes of separation, divorce and repartnering almost entirely in terms of 
family 'brokenness' or 'breakdown. Further, as the opening comment to this chapter 
suggests, the theme of brokenness persists beyond people's experiences of separation 
and divorce, moving with them through repartnering into stepfamily life. At this point, 
notions of 'brokenness' intersect with public stories and cultural stereotypes of 
stepfamilies, in which stepmothers are negatively portrayed as 'wicked' or 'unkind', 
stepfathers as 'abusive' and their children as the potential victims of that abuse and 
neglect (Coleman and Ganong, 1987). 
Themes of ambivalence and brokenness in relation to stepfamilies also pervade the 
literature on kinship. This body of literature focuses on issues of solidarity and conflict 
between people, what it is that binds them, what it is that divides them. Through these 
bonds people develop attachments, form and sustain commitments (Allan, 1996: 1). 
Emphasis here has been - and in many respects remains - on the 'blood' relationship 
between parents and their biological children as the 'natural', given locus of enduring, 
morally binding ties and commitments between people. Empirical studies of family 
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relationships reveal that tensions are most likely to surface around issues of contact 
(between children and their non-resident biological parents) and inheritance. In these 
areas of family law, primacy is also assigned to 'blood' ties. From these different 
perspectives - and as I show further below - not only are stepfamilies viewed as a 
second-best arrangement through the lens of a deficit model of family (Robinson, 1991) 
but the ties and solidarities of stepkinship are regarded as 'unnatural', contingent and 
fragile. 
This brings me to the issues with which this thesis is centrally concerned. My research 
question is: How do parents in stepfamilies reformulate theirfamily relationships in the 
light of separation, divorce and repartnering, and what implications does this havefor 
their handling of contact and inheritance? This question is concerned with ties and 
solidarities in stepfamilies, specifically those between (step)parents and (step)children. 
It is concerned with some of the social consequences of parents' refon-nulated ideas on 
family relationships, that is, with the demands that can be made and the obligations 
owed in these relationships. 
Demographic trends: divorce and repartnering 
Although many of these negative constructions of stepfamily life derive historically 
from contexts in which stepfamily formation occurs after death rather than divorce, they 
nicely feed and fuel contemporary debates about trends and changes in family life and 
relationships and some of the 'risk' factors associated with them (see for example, 
Wallerstein and Kelly, 1980; Cockett and Tripp, 1994; Utting, 1995). A brief survey of 
some of these trends reveals that between 1970 and 1996, the number of divorces in 
England and Wales has more than doubled from 79,000 to 171,000. 'Risk' of the 
'breakdown' of remarriages appears to be about double that of first marriages. We do 
not have access to figures on the number of cohabitation 'breakdowns' (Maclean and 
Eekelaar, 1997). In 1997, over 150,000 children aged under sixteen had experience of 
parental divorce (Social Trends, 1999). Many people who separate and/or divorce 
subsequently repartner and in so doing create a 'stepfamily'. 
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Stepfamilies 
In broadest terms a stcpfamily may be understood as a samc-sex or hctcro-sexual 
couple, one or both of whom is not the biological parent of all or some of the other's 
biological children. This definition allows flexibility as to whether the couple is 
married or cohabiting, co-resident or living apart, or whether they are current or former 
partners. It also leaves open issues of whether a stepfamily is full-time or part-time, a 
stepfather, stepmother or lone-parent household. However, as I show in Chapter 2, 
many definitions assume stepfamilies are heterosexual, married couple, co-resident 
stepfwnilies. According to Haskey (1996) 6.8% of all (heterosexual) families with 
children are stepfamilies (this includes cohabiting and married couple stepfamilies) and 
8.2% of all children living in families live in stepfamilies (1996: 11-14). 
These figures indicate there are over half a million stepfamilies in Britain with almost 
one million stepchildren. Furthermore, it has been estimated that one in eight children 
in Britain will experience life in a stepfamily by the time they reach the age of sixteen 
(Ferri and Smith, 1998). Although a number of typologies have been devised (Burgoyne 
and Clark, 1984; Ihinger-Tallman and Pasley, 1987) to try and capture the diversity of 
stepfamily structures, it is important to remember that subjective definitions can cut 
right across these classifications. Stepfamilies are complex and diverse, both within and 
between their different types (Ferri and Smith, 1998). These studies and statistics 
indicate that stepfamilies are increasingly socially significant. 
As a number of writers (Smart and Neale, 1999; Morgan, 1999) insist, the ways in 
which separation, divorce and repartnering are discursively constituted has a major 
impact on how we 'read' or interpret trends and statistics which claim to describe or 
represent relationship change in objective or value-neutral terms. This is evident in how 
the 'causes' of the above trends have been explained. In broad terms, these are 
expressed either in terms of individual change or social change. 
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Stepfamilies and social policy 
First, rising divorce rates are regarded as clear evidence of a spiralling individualism 
(Dench, 1996) and a corresponding moral downturn (Dennis and Erdos, 1993; Morgan, 
P., 1995; Humphrey, 1996). Although in broad terms this position can be associated 
with populist ideas and political rhetoric (of the 'left' and 'right'), familypolicy and 
how it is implemented are more contradictory in its aims and outcomes (Fox Harding, 
1996; Silva and Smart, 1999). 
For example, while changes in divorce law since the 1960s have consistently aimed to 
strengthen marriage and stabilise families, their effects have been in many respects to 
normalise divorce. Yet when parents do separate and/or divorce, the requirements of 
the Children Act 1989 means that the institution of marriage takes a back seat to 
parenthood and children's interests (Rodger, 1996; Smart and Neale, 1999). These 
tensions and contradictions are similarly reflected in the government's consultation 
document Supporting Families (1998). While it recognises there 'never was a golden 
age of the family' (1998: 2) and claims not to be 'pressurising people into one type of 
relationship or forcing them to stay together' (1998: 3), it also believes that it is 
marriage which 'provides a strong foundation for stable relationships' and is the 'best 
basis for raising children' (1998: 30-1). Divorce 'means more family break up and 
reconstitutýon' (1998: 3 1). By strengthening marriage and encouraging people to take a 
responsible approach towards it, the government aims to protect the interests of children 
by reducing 'risks' of family 'breakdown' (Supporting Families, 1998: 3 1). 
Despite these contradictory elements there is a clear message that family stability, 
responsibility and children's interests are to be equated with 'never-divorced' married 
couples. 'Risks' for children are associated with divorce and 'reconstituted' family life. 
Thus as Silva and Smart (1999: 3) argue, although social policy acknowledges diversity 
and social change, it strives to hold fast to that model of the family which takes as its 
benchmark the heterosexual, conjugal, co-resident couple with their biological children 
(VanEvery, 1991/2; Bourdieu, 1996). It is against this model that stepfamilies are 
defined. 
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Variously described as re-ordered, reconstituted, re-formed, blended or bi-nuclear 
families (Hantrais and Letablier, 1996), they imply the restoration of a previous situation 
rather than a new group of people in a fundamentally different situation (Ferri and 
Smith, 1998: 12). Yet a social policy sensitive to the specific needs and circumstances 
of stepfamilies is conspicuous by its absence (Cretney, 1995). And while the Children 
Act 1989 does allow stepparents to acquire 'parental responsibility' it also stresses that 
biological parents cannot be divested, or divest themselves, of that responsibility 
(De'Ath, 1992a; Ferri and Smith, 1998). There is a consistent lack of clarity about the 
roles and responsibilities of stepparents, and a corresponding lack of recognition of the 
contributions they make. 
Sociological analyses of change 
A second very different kind of explanation for these trends comes from sociologists 
who frame them in the context of wider social change, an effect of that change rather 
than its cause (Giddens, 1991,1992; Beck, 1992,1998; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
1995). These writers argue that ascribing blame to the wants and discontents of 
individuals cannot explain this 'simultaneous mass exodus' from so-called 'traditional' 
forms of family life (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995; Beck, 1998). Individualisation 
is thus better understood as a quest for better if unfamiliar solutions to family life - the 
negotiated family, the multiple family, new arrangements after divorce, divorce again, 
new assortments of your, my, our children, our past and present families. These 
solutions to social change must emerge from individual biographies (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim, 1995: 1-5). From this perspective - and since I commenced this research it 
is a position from which an increasing number of writers argue (Beck, 1998; Jagger and 
Wright, 1999; Morgan, 1999; Silva and Smart, 1999) - notions of brokenness and moral 
decline are inappropriate. 
Taking this second explanation and mapping it onto the statistics outlined above 
suggests interesting and very different ways of seeking to understand or 'read' changes 
in family life. Although many second marriages or relationships may end in separation 
or divorce, there are many which do not. As Walker (1992a) argues, research and 
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statistics which focus on relationship 'breakdown' obscure the potential and actual 
strengths of post-divorce family life. We need to discover what factors enable some 
parents in stepfamilies to build and create constructive, satisfying and more positive 
relationships (Walker, 1992a: 28). It is some of these factors which my research 
explores and seeks to understand. 
Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 examines some of the literature on family and kinship, focusing particularly 
on studies from the late 1950s to the present day, the period during which demographic 
changes outlined above have been most marked. It focuses on British and American 
studies, examining their assumptions and arguments about kinship ties and solidarities 
and their implications and adequacy for understanding and conceptualising stepkinship. 
Chapter 3 addresses issues of methods and methodology. It demonstrates the links 
between my perspectives on key philosophical questions - ontology, epistemology, 
reflexivity and ethics - and my research question, design and practice. 
Chapter 4 examines the work and ideas of some contemporary writers on morality, 
moral subjects and moral domains, focusing on the links they make between moral 
practices and family life. With the help of some illustrative examples from my data, I 
critically analyse some of their main arguments, drawing out some of the implications of 
their ideas for understanding moral practices in stepfamilies. 
On the basis of data generated through my research, Chapters 5,6,7 and 8 analyse some 
of the key issues related to my research question. Chapter 5 analyses the processes 
through which parents in stepfamilies reformulate their family relationships in the light 
of their experiences of separation, divorce and repartnering. It looks at whom they 
include or exclude as close family and how they reached these decisions. Specifically, it 
looks at parents' understandings of their relationships with their biological and step- 
children and seeks to trace some of the factors which influence their ideas and feelings 
about 'closeness' and 'distance'. 
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In the light of parents' understandings of their reformulated family relationships, 
Chapter 6 analyses how these may influence their feelings about, and handling of, 
contact. Chapter 7 moves to matters of inheritance. Commencing with a discussion of 
English inheritance law and some of its implications for stepfamilies, it goes on to 
explore parents' handling of inheritance and how this relates to their understandings of 
their relationships with their biological and step- children. Chapter 8 analyses data 
generated from those respondents with childhood experiences of stepfamily life, 
analysing how these experiences inform or influence their role as stepparents and their 
handling of relationships with their own stepchildren. Finally, in Chapter 9,1 draw 
together some of the key themes which have emerged in earlier chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
Kinship Ties and Solidarities 
'You don't automatically stay close to blood relatives. I'm much closer 
to my granddaughter than to my son or daughter ... And my stepdaughter 
who's thirty-odd is very close to me. She was actually adopted by my 
husband and his first wife. She's closer than my son or daughter but not 
quite as close as my grand-daughter. I'm wondering where to put my 
daughter on here [visual chart]. She's more like my daughter-in-law, 
who I've put the same as my son ... So it's blood and marriage. It's a 
traditional outlook I've got. But, having said that, I've had so much help 
from friends that in a way they're family ... Through my experiences, I've 
changed my ideas of what family is. The operation of these people is 
terribly important isn't it ... So I don't think of my ex-husband as 
family 
any more' (Meg Chandler, aged sixty-eight, emphasis in original). 
Introduction 
If the trends outlined in Chapter I suggest that contemporary British society is diverse, 
changing and fragmented, it raises the question of how these features apply to people's 
understandings of family, kinship and relatedness (Strathern, 1992a; 1992b). This in 
turn raises questions about people's solidarities and commitments - with whom and for 
how long these can be sustained and reciprocated. For, as I argued in Chapter 1, 
increased rates in separation, divorce and repartnering are rarely presented solely in 
statistical or descriptive terms (Smart and Neale, 1999; Morgan, 1999). Rather, they are 
invariably linked to debates about moral and social 'decline' (Cheal, 1991) and to 
8 
concerns that loyalties, obligations and responsibilities in families may be divided, 
weakened or abandoned in the processes of these changes and transitions. 
In the light of these academic and political concerns (and in what must necessarily be a 
selective coverage of relevant material), this chapter reviews some of the research 
literature on family and kinship, focusing particularly on studies carried out in Britain 
and America over the past three decades or so, the period during which these 
demographic changes have been most marked. In addition, it examines the work of a 
number of contemporary sociologists whose ways of theorising wider social change in 
late modernity have made important contributions to our understandings of change in 
intimate and family relationships. Broadly speaking, there is a shift from more rigid, 
structuralist definitions of kin relationships to more flexible approaches which 
cmphasisc the importance of intimacy, individual agency and choice in the creation of 
family, kin and other personal relationships. In exploring these different approaches, 
questions will be raised about their implications for understanding stepkinship, and to 
what extent they arc adequate for conceptualising its relationships and solidarities. 
Terms of definition 
The term 'kinship' as used by the many writers included in this chapter (Schneider, 
1968; Firth, et al, 1970; Finch, 1989; Weston, 1991; Strathern, 1992a, 1992b; Finch and 
Mason, 1993; Allan, 1996) has been defined as that area of study broadly concerned 
with a person's 'family' or 'relatives' and the sets of ties socially recognised to exist 
between them (Firth et al, 1970: 3). If to that extent its meaning is uncontested, what is 
disputed is the basis on which people are 'socially recognised' as relatives or family 
members, as too, are claims about the quality of relationships which are assumed to 
follow. While it is now well documented that the term 'family' is problematic (Barrett 
and McIntosh, 1982; Bernardes, 1985; Cheal, 1991; Weston, 1991; Morgan, 1996), it is 
retained here and throughout this study for two reasons. First, family and kinship are 
frequently linked in theoretical debate. Secondly, there is empirical evidence that its 
flexibility makes it an 'important operational concept' (Firth et al, 1970: 91). That 
actors themselves negotiate the concept (Morgan, 1996) has led a number of researchers 
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to defend its usage on these grounds (Finch, 1989). It will be shown that in the ways the 
term 'family' has been subjected to a range of critiques, so too has the term 'kinship' 
been challenged along broadly similar lines. 
Assumptions about the basis of 'stepfamily', its ties and solidarities have not (yet) been 
challenged to the same extent. Rather, as suggested in Chapter 1, research has focused 
on their lack of solidarity or the diversity of form stepfamilies take. In the discussion 
which follows - and in contrast to the broad, inclusive definitions I proposed in Chapter 
I- it will be seen that many writers assume a narrower, more exclusive definition such 
as that proposed by Ferri and Smith (1998): 'a married or cohabiting couple one or both 
of whom is not the biological parent of all or some of the other's biological children' 
(Ferri and Smith, 1998: 10). This usage tends to assume couples are also heterosexual 
and co-resident. 
Earlier approaches to family and kin relationships (I 950s - 1970s) 
Many of the earlier analyses of kinship carried out in Britain or America in the period 
under review were conducted by anthropologists, or by sociologists influenced by 
anthropological concerns. Thus, interest lay not only in determining the existence or 
otherwise of kinship 'systems' - that is, whether broad patterns of relationship existed 
between different kin in terms of their behaviour, beliefs, or actual commitments - but 
also in evaluating the extent and influence of these kinship ties and solidarities. These 
interests were linked in turn to certain sociological preoccupations of the 1950s, in 
particular to structural-functionalist debates on family stability and cohesion. If on the 
one hand, the 1950s - 1970s were regarded as the 'golden age of the nuclear family, 
concerns existed too about the extent to which Parsons' (1956) 'structurally isolated' 
nuclear family had replaced the 'extended' family as the dominant form of household. 
Consonant with these concerns were debates about marriage and the extent to which it 
was changing from an institution to a relationship, based on equality and 'love' (Finch 
and Summerfield, 1991; Morgan, 1991). 
Although the historical basis of Parsons' claims have since been challenged (Anderson, 
1971), and his claims about family harmony criticised (Morgan, 1975; Cheal, 1991), his 
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ideas have been highly influential. During the 1950s and 1960s a number of kinship 
studies emerged in Britain (Firth, 1956; Young and Willmott, 1957; Townsend, 1958; 
Willmott and Young, 1960; Rosser and Harris, 1965; Bell, 1968) with a view to 
demonstrating that such a broad overview misrepresented social reality, and that wider 
kinship ties were also important. Implicitly or explicitly, many of these took as 'given' 
the model of kinship which follows. 
David Schneider's (1968) study of American kinship 
One of the most widely acknowledged and influential studies to emerge during this 
period was David Schneider's (1968) model of kinship in twentieth century America. 
As the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern acknowledges some twenty years later, it is 
'both with and against his ideas on kinship' that her own work on late twentieth century 
English kinship derives (Strathern, 1992a: xviii). Indeed, in the way Schneider's 
conceptual model has been widely applied to patterns of kinship in Britain and has 
formed the basis of comparative studies and critical analysis on both sides of the 
Atlantic, Strathern's comments may be said to reflect the position of many writers and 
researchers in this field. 
Schneider (1968) argues that the American kinship system is based on two basic 
principles, blood and marriage, derived respectively from the two major cultural orders 
in American society, the 'order of nature' and the 'order of law'. Relatives related 
through blood are termed consanguinial kin; those related through marriage arc termed 
affinal kin. The 'blood' relationship is formulated in biogenetic terms. That is, the 
conception of a child occurs during an act of sexual intercourse, at which time each 
parent provides one half of the child's biogenetic constitution. From this relationship of 
'shared substance' follows a shared or common identity. Because blood is a material, 
biological substance, the blood relationship is culturally defined as 'natural', 'real' and 
'true', an objective fact of science and nature. It is believed to be of fundamental and 
enduring significance and can never be terminated or changed. 'Disowning' or 
'disinheriting' a child is the furthest one can go in this direction (Schneider, 1968: 23- 
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25). As I show in Chapter 7, the primacy accorded to blood ties in English inheritance 
law reveals similar assumptions about their significance. 
In contrast, relationship by marriage has no 'natural' or biogenetic basis and is 
ten-ninable by death or divorce. Relatives by marriage are bound only by law and a 
'code for conduct' - based on affection, concern and care - which is believed to arise 
4naturally' among those related by blood. The exception to this is the relationship 
between husband and wife. Their union - socially legitimated in lawful marriage and 
expressed through the act of sexual intercourse - is an act of procreation through which 
the child and the blood relationship is created. For this reason, they are the only 
relatives in law who are culturally defined as being on a par with the closest blood 
relatives (Schneider, 1968: 26). Because father, mother and (biological) child are also 
husband, wife and child, they bring together, it is believed, the two cultural orders of 
nature and law. This is 'the family' in its essential form, a 'natural' unit formed 
according to the laws of nature. To be a 'complete' family, father, mother and their 
biological offspring must also live together. 
However, as Schneider goes on to say, since only certain facts of nature or sexual acts 
are culturally defined as 'natural', moral and legal (1968: 33-40), the link between 
procreative intercourse and family or kinship is symbolic. Sexual intercourse serves as 
the symbol in terms of which members of the family as relatives, and 'the family' as a 
cultural unit, are defined and differentiated (1968: 33). Its symbolic basis is also evident 
in the way that (at that time) children conceived 'naturally' outside wedlock are not 
socially recognised as kin; they are 'illegitimate' (Smart, 1987; Wolfram, 1987). 
Conversely, adopted children who have no so-called 'natural' connection with their 
adoptive parents are none the less ascribed the full social and legal rights of kinship. 
These anomalies indicate that there is no intrinsic or necessary relationship between the 
symbol (the procreative act) and the object symbolised (kinship). 
The guiding principle for the conduct of family relationships is 'love' - symbolised in 
the conjugal relationship between husband and wife and the blood relationship between 
parent and child. Together, these two kinds of love symbolise unity, identity and 
belonging. (The resemblance to Parsonian notions of family harmony and cohesiveness 
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is striking). In practice, love means loyalty, support, help and so on, summarised by 
Schneider as 'enduring, diffuse solidarity' (1968: 52). Arising most 'naturally' between 
parents and their (biological) children, 'enduring, diffuse solidarity' is normatively 
expected to be present, albeit to a lesser degree, among all kin. From this perspective, a 
sharp distinction is drawn between friendship and kinship. While both are relationships 
of diffuse solidarity, only kinship, or more specifically the blood relationship, is defined 
as enduring. Blood relatives are 'given' at birth and 'for life'; friends are picked or 
chosen and can, it is claimed, be 'dropped at will and without obligation' (Schneider, 
1968: 53-54,92). Some writers it will be shown (see also Chapter 5 of this study) 
challenge Schneider's assertions about friendship and include friends as kin at both a 
conceptual and empirical level. 
Schneider and the 'special problems'oftlivorce and remarriage 
Given the tight cultural fit in Schneider's account between kinship and biology, and 
family and household, it is unsurprising that separation, divorce and remarriage present 
'special problems' for his analysis. Since the state of a family's well-being, its integrity 
and stability, is measured decisively in terms of whether husband, wife and children are 
living together, where this is not the case, 'the family' is incomplete and 'broken'. The 
'broken' status of such families raises questions about the kinship ties of children whose 
parents have divorced. While some of those Schneider interviewed believed such 
children had 'no family at all', he suggests it may be 'technically' more accurate to say 
they have 'two families' (1968: 34). 
Another 'problem' for Schneider derives from the wide variation in people's views on 
kinship ties after divorce. Although none of his informants had themselves been 
separated or divorced, some insisted that divorce severs ties with former in-laws, while 
others asserted that it does not. What emerges unequivocally is that 'It all depends on 
the relationship' (Schneider, 1968: 92). If these relationships continue, it is regarded as 
voluntary, a matter of mutual consent. Similar findings about former in-laws have 
emerged in more recent studies (Finch and Mason, 1990a; Stacey, 1991). However, as I 
argue in Chapters 5 and 6, contact between children and a non-resident parent as well as 
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social expectations about how post-divorce relationships should be conducted may limit 
the extent to which they are voluntary or mutually agreed. 
Finally, the thorniest 'problem' for Schneider is posed by remarriage and the 
steprelationship. He suggests, as do many writers, that the nature of this 'problem' is 
precisely illustrated in the 'tragedy' of the step-child in Western European folklore. The 
fundamental difficulty is that step-relatives have the role of close relatives without being 
greal' relatives, that is, blood relatives. Whereas a 'real' mother is related to her child 
both by law and nature, a stepmother is related by law alone (he does not consider same- 
sex or cohabiting couple stepfamilies). What a stepmother does for her step-child is 
based on her husband's claim on her (Schneider, 1968: 26-27). Lacking the 'natural' 
basis for a parent-child relationship, she can feel none of that abiding love and loyalty 
which arises 'naturally' between a mother and her 'own' child. Although Schneider 
focuses exclusively on stepmothers, his argument also applies to stepfathers. 
Stepparents thus fail twice. Not only are they unreal, they are also unkind. Lacking the 
common biogenetic substance which marks the obligatory and permanent condition, the 
steprclationship is 'unnatural', its solidaritics contingent. By definition, the solidarities 
of partnerships sustained neither by nature nor by law - those between cohabiting or 
same-scx partners - arc also inherently fragile, unstable or non-existent. Other studies 
(see below) present a more varied picture of these relationships, as do my own findings 
discussed in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8. It is important to note that Schneider's analysis - 
which so clearly subscribes to the 'deficit model' of stepfamily life referred to in chapter 
I- is not empirically based. Many of the issues raised in Schneider's analysis of 
stepkinship are addressed in my research. 
Although the majority of people in Schneider's study ascribed the 'blood' relationship 
the highest cultural value overall, there were dissenting voices. Anticipating more 
recent theoretical approaches, some insisted that 'blood' ties are not inherently more 
solid or enduring than those of other relationships. Commitments and solidarities 
develop, if at all, contextually over time. This suggests that if blood may be understood 
as one symbolic basis for kinship, it is by no means the only one. Choice, shared history 
and the quality of relationships also emerged as significant. Despite these 
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'inconsistencies' (of which more may have emerged had the majority of his informants 
not been white, married couples), Schneider claims that his genealogical model of 
American kinship remains intact. Within this structuralist framework, contradictions 
and ambiguities are interpreted as 'variations' within a single system (1968: 113), the 
'understandable but perhaps eccentric decisions' of a minority (1968: 70-71). Other 
writers, for example Yanagisako (1978; 1985) in her studies of Japanese-Americans and 
Cherlin (1996) in his account of different 'racial' and ethnic groups, show how 
American kinship varies considerably from group to group. 
Rosser and Harris (1965): kinship as a process 
As I have suggested above, Schneider's (1968) model of kinship and Parsons' (1956) 
model of the conjugal family provided the basis and impetus for a number of British 
studies in the 1950s and 1960s. Rosser and Harris' (1965) study in Swansea sought to 
establish how far the patterns of kinship found in Young and Willmott's (1957) study in 
Bethnal Green could be applied to other urban areas. Their findings were broadly 
similar. That is, while 'close' kin (parents and biological children) were important in 
people's everyday lives, so too were 'extended' or more distant kin - especially 
grandparents and grandchildren, but also uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews and cousins. 
They argued that because the kinship system in Britain does not bear any great structural 
weight, it is not subject to tight controls or precise sanctions. As a result, a fairly wide 
margin is allowed for individual variation and preference in kin behaviour (1965: 287- 
8). 
For this reason, 'counting' kin genealogically was deemed largely 'irrelevant' to an 
understanding of the 'social significance' (Rosser and Harris, 1965: 196-7) of people's 
family relationships. It was the social significance of relationships which accounted for 
the diversity and complexity of people's understandings of who counted as family and 
the kinds of commitments that followed from this. Importantly, this led them to 
conclude that while kinship is an enduring social entity, it is not static or fixed but 
subject to variation and change. It is 'essentially a process' (Rosser and Harris, 1965: 
200). They noted that departures from the 'normal and universal' patterns of the life 
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cycle accounted in part for these variations. One way in which the cycle became 
'abnon-nal' was through 'broken homes' produced by separation and divorce. In their 
study these were very much 'minority instances' (Rosser and Harris, 1965: 166-7). This 
is in marked contrast to later studies on family and kinship where changing attitudes 
towards divorce, its easier availability and increased rates from the 1970s onwards, are 
reflected in the very different amounts of space it secures. 
Firth, Hubert and Forge's (1970) study of middle-class kinship 
Similar findings regarding flexibility and variation emerged in another important study 
by Firth, Hubert and Forge (1970). Originally intended as a collaborative study, it was 
conceived in discussion with Schneider in 1959. Like Rosser and Harris (1965) before 
them, Firth et al (1970) specified that it was the social signi(licance of kin relationships 
with which they were primarily concerned. With this objective in mind, they developed 
a four-level classification of kin relationships, concisely summarised by Allan (1996) as 
named, unnamed, effective and intimate kin (1996: 3 9). 
Broadly speaking, the 'intimate' kin category, where contact is 'purposeful, close and 
frequent' (Firth, Hubert and Forge, 1970: 156) coincides with anthropological 
definitions of primary kin. This includes all those connected by a single genealogical 
link - parents, siblings and children - and as some writers (Schneider, 1968; Allan, 
1996) argue, partners or spouses. The remaining three categories (named, unnamed, and 
effective) more or less coincide with 'secondary kin' - all those who do not fall into the 
primary category - aunts, uncles, cousins, grandparents and so on. Generally (although 
not always), contact with secondary kin is less frequent. As Allan (1996) points out, 
simple as it is, Firth et al's (1970) classificatory system does manage to convey the 
social rather than the genealogical basis of people's kin relationships (1996: 31). My 
own research design incorporates a similar approach, and will be described in Chapter 3. 
As in Firth's (1956) earlier study, what was immediately striking to Firth and his 
colleagues was how active people's kinship ties were. Of particular importance to all 
their respondents was the notion of some moral quality or imperative attached to kin 
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relationships, especially those based on close consanguinity. This translates into two 
basic principles: personal support is expected to be derived from kin and personal 
responsibility is expected to be assumed for kin. Related to this was the view that these 
ties should be marked by continuity. If dropped, they can later be reactivated (Firth et 
al, 1970: 343,385-7). Here too kinship is not perceived as static or fixed. Again, in 
common with findings from other studies, people's greatest commitments and 
obligations emerged in relation to 'primary' kin. Firth et al report markedly less 
ambivalence and ambiguity in people's minds about these and other consanguinial 
relationships than they do about so-called 'secondary kin' and/or relatives 'in-law'. 
Notwithstanding broad agreement about these relationships, some important exceptions 
emerged. For example, they found that relationships between parents and adult children 
were not unambiguously 'good' or straightforward. Rather they were qualitatively very 
different, revealing complex patterns that were not stereotypical. And while strains in 
these relationships could be endured at a greater intensity and over a longer period, they 
did, in rare cases, lead to a complete breach (Firth et al, 1970: 400-1). Of particular 
relevance in the context of my own research is their finding that parental divorce was an 
important factor in bad relations between parents and adult children, especially where 
contact between them had not been satisfactorily maintained. Tensions in this 
relationship also affected the amount and quality of contact between stepsiblings, half- 
siblings and stepparents (Firth et al, 1970: 199). 1 address some of these issues in 
Chapters 6 and 8. 
Firth et al's (1970) findings on stepkinship present a more varied picture of these 
relationships than Schneider's (1968) account suggests. Like Schneider, they argue that 
because stepkin are assimilated in position to close consanguinial kin through a legal 
process rather than a biological one, the step-relationship is 'structurally ambiguous' 
(1970: 328). In their reference to legal processes, they too are thinking only in terms of 
heterosexual married couple stepfamilies. Either way, stepchildren in these families 
have not grown up with their new kin. The structural ambiguity of their situation is 
further compounded because they do not meet the expectation that family and household 
coincide (Firth et al, 1970: 153). 
17 
Yet, despite these ambiguities, Firth et al found that conflict was not present or absent in 
any easily predictable way in these relationships. Ambiguity was most marked around 
issues of kinship terminology or how steprelatives should be addressed. Although in 
some cases stepmothers were 'hated', in others a stepmother was liked and a new 
marriage much approved of. What mattered in all cases was the quality of relationship 
between people (1970: 301,329,402). And while they found inheritance caused some 
'bad feeling' in 'second' families - as indeed it did in 'first' families - they concluded 
that second marriages do not automatically complicate things in this area. Again, the 
quality and history of the relationships involved was an important factor. These issues 
are explored in Chapter 7 of my study. 
For Firth and his colleagues, these variations in kin behaviour indicate that people's 
&operational categories' for defining 'close' and 'distant' kin are more fluid and flexible 
than structural definitions allow. Kinship ties are 'permissive' rather than 'obligatory' 
(Firth et al, 1970: 97,453; see also Firth, 1956: 14). That is, as Allan (1996) expresses 
it, they were comparatively freely chosen, rather than tightly prescribed by social norms, 
rules and conventions (1996: 30-1). However, the moral imperative of kinship means 
that choice is not unlimited. Although no precise rules exist and making moral choices 
thus presented difficulties for people, in all cases the history of a relationship and the 
amount of personal time expended on it emerged as important factors (Firth et al, 1970: 
390-6). 
On the basis of their findings Firth et al (1970) deny that the procreative act alone 
creates kinship. Because the genetic link starts at birth and lasts through life, the ties 
and obligations associated with it assume a 'built-in' or 'given' quality which makes 
them appear unalterable and unlike anything else (1970: 3-11,154). In fact, as Firth et 
al point out, the morally binding quality of these ties is 'to some extent acquired through 
the natal family during childhood' (1970: 109). In other words, as later perspectives 
argue, and as I do in later chapters, the moral imperative of kinship is culturally derived, 
developed and negotiated in and through relationship. It is not, as Schneider (1968) 
insists, a given quality of kinship which occurs 'naturally' at birth, and for life, between 
those - and only those - who arc related through 'blood'. 
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Approaches to family and kin relationships (I 980s) 
Although the biogenetic and marriage relationship remain central to these earlier 
studies, their explicit focus on the social basis of kinship is important, demonstrating as 
it does (Allan, 1996) the complexity and moral significance of these ties. Allan (1996) 
suggests that possibly on account of the success of these earlier works, kinship studies 
became 'unfashionable' during the 1970s and 1980s. A more convincing explanation of 
kinship's declining popularity as a research topic lies in what Cheal (1991) refers to as 
'a Big Bang' in the sociology of the family during the mid- 1970s. At this point, the 
image of unity and certainty in so-called 'standard sociological theory' -a unity Cheal 
considers to be overstated anyway - gave way under the impact of a number of different 
theoretical approaches, arguably the most conspicuous of which was feminism (Cheal, 
1991: 1-9). 
What these newer perspectives emphasised, and earlier ones had largely ignored, was 
that family relationships are also power relationships, in which inequality and conflict 
can also play a significant role (Morgan, 1975; Barrett and McIntosh, 1982). These 
ideas appeared to receive additional support from the social and demographic trends 
outlined in Chapter 1, all of which suggested that the nuclear family was neither 
universal nor the sole site for close relationships. Studies at this time thus tended to 
look at marriage or parent child relationships. Some of them looked specifically at 
stepfamily relationships, exploring these in both their historical and contemporary 
contexts. 
Studies of stepfarnily relationships 
As argued in Chapter 1, the increasing social significance of stepfamilies is only 
partially reflected in the research literature. Much of this comes from within the field of 
psychology where emphasis is placed on the 'problems' of stepfamilies as revealed in 
the therapeutic context. Comparatively little has been written from a sociological 
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perspective. Little of this explores solidarities between stepkin; even less considers 
cohabiting or gay and lesbian stepfamilies. 
Early traditions and accounts of stepfamily relationships 
Discussions of stepfamily relationships invariably commence with some reference to the 
'wicked stepmother' of myth and folklore, and that these myths may negatively shape 
the expectations and experience of people living in stepfamilies (Maddox, 1975). 
Stepfamily formation in this early tradition occurs of course following death rather than 
divorce. Noy (1991) has explored the development of this tradition in some detail. 
While the Cinderella story can be traced to ninth century China, its sentiments, 
specifically the concept of the 'wicked stepmother', are to be found in most parts of the 
modem world, in Asia, Africa, America and Europe. This figure also occupies a 
position of considerable importance in ancient Roman literature, where she is familiar in 
those contexts where monogamy and remarriage are normative. 
Noy distinguishes two traditions. In the first, this stepmother appears amongst Roman 
writers as a product both of their general misogynistic tradition and also as the locus for 
Roman obsessions with property and inheritance. What is feared is the influence of 
'stepmotherly blandishments' on a husband's decisions about inheritance (Gaius, Digest 
5.2.4., in Noy, 1991: 35 1). In the second tradition, in the folklore of medieval Europe, 
she emerges as the habitually cruel and jealous stepmother of subsequent European 
culture. Although in legal texts, there are examples of 'good' stepmothers, what both 
traditions endorse is the view that hostility is the 'natural' feeling of a stepmother 
towards her stepchild. Relatedly, while examples of wicked stepfathers occur in both 
Roman and later literature, no folklore exists (Noy, 1991: 349). A cautionary point 
Burchardt (1990) makes, and one which has relevance more widely, is that legal records 
are 'a misleading source' for understanding patterns in stepfamily relationships because 
'they only concern families so conflictual that they came before the courts' (1990: 240). 
Yet, evidence from historical and contemporary sources suggests a more variable picture 
of these relationships. Thus, while both Houlbrooke (1984) and Collins (1991) find 
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evidence of conflict in stepfamily households in the early modem period (1500-1800), 
Collins also reports affectionate relationships. However, since much of this information 
is recorded in diaries, letters and autobiographies, it is by implication drawn almost 
entirely from adult stepchildren of the upper middle classes. What emerges is therefore 
partial and fragmented. Collins concludes that although the absence of data on 
stepchildren from the labouring classes is a serious bar to drawing further conclusions 
about steprelationships in this period, the general impression according to these writers 
is that stepfamilies were not always 'troublesome places'. Rather, as Firth et al (1970) 
also found, 'stepfamily lives were mixed in quality' (Collins, 1991: 343). 
Burgoyne and Clark's (1984) study of stepfamily life 
Similar variations emerge in Burgoyne and Clark's (1984) major study of stepfamily life 
in Sheffield. For most people in their study, stepfamily formation followed divorce 
rather than death. On the basis of interview data with forty remarried couples with 
dependent children, Burgoyne and Clark developed a typology of stepfamilies in which 
parents were classified according to goals they held in relation to family life. Although 
their study does not focus explicitly on kinship, it is implicit in their discussions with 
people and in their recognition that the process from separation to remarriage entails the 
renegotiation and redrawing of family boundaries (Burgoyne and Clark, 1984: 70). 
Thus they do look at conflicts and solidarities in stepfamilies, noting how conflict 
between stepkin is conventionally regarded as 'both endemic and inevitable' (1984: 14). 
They argue that marriage breakdown and divorce have become public issues because 
they appear to threaten cherished moral values and principles - responsibility, stability 
and commitment - which in the context of family life are identified with a life-long, 
heterosexual married partnership and the raising of biological, dependent children 
(Burgoyne and Clark, 1984: 1-4,202). 
They found that one of the key areas of conflict for parents in stepfamilies revolves 
around the 'structural ambiguities' (see above, Firth et al, 1970) of their situation which 
make it difficult to be rigid or precise about kin boundaries. In particular, contact (then 
termed 'access') between a child and a non-resident biological parent was perceived as 
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threatening to the unity of the new family, making it difficult for stepfamilies to 'hide' 
their step- status (Coleman and Ganong, 1987) and conform to the pattern of the 
'unbroken' nuclear family to which many of them aspired (Burgoyne and Clark, 1984: 
156-162). Surprisingly then, a study by Furstenberg and Spanier (1984) found that 
relationships between stepfathers and their stepchildren were not adversely affected by 
children's contact with their biological fathers. 
Importantly, Burgoyne and Clark recognise that although levels of conflict and co- 
operation between ex-partners are to some extent a matter of personal history and 
preference, these relationships are also affected by public expectations and beliefs about 
appropriate post-divorce behaviour. At the time they were writing, notions of a 'clean 
break' after divorce tended to discourage ex-partners from sustaining amicable relations 
with each other (Burgoyne and Clark, 1984: 124,134). None the less, a study by 
Ahrons and Wallisch (1987) found that a number of former partners maintained some 
form of relationship with each other. As Robinson (1991) points out, legal processes 
can further polarise ex-partners with the result that non-resident parents, usually fathers, 
become increasingly marginal in the lives of their biological children (see also Lund, 
1987; Walker, 1992). Respondents in Burgoyne and Clark's study said this was less 
likely to occur where maintenance payments were still being made (1984: 140). This 
raises important questions about the relationship between maintenance payments and 
contact and their long-term impact on kinship ties and solidarities between children and 
non-resident parents. 
More recent changes in family and divorce law, viz. the Children Act (1989), the Child 
Support Act (1991) and the Family Law Act (1996) are designed to encourage co- 
parenting between biological parents and a continuing responsibility for their children 
(Smart and Neale, 1999). Grandparents too have a limited role, showing that in this area 
of family law as in inheritance law, 'blood' ties tend still to be accorded primacy. By 
contrast, as Burgoyne and Clark found, the role of stepparents remains ambiguous and 
ill-defined (see also De'Ath, 1992; Robinson and Smith, 1993). As Cherlin argues, the 
meaning of kinship in stepfamilies is unclear because remarriage is an 'incomplete 
institution' without clear rules or guidelines (1996: 380-8). Evidence from my research 
and from studies more widely (Stacey, 1991; Smart and Neale, 1999) indicates that a 
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range of post-divorce relationships are important for promoting children's wellbeing and 
interests. 
In Burgoyne and Clark's study, issues around kinship also arose (again implicitly) in the 
context of parents' decisions about whether or not to have 'our own child' (1984: 157, 
emphasis in original). Burgoyne and Clark argue that while both 'blood' and social' 
parenthood are seen as desirable and useful activities, only biological parenthood with 
its mingling of two genetic inheritances is believed to reproduce something of oneself 
and create a unique product of a particular relationship. Given the connection between 
these beliefs and ideas about what is 'natural' in family life, it appears that parents' 
decisions to have a child were in part informed by this kind of kinship thinking. 
However, where Burgoyne and Clark found strong ties between stepparents and 
stepchildren, there was no suggestion that these were contingent, less morally binding or 
inherently fragile. 
More recent accounts of stepfamily relationships 
Variability is the recurring theme too in more recent studies of steprelationships. For 
example, Burchardt (1990) analyses material from life story interviews carried out in the 
1970s with adult stepchildren brought up in Edwardian England. She reports a wide 
diversity in the quality of relationships with stepparents as does Gorrell-Barnes (1992) 
in her study of young adults who grew up in stepfamilies during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Ferri and Smith (1998) report that one of the most positive findings in their study on 
stepparenting is the quality of relationships between stepfathers and stepchildren. 
Exceptionally, Stacey's (1991) study among working-class Californian families does 
look explicitly at stepkinship. Stacey argues that in the way people draw on a range of 
relatives including 'ex'-partners and 'ex'-parents in-law, they turn divorce from a 
kinship rupture into a kinship resource, creating complex 'divorce-extended' families 
through which these resources can be mobilised (1991: 16). Furstenberg (1987) 
describes such families as 'new-extended'. Stacey's analysis better captures the 
dynamic, vibrant possibilities of stepkinship. By contrast, Cherlin's (1996) concept of 
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'remarriage chains' (1996: 387) whereby parents and children are linked across 
households is limited in its kinship reach, fixed and burdensome in the image it 
conveys. These findings suggest, as other writers (Finch, 1989; Allan, 1996) point out, 
that increased levels of separation, divorce and repartnering raise interesting questions 
about kinship. Yet, this is an area which remains largely unexplored. Some of these 
questions are addressed in my research. 
Later approaches to family and kin relationships (I 990s) 
It is clear from the discussion so far that people's understandings of family and kin 
relationships are rarely straightforward, but are fluid, complex and contradictory. 
Although these aspects of kinship become prominent and conceptually more 
sophisticated from the late 1980s onwards, the importance of these earlier studies should 
not be underestimated. Following Strathern (1992b), new ideas about kinship can only 
be thought through old ideas. It will be seen in the following section that many who 
take issue with notions of a 'natural' or 'given' basis of kinship (howsoever that is 
defined) rely on these earlier ideas as their intellectual Tickstart' or point of departure. 
Kinship assisted: the 'new reproductive technologies' 
Much debated in the late 1980s and early 1990s were the implications for kinship of the 
so-called 'new reproductive technologies' (NRTs). Debate focused on how far these 
technologies were beneficial to individuals and society, and what limits should be put on 
'interfering' with 'nature'. As Strathern (1992a) argues, the certainties of Schneider's 
(1968) premises, namely that the procreative act not only creates new human beings but 
also kin relations and life-long ties and obligations, can no longer be identified with 
such transparency. Although what is 'natural' may be valued, what constitutes 'natural' 
has lost its obviousness in a world where couples can seek assistance to beget children 
without sexual intercourse (Strathern, 1992a: 43). While Parliamentary debates 
surrounding the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill enacted in 1990 were most 
concerned with the rights and status of embryos and were strikingly non-relational in 
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character (Franklin, 1993: 106), it was the impact of NRTs on the relational dimension 
of people's lives which emerged as the primary concern in empirical studies on this 
topic at that time. 
In Edwards' (1993) study in the north-west of England, the implications for kin 
relationships of different NRTs (including gamete donation by third parties and women 
bringing to term children formed in part or whole from the genetic material of others), 
were explored in some detail. Although none of those interviewed had any personal 
experience of these procedures, Edwards found that the idea of unknown genetic origins 
prompted people to think about kinship. Extrapolating from their own experiences of 
family relationships, Edwards' respondents could visualise the social consequences of 
NRTs for a wide range of kin relationships, not just for parents and children, but for 
those between affines, across generations and so on. In doing this, people frequently 
made analogies with the kinds of 'problems' that arise in what they ten-ned 'complex' 
family relationships, such as those involving divorce or adoption. 
One of the major difficulties for people was trying to determine who had the strongest 
claim as the 'real' parent. As Strathem (1992) argues, our mode of kin reckoning is 
preoccupied with distinctions between 'real' and 'fictional' relatives. We value what is 
'real', what is 'seen' and what is 'natural', and in relation to procreation we assume an 
equation exists between them (1992: 52-3). By implication, there is the anxiety that we 
may take as 'real' someone who is not. In both Edwards' (1993) study and a related one 
by Hirsch (1993), analogies were sometimes made between the competing claims of 
genetic and birth mothers in surrogacy, and those of biological parents and step- or 
adoptive parents. Opinions differed as to who had stronger claims as 'real' parents. 
Some stepparents Edwards (1993: 50) interviewed claimed that despite not being 
genetically or 'fully related' to their children and grandchildren, they regarded them as 
4very close' and were concerned to treat them 'as if they were 'true' relatives. It will be 
seen that parents in my study voice similar concerns. 
A related concern was the potential disruption to a family unit posed by donating or 
surrogate parents. People predicted they might 'interfere' in the child's upbringing, 
thereby creating tensions or causing conflict (Edwards, 1993: 55,63). By analogy, as I 
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show in Chapter 6, such intrusions are routinely faced by parents in stepfamilies where 
contact between a child and a non-resident biological parent does indeed have the 
potential for disruption. Theoretically, in same-sex stepfamilies disruption of this kind 
may issue from two sources: from a donating or surrogate parent and from a non- 
resident social parent. This points to a further complication in stepkinship. Strathern 
states that in kinship idiom, children are future to their parents' past (1992a: 55). While 
children conceived through NRTs do not contradict this characteristic way of thinking, 
stepchildren do. They enter their new family situations bringing a history of another 
family with them. In this sense they are past to their (step-)parents' future. As I argue 
in my concluding chapter, in reversing these processes of partner formation and the 
arrival of children, parents in stepfamilies must learn 'at a run' another kinship script or 
idiom. 
In these studies people are making explicit certain values about kinship: the importance 
of genetic inheritance for knowing one's roots, the individuality of persons, and the 
desire to reproduce oneself and one's partner (Strathern, 1992a). Certainly parents in 
Burgoyne and Clark's (1984) study appear to have been informed by this kind of kinship 
thinking when making decisions to 'have a child together'. Arguably, in their 
discussions on NRTs people were also making explicit other values: the importance of 
shared history and the view that children should be treated equally. In other words, a 
recurring theme throughout the kinship literature is the implicit tension between a 
'biological or natural' connection with children and a 'social' connection. It emerges 
too among parents in my study. It also surfaces in the literature discussed in the 
following section. 
Families of choice: gay and lesbian kinship 
One of the most important challenges to Schneider's (1968) procreative model of 
kinship comes from writers in the field of gay and lesbian kinship. In Families We 
Choose (199 1) Kath Weston explores the meaning of kinship for lesbian and gay people 
living in the Bay Area of San Francisco. She contends that only gradually have scholars 
recognised that not all cultures privilege biology as a self-evident 'natural fact', the 
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defining feature of kinship. As Schneider (1968,1984) emphasises, this cultural 
variation means the biological basis of kinship is symbolic. As such, argues Weston, 
biology is no less a symbol than choice or creation. Culturally, none of these symbols is 
inherently more 'real' or valid than the other (1991: 33-5). 
However, because heterosexual intercourse is isolated as a core symbol (Schneider, 
1968) in American culture, and is believed to bring people into enduring association 
through the creation of kinship ties, gay and lesbian people have been defined as a 
nonprocreative species, 'exiles from kinship', set apart from the rest of humanity 
(Weston, 1991: 23). As the gay and lesbian movement gathered momentum in the 
1970s, concerns were voiced that biological connection might not be enough to make 
kinship endure through the risky process of 'coming out' to biological kin. Through the 
fear and sometimes the experience of being rejected or disowned, lesbians and gay men 
were forced to question assumptions that biogenetic connection in itself confers kinship 
and that the permanence and unconditional love attributed to those ties cannot be 
sundered (Weston, 1991: 73-5). For different reasons, as I show in my study, processes 
of separation, divorce and repartnering can also make people question these 
assumptions. 
If, as Weston puts it 'blood could prove thinner than water', then the kinship potential of 
other sorts of social ties - of friendship or social parenthood, or a committed gay 
partnership - could be explored and choices made accordingly (1991: xv). Choice 
became an organising principle for kinship. If dominant cultural representations 
asserted that straight is to gay as family is to no family, gay people began to contend that 
straight is to gay as 'blood' family is to 'chosen' families (Weston, 1991: 29). At the 
same time, some of those Weston interviewed disputed the validity of chosen families, 
especially where notions of kinship were tied up with a sense of 'racial' or ethnic 
identity. Others, notably African-Americans, argued that black communities had never 
held to a strictly biogenetic interpretation of kinship, a finding endorsed in other studies 
of black American kinship (Stack, 1974; Schneider and Smith, 1978). 
As Weston rightly argues, what these different accounts describe is a sense of enduring 
solidarity arising from shared history and material or emotional support, which some 
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people symbolised by a blood connection. What chosen families challenge is not the 
concept of procreation per se, but the belief that it alone constitutes kinship (1991: 34- 
6). While these insights are central to conceptualising the solidarities of stepkinship, the 
notion of choice is less salient. In choosing a partner who has been separated or 
divorced, there may be little or no choice about taking on her or his children too. 
Similarly, when relationships between same-sex partners end and one partner is the 
biological parent of their child, then they too face some of the kinship dilemmas posed 
within a heterosexual context, including contact with a non-resident parent. 
Maintaining the principle of choice may be more difficult in these circumstances. As 
yet we know virtually nothing about gay and lesbian step-families or to what extent 
there are overlaps and distinctions in their experience of these transitions and those in 
heterosexual stepfamilies (although see Dunne, 1997). 
In the concept of 'families we choose' with its emphasis on individual agency in the 
creation of kinship, gay and lesbian families are not just 'variations' within a 'single 
system'; they represent a more comprehensive attack on Schneider's (1968) model of 
kinship. In displacing rather than disallowing biogenetic symbolism, and releasing 
themselves 'from any sort of procreative imperative' (Weston, 1991: 210), lesbians and 
gay men began to re-negotiate the meaning and practice of kinship. It is to the concept 
of negotiation I now turn. 
Negotiated kinship 
Implicit in much of the research literature reviewed so far is a line of argument which 
does not become explicit until it is systematically explored and developed in the work of 
Finch and Mason (Finch, 1989; Finch and Mason, 1993). Their interests lie in analysing 
the processes through which kinship solidarities are created and sustained. 
On the basis of existing research evidence, Finch (1989) analyses the obligations and 
flows of support - material, emotional and practical - which exist between different sets 
of kin. Although she found, as the discussion in this chapter strongly suggests, that ties 
between parents and children were often characterised by a stronger sense of obligation 
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than those between other primary or 'secondary' kin (Finch, 1989: 36-37), they were 
subject to wide variations at both an individual and collective level. At the collective 
level, gender (Land and Rose, 1985; Qureshi and Simon, 1987), ethnicity and religious 
affiliation (Anthias and Yuval-Davies, 1983; Brah 1986) are key factors in accounting 
for these variations. The recognition of cultural diversity in particular had largely been 
ignored in earlier studies of kinship in Britain. 
For example, Finch (1989) argues that although in white British culture a 'sense of 
responsibility' (Graham, 1985) permeates the approach of many women to family 
relationships, in the case of people of Asian origin living in Britain, the main supportive 
bond often - although not always - existed between parents and sons. Similar findings 
emerge, again with variation and diversity, in Roger Ballard's (1994) collection of 
essays Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain. By highlighting the ways in 
which gendered, moral practices in families are culturally derived, the way is left open 
for accounts which emphasise diversity and difference. For example, my research 
examines how men from white British cultures may also feel a sense of responsibility in 
the context of their (step-)fwnily relationships. 
Notwithstanding these variations, Finch (1989) identifies certain common themes in 
research findings. Following Firth et al (1970), she argues that the distinctive feature of 
kin relationships, both in how they are conceptualised and practised, appears to be their 
moral quality. Importantly, this moral quality or sense of obligation is not fixed or 
static, based on rules and genealogical position. Rather it is fluid, related to the history 
and quality of a particular kin relationship. In the process of sustaining solidarities there 
is, then, another key element which Finch (1989) describes as the 'negotiated element' 
of kinship (1989: 236). This concept is fully developed in Finch and Mason's (1993) 
collaborative study Negotiating Family Responsibilities. 
Based on both a large-scale structured survey and in-depth interviews with a smaller 
number of respondents, this work examines the nature of kin responsibilities. It sets out 
to discover whether any normative agreement exists on kinship morality, that is, who 
should do what in given situations. In particular, Finch and Mason are interested in 
distinctions between what people say should be done and what is done in practice. 
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While they found substantial agreement on almost half of the kinship issues covered in 
their survey, they report little agreement about kinship rules or 'norrns' among those 
interviewed. Thus, although there was consensus that somebody should do something 
in a given situation, there was little agreement on who should do it or what should be 
done. 
On the basis of these findings, Finch and Mason argue that kinship responsibilities 
cannot simply be understood as rule-following on the basis of genealogical position, 
gender, generation and so on (see also Finch and Mason, 1991). What takes place is a 
complex process of negotiation which can be categorised, although in no watertight 
way, as open discussions, clear intentions or non-decisions (1993: 64-74). In each 
category, negotiations may be implicit, explicit, or both. Through the negotiation of 
responsibilities, commitments develop over time (1993: 93). Drawing on Becker's 
(1960) insights, Finch and Mason argue that in taking on certain responsibilities to 
family members, people make investments or 'side bets' in their family relationships. 
Through this process of side-betting, moral and material 'valuables' (Becker, 1960) are 
created over time which contribute to a person's moral identity. In this way, moral 
reputations are also 'negotiated' between family members (Finch and Mason, 1993: 
158-9). These valuables may be lost if people withdraw from relationships or fail to 
continue along a committed path. 
Finch and Mason's concept of negotiated commitments implies purposive action, 
agency, and the creation of something with lasting consequences (1993: 93-4). In this it 
has wide application. For example, Weeks, Donovan and Heaphy (1999) show how 
responsibilities and commitments are gradually negotiated over time in gay and lesbian 
families too. These ideas are also explored in my study of post-divorce relationships 
(see also Finch and Mason 1990) and stepkinship. In these contexts, partners may 
indeed be perceived to have withdrawn from a committed path and may have to engage 
in complex (re)negotiations of their moral reputations with 'former' and 'new' family 
members, including their biological and step-children. 
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Intimacy and kin relationships 
One of the striking features of the studies examined so far is that although kin 
relationships include the most intimate and important relationships of many people's 
daily lives, intimacy itself is not considered. Recent writers do talk about intimacy, 
arguing that the search for intimacy as an idealised version of personal life has gained 
ground previously occupied by an idealised version of 'the family' (Jamieson, 1998: 2- 
3). By linking the concept of 'disclosing intimacy' (Jamieson, 1998) to the trends 
outlined in Chapter I and analysing these within the context of wider social change, 
these writers make further important contributions to our understandings of the shifting 
and fluid patterns of people's family and kin relationships. 
Pure relationships 
One of the most influential contemporary writers in this respect is Anthony Giddens 
(199 1; 1992) who argues that the domain of intimacy is a key exemplification of wider 
social change. According to Giddens, modem institutions and modes of behaviour 
differ from all preceding ones to the extent they undercut traditional habits and customs. 
Social institutions and social relations, including those of the family, have been lifted 
out or 'disembedded' from their local contexts and recombined across time and space 
(1991: 2-17). These disembedding mechanisms have given rise to what Giddens terms 
the 'institutional reflexivity' of modernity -a process through which many aspects of 
social activity are susceptible to continuous revision in the light of new information or 
knowledge. This revised knowledge routinely enters and becomes a constitutive 
element in the organisation and practices of modem institutions - including those of 
marriage, family and intimacy - providing an impetus for transformation and change 
(Giddens, 1991: 16-20; 1992: 28). 
In the context of this 'post-traditional' order, the self too is subject to constant 
exploration and revision. Unlike the situation in traditional cultures where personal 
identity was clearly marked out in known 'rites of passage', the self in late modernity 
has become a 'reflexive project'. The construction of self-identity consists in sustaining 
a coherent yet continuously revised biographical narrative which forms a trajectory from 
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past to future (1991: 75). What is peculiarly difficult about this project is that as 
tradition loses its hold, it must be accomplished amid pervasive doubt and diversity of 
choice. Inevitably, it entails a balance between opportunity and risk, especially in the 
realm of personal relationships which have become 'mobile, unsettled and open' 
(Giddens, 1991: 6). Sexuality, once bound to procreation, kinship and generation is also 
mobile or 'plastic', freed from these constraints and obligations (Giddens, 1992: 27). 
Because external criteria for close personal ties have been 'dissolved', relationships tend 
increasingly to approximate to the 'pure relationship': 
, ... where a social relationship is entered into for its own sake, for what 
can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; 
and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to 
deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to stay within it' 
(Giddens, 1992: 58). 
Although romantic love was the precursor to the pure relationship, in many ways it 
stands in tension to the reflexive project of the self and the love component of the pure 
relationship, namely 'confluent love' (1992: 46-60). Whereas romantic love assumes a 
joint long-tenn trajectory and a mutual narrative biography, confluent love is 'active, 
contingent love, and therefore jars with the 'for-ever', 'one-and-only' qualities of the 
romantic love complex' (1992: 61). Importantly, Giddens insists that today's separating 
and divorcing society is an effect of the emergence of confluent love rather than its 
cause (1992: 61). Pure relationships are inherently unstable. They presume intimacy, 
commitment, mutual trust and a shared history, yet are required to be free-floating, 
subject to constant (re)negotiation, scrutiny and self-exploration. Because they assume 
equality and reciprocity, they appear not only in heterosexual marriage, but also in 
cohabiting, same-sex relationships and friendships. 
While Giddens' ideas are suggestive for understanding fluidity in some aspects of adult 
relationships, he ignores the difficulties - emotional, practical and financial - entailed in 
relationship change, especially when children are involved. In particular, as Smart and 
Neale (1999) object, he underplays not only how differences of class, gender, 'race', 
ethnicity and age affect people's level of access to 'life-style' choices, but also how 
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these factors will affect the choices they wish to make. Jamieson (1998) rejects the idea 
that 'disclosing intimacy' is sought in all relationships to the exclusion of other forms of 
intimacy - unconditional love, support, obligation and care - particularly where children 
are concerned. Children do not figure in Giddens' schema. Yet, as Smart (1997) and 
Smart and Neale (1999) insist, children actively participate in family relationships and 
are certainly given a higher priority in their parents' relationships than Giddens' concept 
of 'inertial drag' implies (1992: 88). My study shows that the role of children in these 
transitions can be significant. 
Giddens does consider children in his ideas about kinship. He argues that because 
kinship in late modernity is permeated to some extent by the pure relationship, it can no 
longer be viewed as a set of rights and obligations naturally 'given' by biology and 
marriage. Although relationships between parents and young children as well as those 
between more extended kin may 'remain substantially tied to external criteria' (Giddens, 
1991: 97) things have changed. Whereas trust in kin relations was often taken for 
granted, trust now has to be earned and negotiated as in sexual relationships. Drawing 
on Finch's (1989) concept of 'negotiated commitment', Giddens applies it to 
relationships between stepparents and stepchildren. While negotiating diverse kin ties 
may be arduous and risky, it does offer opportunities for novel, democratic and fulfilling 
social relations (Giddens, 1991: 13; 1992: 196). These ideas form the basis of critical 
analysis in later chapters of this study. 
Reflexive social ties 
Two other key writers on contemporary social change are Beck (1992) and Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim (1995). In contrast to Giddens, they do make family relationships, 
including those with children, central to their analysis, although less satisfactorily, they 
exclude same-sex relationships. Beck's (1992) modemisation thesis paints a darker 
picture of scientific and industrial development - one in which we, and generations to 
come, face risks and hazards on a scale previously unknown. Since we cannot negate or 
wholly avert these risks, societies can only evolve if we become radical and reflexive. 
Reflexive modernity requires a change in the relationship between social structures and 
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social agents. Given that when modernisation reaches a certain level, agents tend to 
become more individualised, that is, less constrained by structures, they are able to 
engage in the reflexive monitoring or shaping of the modernisation process (Lash and 
Wynne, 1992, in Beck, 1992: 2-3). 
Beck argues that reflexive modernisation proceeds right into the sphere of family and 
intimate relations. The individualisation of social agents forces men and women to 
make decisions and choices about their sexual preference, whom and whether they shall 
marry, whether they shall have children and so on. This cannot be done without 
discussing work, mobility, politics and economics (Beck, 1992: 103). In short, as 
Giddens (1992) also argues, they must reflexively construct their own identities and 
biographies. In contrast to Giddens, Beck is pessimistic that this can be achieved within 
the context of intimate and harmonious relationships. Unlike in feudal societies where 
unequal status was ascribed to men and women at birth, the principles of modernity, 
specifically individualisation, have led women and men to expect equality. However, 
because the inequality of men and women in labour markets and the home is 
fundamental to the development and success of industrial society, the rhetoric of 
equality does not match the reality (Beck, 1992: 105-8). 
This 'historically created mixture of new consciousness and old conditions' (Beck, 
1992: 103) is potentially explosive, resulting in conflicts and collisions of interests 
between men and women which Beck and Beck-Gernsheim describe as 'the quite 
non-nal chaos of love' (1995: 2). Like Giddens, the important theoretical link they make 
- and it is one in which they diverge from many other writers - is that although these 
clashes appear as direct clashes between individuals, it is neither individuals nor 'the 
family' who are the cause of these institutionalised conflicts. Rather, families provide 
the setting in which these conflicts are played out. By releasing people from traditional 
ties and social relationships and making this area of their lives reflexive and political, 
not only are men and women freed from constraints and obligations, they are severed 
too from sources of security and support. Thus, although these conflicts may result in 
flight from family and relationship, the isolation which ensues drives people back into 
relationship in a search for closeness and bonding (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995: 22- 
4,46). 
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Increasingly, men and women will integrate into their biographies a variety of familial 
and non-familial forms of living: single life, cohabitation in and outside of marriage, 
various parenthoods over one or two divorces, splitting up, coming back together again, 
and living alone again (Beck, 1992: 119; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 142-50). 
But these biographical phases are not discrete. For example, divorced people, linked to 
each other through their children, a long common biography and the problems of 
continuing material support, share what Beck and Beck-Gernsheirn describe as a 'post- 
marital marriage' (1995: 147). In all these changes the only durable and permanent tie 
is with children at least while they are young. 'Parents come and go, but the child 
remains' (1995: 37). They remain less for fathers who are often faced with a diminished 
or lost relationship with their children after divorce. 
If Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's portrayal of intimate relationships in late modernity is 
accurate, then their notion of risk, like Giddens', is salient. Trying to build kinship 
solidarities amidst the chaos, flight and searching they define as 'normal' appears a 
hugely risky business. It is curious, given their emphasis on multiplicity and diversity in 
family life, that they remain preoccupied with the contingencies of heterosexual marital 
relationships and the biological idiom of procreative kinship. In this, their approach is 
less successful than Giddens' in theorising fluidity and intimacy. Other writers (Stacey, 
1991; Robinson, 1991; Smart and Neale, 1999) argue post-divorce kinship includes a 
range of people - (step-)gandparents, 'ex'-partners, 'ex' in-laws, 'new' in-laws and so 
on. 
Making connections: David Morgan (1996) 
Arguably, the single most striking feature of the literature on family and kinship is the 
complexity and diversity of these relationships, both in how they are conceptualised and 
realised. In a variety of cultural, historical and geographical contexts, people re-work or 
create anew the ways in which they think about and 'do' kinship. Always, this is done 
within a range of constraints and possibilities - material, practical and emotional - in 
which the balance between them shifts over time. Such issues are central to David 
Morgan's (1996) work Family Connections where he draws attention to the various 
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ways Nnily and domestic life are implicated in areas of sociology traditionally kept 
separate. Developing his earlier arguments (Morgan, 1975; 1985) on the 'theoretical 
locations' of family relationships - positioned for example between the individual and 
the structural or the individual and history (1996: 154) - Morgan examines the 
connections between key themes in family studies and those in other areas of 
contemporary sociology, including class, gender, care, time and space. A number of 
these themes are directly relevant to my research with stepfamilies. 
In looking at the tradition of family studies, Morgan argues that many large-scale 
studies, in their preoccupation with broad-based inequalities of class or gender, 
emphasise the impact on families of wide structures and systems. In focusing on what 
families share they hugely underplay the diversity of family forms and relationships. To 
understand diversity we need accounts which are historically informed, which explore 
the 'interplays between macro and micro levels' and allow for the possibility of change 
through human agency (1996: 7-8). By implication, Morgan is arguing for additional 
smaller-scale studies of families of which my own is one. (I return to this point in my 
discussion of methodology in Chapter 3). Morgan's dual emphasis on diversity and 
agency is key to understanding processes in all families. Evidence from my study 
suggests this is especially so in stepfamilies where relationships are not only diverse but 
complex. The management of diversity and complexity implies a greater role for 
agency than many analyses allow. 
In considering feminist contributions to family studies, Morgan argues that many of 
them, in their emphasis on divisions in families, fail to recognise that family 
relationships are also about 'unities, alliances and co-operation' (1996: 9). As I argue in 
Chapter I and here, this failure is particularly evident in studies of stepfamilies. A 
second point Morgan makes is that family relationships include men. Yet feminist 
analyses tend to make gender synonymous with women, especially in relation to caring 
and responsibility. While not denying that women generally take on the burden of the 
mental, physical and emotional tasks associated with 'caring' in families, it is important 
to document cases which diverge from this pattern. As stated above, although such 
differences have been explored between cultures in Britain (see Finch (1989) above), we 
need also to take account of variations within cultures. As I argue in Chapter 3 in my 
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discussion of methodology, this becomes especially pressing in the context of 
stepfamilies where myths and stereotypes of 'abusing stepfathers' may carelessly be 
mapped onto analyses of power, care and responsibility. 
Another key connection Morgan makes - and one in which he specifically mentions 
(reconstituted' families - is that between family processes and time and space (1996: 
137). That to date such analyses have been slow to appear indicates how family studies 
have been relegated to the periphery in these theoretical debates. In the ways families 
care constituted and reconstituted' through 'multiplicities of times and spaces' their 
relationships are not fixed but fluid (Morgan, 1996: 140). Closely linked to the concept 
of space are Morgan's concepts of 'family body' and 'bodily density', both important 
for understanding the ways in which domestic spaces and boundaries are renegotiated 
and redefined in stepfamilies. Although I do not focus explicitly on dimensions of time 
and space in my own study, they are clearly implicated in the processes through which 
family relationships are reordered following separation, divorce, repartnering or death. 
This emerges in Chapters 5 and 6. 
On account of the diversity, fluidity and flexibility of family life, Morgan's preferred 
term for what he has been describing is 'family practices. This term recognises the 
continuing significance of family life in the lives of individuals at the same time as 
acknowledging the diversity of how that life is constituted. It therefore has meaning for 
both actors and observers. Practices can be active, routine, fluid or flexible and in this 
sense capture the 'shifting patterns of relationships' (Morgan, 1996: 187). Most 
importantly, the term is capable of holding those aspects of family life which have an 
emotional, moral and even negative significance for people (Morgan, 1996: 186-193). 
And though, for reasons I discuss in Chapter 3, the word 'family' is retained in many 
contexts in my own study, the term 'family practices' is frequently utilised for the 
reasons outlined above. 
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Conclusion 
Although more recent analyses have seized the initiative offered by demographic change 
to foreground the fluidity and diversity of kinship ties, and draw attention to other 
organising principles for kinship, the blood relationship retains a fundamental 
significance throughout. As Strathem (1993: 15-6) observes, whether emphasised, 
ignored or bypassed, the 'blood tie' remains 'a grounding point' in people's 
understandings of kinship. Notwithstanding this, as Meg Chandler's opening comments 
to this chapter illustrate, a 'traditional outlook' on kinship is a slippery concept to grasp. 
If biology represents one symbolic basis for kinship, this discussion shows that people 
invoke other symbols too - choice, necessity, friendship and shared history - and that 
these can equally well form the basis of a solidarity that endures. Although for many, 
the tics between parents and their (biological) children continue to be regarded as 
6primary', the changes outlined in Chapter I do raise questions about the ties and 
solidarities of stepkinship, and how far they may assume an equal or comparable 
significance in the lives of some. 
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Chapter 3 
The Research Process 
'Stop me if this isn't relevant ... but I don't think you'll understand unless you 
know the background.... ' (George Gallagher, aged sixty-eight). 
Introduction: aims of the study 
Chapters I and 2 examined the different ways in which stepfamily life is constituted and 
represented. This was done by looking at some of its demographic characteristics, its 
representations in 'public stories' (Jamieson, 1998) and discourses, and how it features 
in empirical and theoretical research literature. It was argued that very few of these 
sources focus explicitly on kinship in stepfamilies, specifically on the building of ties 
and solidarities between stepparents and stepchildren. Where they do, there is often an 
assumption that stepties are, comparatively weak or fragile, secondary or peripheral to 
the stronger 'natural' ties of 'blood'. These observations brought me to the main focus 
of my own research topic: how do parents in stepfamilies reformulate their family 
relationships in the light of separation, divorce and repartnering, and what are the 
implications ofthisfor their handling of contact and inheritance? 
As Graham (1997) argues, one of the purposes of any piece of research work is to find 
some 'answers' to a set of research questions or to what Mason (1996) calls an 
'intellectual puzzle'. It is the aim of this chapter to set out - and justify - the ways in 
which I designed a study that would not only translate my research question into a 
coherent research practice but would also help me to find some 'answers' to this 
question. As the opening comment to this chapter suggests, these tasks entail working 
out what is relevant and trying to find a methodological balance between whose 
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definition of relevance - respondents', mine or the requirements of doing a PhD - 
prevails. In order to do this I consider first my position in relation to some key 
philosophical issues related to research. I then relate these to the logic of my research 
design and practice. 
Reflections on some valued positions 
It is paradoxical perhaps in a sociological climate which emphasises fluidity and 
diversity, multiple realities and shifting values, that it has become axiomatic for 
researchers to 'position' themselves or state where they 'stand' in relation to key 
philosophical questions related to the research process - ontology, epistemology and 
ethics. Terms such as 'position' or 'stand' conjure images of researchers 'at the helm' 
who have competently steered a course through philosophical obstacles and are now 
enjoying 'plain sailing'. For myself, coming to grips (and grief) with 'relevant' 
literature across a range of competing philosophical positions continues to be daunting. 
As a number of writers in this field point out (presumably in relation to other people's 
work), not only is this body of literature vast, it is often inaccessible, conceptually and 
theoretically opaque, and internally inconsistent. There are notable exceptions to this 
(see especially Mason, 1996; Crang, 1997; Graham, 1997). Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, it is evident and now well documented that research practices cannot be 
divorced from questions of philosophy (Sayer, 1992; Stanley and Wise, 1993; Mason, 
1996; Graham, 1997). Methodological choices - choices about what is being studied 
and how it is being studied - are fundamentally about philosophical choices. What 
follows is a broad outline of my perspectives on these philosophical issues and the broad 
implications these have for my research design. 
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Ontology and epistemology 
Ontology: the nature ofsocial reality 
One of the fundamentally important issues about which researchers must decide is their 
ontological position or perspective, that is, what they believe or think is the nature of the 
social reality or social world they wish to investigate (Blaikie, 1993; Stanley and Wise, 
1993; Mason, 1996). In common with philosophical approaches which are fully or 
partly constructivist in their ontological assumptions - Interpretivism, Critical Theory, 
Structuration Theory and Feminism -I hold the view that social reality is produced and 
reproduced by social actors, that it is a 'preinterpreted, intersubjective world of cultural 
objects, meanings and social institutions' (Blaikie, 1993: 203; see also Graham, 1997). 
This is neither to assert nor deny that a 'real' world exists independently of our mental 
constructions. It is to claim that it can only be known and understood interpretively 
(Mason, 1996: 140). The social world does not exist as a set of social facts, an objective 
reality that can be directly observed. 
Although it may be somewhat artificial to dissect social reality into various 'ontological 
components' (Mason, 1996: 12), it is a useful exercise for determining what aspects of 
social reality I regard as fundamental to my own project. In my study of how parents in 
stepfamilies reformulate their family relationships, some of the key 'components' I wish 
to explore include social processes, social practices, social relationships, experiences, 
understandings, interpretations, meanings, negotiations and beliefs. As Blaikie (1993) 
observes, it follows from the logic of taking this kind of ontological perspective that in 
any social situation there may be not one but multiple realities. 
Epistemology: gaining knowledge about social reality 
My ontological position has logical implications for my epistemological position, that is, 
for my claims about what constitutes knowledge. I believe that what we know is based 
on how we understand and interpret social reality. I believe that evidence for, and 
knowledge about, the social realities on which my research question focuses is 
generated primarily (although not entirely) through interactions between interviewer and 
interviewees. It is parents' interpretations and understandings (what some would 
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describe as 'lay' accounts) and my interpretations of those accounts from which 
knowledge and explanations are generated. This suggests that knowledge about those 
social realities can only be achieved through some form of 'immersion' in that part of 
the social world of which they are part (Blaikie, 1993: 203). 
My research question focuses on detailed issues of process and meaning. To get at such 
processes, I need to talk directly and in detail to parents about their own experiences and 
understandings of the issues involved. Qualitative researching, or more specifically, 
qualitative interviewing, with its emphasis on methods of data generation which are 
flexible and sensitive to the social context in which they are produced (Bryman, 1988; 
Marshall and Rossman, 1995), and which aim to produce rich, contextual and detailed 
data (Mason, 1996) is best suited to generating the kind of 'inside' or in-depth 
knowledge I am seeking (Geertz, 1973; Ely, Anzul, Friedman et al, 1991; Maynard and 
Purvis, 1994). As Morgan (1996) argues (see Chapter 2), rigidly standardised or 
structured large-scale surveys removed from the social context being studied are 
unlikely to generate these kinds of in-depth data. 
At the same time, because I believe that the production and reproduction of social reality 
occurs within wider social conditions of which social actors may not be fully or even 
partially aware (Blaikie, 1993: 203), these accounts are not the sole source for 
generating explanations. As I describe more fully below in my discussion of analysis, I 
also develop other concepts or conceptual categories to organise data (Blaikie, 1993: 
193), using social science interpretations as well as those from other disciplines to 
amplify and move towards a fuller, rounder social explanation (Mason, 1996; Graham, 
1997). Given that I had engaged in 'reading around' my topic prior to data generation, it 
is clear that I did not approach the research process in some kind of 'theoretical vacuum' 
(Mason, 1996: 141-2). In addition, as I argue below, the specificities of my own 
experience prior to and during the research process have a number of implications in 
this respect. 
For these reasons (and this follows from the logic of my constructivist ontology), I 
believe that howsoever data generation proceeds - whether through in-depth 
'immersion' in the context under study or through the medium of a large-scale survey, 
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the interpretation which ensues and the knowledge it generates is socially produced and 
socially situated (Wcedon, 1987; Hekman, 1990,1995; Stanley and Wise, 1993). In 
other words, interpretations and knowledge are context- and person-dependent, based on 
the specific standpoint of researchers and - in the case of qualitative research - on their 
interactions with interviewees. It is on this account that Skeggs (1994) defines 
epistemology as the 'relationship of the knower to the known' (1994: 77). In making 
these claims, these epistemological positions have proved especially provocative. 
As Code (1993) argues, as soon as we take seriously a view that knowledge is a 
construct produced by cognitive agents within social practices, and acknowledge the 
variability of agents and practices across social groups (1993: 15), we run into trouble 
with the dominant epistemologies of modernity which continue to inform natural 
sciences and also some social sciences. These epistemologies with their Enlightenment 
legacy and later infusion with positivist and empiricist principles have been defined 
around Cartesian ideals of pure objectivity and value-neutrality - and hence, as Code 
points out, around ideals of political innocence (1993: 16). Through the autonomous 
exercise of reason, these cognitive agents or knowers are capable of transcending 
particularity and contingency (Benhabib, 1992; Hekman, 1995) and achieving in Nagel's 
(1986) famous words 'a view from nowhere'. These ideas presume a universal, 
homogeneous and essential 'human nature' which allows knowers to be 
interchangeable. 
While critics of this modernist epistemological discourse are perhaps most readily 
associated with feminist, postmodernist and poststructuralist writers, some of the key 
issues they raise can, as Stanley and Wise (1993) point out, be traced through earlier 
interpretivist literature. In different ways with different emphases these approaches 
argue that knowledge is situated, contextual, historically and geographically specific. 
Research produces knowledge that is always a 'view from somewhere' (Code, 1993: 
39). The two charges most frequently and vehemently levelled against these claims are 
that such research is not objective and the knowledge or 'truth' it produces is relative. I 
return to these criticisms below. In the following section I outline what I believe are key 
aspects of the 'view from somewhere' which I embody and how these may relate to, or 
influence, the research process and the knowledge or explanations I produce. 
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Reflexivity 
Closely related to my epistemological position are issues around reflexivity. Mason 
(1996) argues that while there are many versions of what qualitative research can be, 
there are certain key features which she regards as fundamental to any version. 
Specifically, these include critical self-scrutiny or active reflexivity by the researcher. 
This means constantly taking stock of one's actions and role in the research process and 
subjecting these to scrutiny in the same way as the rest of their 'data'. This is based on 
the belief that a researcher cannot be objective or detached in the knowledge she 
generates. In addition qualitative research should always be conducted as an ethical 
practice (Mason, 1996: 5-6; see also Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). In many 
respects these two aspects of the research process are inextricably linked (Stanley and 
Wise, 1993; Maynard, 1994). Although critical self-scrutiny informs all contexts of the 
research process (see below), there is one important sense in which I think active 
reflexivity or the monitoring of my role in this process has to be undertaken at a sharper, 
more constant level. 
Some links between intellectual andpersonal biography 
In David Clark's (1991) foreword to a collection of essays dedicated to the memory of 
Jacqueline Burgoyne, he talks about her life as a researcher in the field of stepfamily 
life. Of particular interest in the present context is her description of her 'vehement' 
resistance for many years to any suggestion that her own experiences of family life had 
any connection with her long standing research interest in stepfamilies. She admits that 
only gradually did she come to recognise that her own experience as a stepchild 
provided the impetus, albeit an unconscious one, for 'an intense and abiding curiosity 
about the way people inhabit their home and domestic lives' (Burgoyne, 1987, 
unfinished manuscript in Clark, 1991: xii). 
Although, in contrast to Burgoyne's experience, my own intellectual journey started late 
and has taken me less far, there is no doubt that my choice of research topic was to some 
extent biographically induced. Specifically, my experience from my mid-teens onwards 
of being 'stepdaughter' to one stepmother and two stepfathers, and 'foster daughter' to 
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an 'othermother' (Hill Collins, 1990), predisposed me to critical analysis - then and 
now - of the social realities I am currently investigating. The importance of researcher 
reflexivity became even more acute when my own experience of relationship change - 
divorce, repartnering and movement into stepfamily life - occurred during the research 
process. This meant grappling not only with the 'intellectual puzzle' (Mason, 1996) 
posed by my research topic, but also with its various other dimensions - emotional, 
practical and financial - the very issues with which parents I interviewed wrestled too. 
These aspects of my personal biography have obviously influenced and had an impact 
on various phases and aspects of the research process. For reasons I outline below, this 
is something I regard as both enabling and disabling. What I have tried to retain (and 
this is central to my ontological belief in the multilayered nature of social reality) is the 
view that there is no single experience or version of relationship change or stepfamily 
life which can be said to encapsulate, or be representative of, the whole of that reality. 
From this perspective, notions of epistemic privilege - that my experiences of the 
toppressions' of stepfamily life automatically grant me insider knowledge on the 
experiences of all stepfamilies - are rejected. To claim otherwise would, as many 
writers in this field argue (Harding 1986; Haraway, 1988; Stanley and Wise, 1993; 
Holland and Ramazanoglu, 1994) involve making essentialist claims not only that all 
those in a particular 'oppressed' group (all women, all disabled people, all stepfamilies) 
are the same, but also that they are automatically best placed to understand their own 
oppression. If from my epistemological position parents' accounts are deemed 
inadequate as a sole source of knowledge for what I am investigating, then my own 
experience must be deemed inadequate on similar grounds. 
The purposes of my research 
In raising issues about critical self-scrutiny, the question is also raised about my 
purposes or motives for doing this piece of research. As Mason (1996) insists, it is vital 
to be reflexive and honest about these, and to contextualise them within the ethics and 
politics of research. In my own case, there were motives or purposes apart from 
'biographical determinants' (Clark, 1991). These included the twin objectives of 
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attaining a higher degree and researching something which I considered to be of both 
personal and public interest. An interest in stepfamilies had been triggered and 
developed during my undergraduate years which immediately preceded my entry into 
graduate studies. 
The overlap between intellectual interests and personal experience had also alerted me 
to some of the negative legal, political, social, media and academic discourses around 
separation, divorce and repartnering. By implication, and as many researchers and 
writers about family life have pointed out (Burgoyne and Clark, 1984; Finch, 1984; 
Morgan, 1996; Rodger, 1996; Mason, 1996; Ferri and Smith, 1998; Silva and Smart, 
1999) the way in which 'findings' on family life are disseminated is an important issue. 
Different and possibly competing interest groups - which in my case minimally include 
those I interviewed, myself, my institution and my funding body - may stand to gain or 
lose in some way from what I 'do' with my research. I return to some of these issues 
below. 
Ethics 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that ethical practices are implicated in all 
aspects of research practices. Given that more specific ethical issues, decisions and 
dilemmas arise at different stages in the research process, I deal with these in more 
detail as they arise (see below). At this point, I give only a brief statement of my ethical 
position which in broad terms may be defined as feminist. It takes as its starting point 
my epistemological position summarised above as 'the relationship of the knower to the 
known' (Skeggs 1994: 77). If, as I suggest above, 'living-in-a-stepfamily' represents 
one important factor in this respect, there are others too. I am also middle-aged, middle- 
class, white, woman, mature research student and so on. The ways in which these 
different factors interact with the research process will vary according to who is being 
interviewed or what stage of the research process I have reached. I return to these points 
below. In connection with these issues I identify a number of key ethical concerns. 
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These include the significance of women's lives and experience (Alcoff and Potter, 
1993; Maynard and Purvis, 1994), the relationship between the researcher and the 
researched and the impact of the former on the research process (Stanley and Wise, 
1993), explanations for the grounds on which sampling decisions and interpretation of 
data have been made (Holland and Ramazanoglu, 1994), a focus on the material forces 
which shape people's lives (Purvis, 1994), a commitment both to the creation of 'useful 
knowledge' (Kelly, Burton and Regan, 1994: 28) and to the use of that knowledge in the 
interests of those directly or indirectly involved (Finch, 1984: Mason, 1996). These 
concerns do not necessarily imply exclusive focus on women. If gender divisions and 
other social relations are to be fully understood, men must also be included in a research 
practice (Stanley and Wise, 1993; Kelly, Burton and Regan, 1994). Specifically, as 
Morgan (1996) argues (see Chapter 2), men's accounts must be heard. 
Selecting a study population 
As I suggested above, the logic of my ontological and epistemological perspective, or 
what Marshall and Rossman (1995: 40) call the 'epistemological integrity' between my 
research question and my research design suggests that qualitative interviewing is the 
best way of generating the kind of rich, contextual, in-depth data on parents' 
experiences, interpretations and understandings of the issues involved. In this section I 
describe the logic of my sampling strategy and how I went about selecting a particular 
study population in practice. 
In broad terms Mason (1996) defines sampling and selecting as principles and 
procedures used to identify, choose, and gain access to relevant units which will be used 
for data generation' (1996: 83). It is assumed that these sampling units or 'units of 
analysis' will in some way relate to a relevant wider or 'parent' population - whether 
this be an empirical link (Marsh, 1988) or a theoretical one (Mason, 1996). A 
researcher's principle of selection is important for her study as a whole. Specifically the 
rigour with which this is done is viewed by many (Finch and Mason, 1990b; Silverman, 
1993; Dey, 1993) as a decisive factor in upholding or undermining the analytical 
validity (see below) of her overall interpretation of the data. 
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Principles on which I selected a population: theoretical sampling 
As I argued in Chapters I and 2, stepfamilies have a range of social characteristics and 
are constituted in diverse and complex ways. This raises problems when thinking about 
ways in which to select a sample. Specifically, there is no empirical population with 
clearly defined key characteristics whose parameters are known and which can be drawn 
upon to select a representative sample (see Mason, 1996: 91). Representative sampling 
seeks to achieve a randomly-selected representative microcosm of the wider population 
under study in order to be able to claim that patterns in this smaller sample are likely to 
appear in similar proportions in the larger one (Marsh, 1998: 3-4; Mason, 1996: 91). 
However, patterns generated from representative sampling tend to be superficial, not 
particularly well suited to the development of analysis and theory. The nature of my 
interest in a wider population of stepfamilies is not simply empirical but theoretical and 
conceptual. There is a wider universe of social theory and explanation (Mason, 1996: 
85) - around issues of kinship, intimacy, relationships, social change - related to my 
research question about which I want to have something to say. A sampling logic better 
suited to the analytic logic of much qualitative researching and, importantly, to detailed 
exploration of social processes is theoretical or purposive sampling. 
Generally associated with Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss (1987), its utility is not 
restricted to those engaging more fully with their principles of grounded theory. The 
aim in constructing a non-representative sample is to select units which will enable me 
to make key comparisons and to test and develop theoretical propositions. It links 
sampling directly to the process of generating theory and explanation 'inductively' from 
data (Mason, 1996: 85-93; see also Finch and Mason, 1990; Dey, 1993). From this 
perspective, sampling means constructing a sample or 'study group' on the basis of its 
theoretical relevance to my research question, my analytical framework and practice, 
and most importantly, to the kind of explanation I develop (Finch and Mason, 1990b: 
28). 
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Key to this process (and this is linked to my analytical and explanatory logic) is the 
selection of sampling units which will not only support or develop my theoretical 
arguments or explanation, but will also test them (Mason, 1996: 94). In other words, as 
with procedures associated with 'analytic induction' (Fielding, 1988; Dcnzin, 1989; 
Silverman, 1993), it is important too to seek out negative instances or cases which 
contradict my developing concepts or analytical ideas. This process is derived from the 
logic of 'analytic induction' (Denzin, 1989; Finch and Mason, 1990b) and has in turn 
important implications for what type of generalisations, that is, what type of wider 
claims I can make on the basis of my research (Platt, 1988; Finch and Mason, 1990: 25- 
34). 
Putting principles of theoretical sampling into practice 
As suggested above, in theoretical sampling, the processes of sampling, data generation 
and data analysis are interactive (Mason, 1996: 100). For this reason sampling decisions 
are not made once and for all at the beginning of the research project. This process 
helps to identify gaps in the range of experiences under study and enables further 
decisions to be made which are both situated and informed, sensitive to the data 
emerging (Sayer, 1992; see also Hughes, 1990). Finch and Mason (1990b) refer to these 
later decisions as 'stock-taking exercises'. As Sayer (1992) observes, this acts as a 
ccounter to the rather peculiar idea that researchers should specify what they are going to 
find out before they begin' (Sayer, 1992: 245). The strength of this kind of sampling is 
that it allows flexibility (Silverman, 1993; Dey, 1993; Marshall and Rossman, 1995). 
However, this method has been criticised for being not purposive but vague if not 
practised systematically. It is therefore important to keep an ongoing record of sampling 
decisions. This record is substantially reproduced in what follows. 
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Quotas I targeted and quotas I reached 
Size ofsample or study population 
The proposed size of my sample or study population moved from 50 (on my ESRC 
application) to 70 (the number preferred by my upgrading panel) to 30 (the number 
finally agreed between myself and my supervisors as temporal, financial and practical 
constraints began to assert themselves). This number is large enough to allow me to' 
understand the process being studied (Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame, 1981) and to make 
meaningful comparisons between units of a particular type. Deciding how many units 
of a particular type to target was based on the need to constitute a relevant range of 
social characteristics for purposes of exploring similarities and differences in people's 
experiences of this process (of refortnulating their family relationships) and to test and 
develop theory and explanation to account for why these similarities and differences 
exist (Mason, 1996: 97). In the context of my research question this meant selecting 
people as sampling units on the basis of key experiences they had rather than because 
they were people per se (Mason, 1996: 87). 
An important decision to make at this stage was whether or not I would interview 
couples together or separately. There has been much discussion about the ethics and 
relative merits of taking either route (Bennett and McAvity, 1992; England, 1994; Hertz, 
1995; Valentine, 1999). Whichever route is taken, different accounts, interpretations or 
stories will emerge. Given the sensitive nature of topics to be explored, specifically 
'other people's children' and the unpredictability of associated issues that may (and did) 
arise, I decided to interview couples separately. In addition, as I argued in Chapter 2, 
existing research evidence suggests we need women's and men's separate accounts if 
we are to understand some of the complexities and differences in their experiences 
(Morgan, 1996). 
With these considerations, objectives and my key research question in mind, I set some 
initial sampling quotas and targets, specifying my intentions in relation to a range of 
sampling units and their numbers (see Figure 1). The total number of experiences 
exceeds the total number of people to be interviewed because many people will fill more 
than one quota slot, that is, have more than one of these experiences or characteristics. 
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Figure I Composition ofstudy population: quota targets (Total=30) 
30 people (preferably 15 couples) who are living in a heterosexual stepfamily situation 
in which they and their partner co-reside and one or both of them has a child or children 
(dependent and/or adult) from a former partnership (whether or not they also have 
children from their current one, and whether or not all dependent children have 
'residence' with them) 
20 people who are currently remarried 
10 people who are currently cohabiting 
15 people with dependent stepchildren 
15 people with adult stepchildren 
5 people who have experience of widow(er)hood 
15 people who are aged less than fifly years 
15 people who are aged fifty years or more 
20 women 
10 men 
30 people who are homeowners 
15 people who define themselves as middle-class 
15 people who define themselves as working-class 
Setting quota targets not only forced me to work out carefully what experiences and 
characteristics were likely to be important for understanding the processes under study, 
it also enabled me to monitor how far my sampling practice was 'on target' in fulfilling 
these objectives, and how far these initial targets needed to be modified in the light of 
how my analysis was developing (Finch and Mason, 1990: 25-34). In what follows I 
describe the logic behind these targets, noting when, how and for what reasons these 
were changed during the initial and 'stock-taking' phases of sample selection. Finally, I 
describe the methods I used to achieve my sample. 
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The logic behind my quota target 
1) A specific experience of stepfamily life 
There are a number of points to be made in relation to my decision to focus on a specific 
experience of stepfamily life. First, in Chapters I and 2,1 identified a wide variety of 
stepfamily forms. I do not however target or include all these conceptual variants in my 
study population. In particular, I do not include gay and lesbian stepfamilies. As I 
showed in Chapter 2, current research on kinship in gay and lesbian stepfamilies 
suggests that the principle of 'choice' is a major factor in how they forimilate their 
family relationships. This is at odds with the clearly defined parameters of heterosexual 
family and kin relationships. In addition, as I also argued, the legal process of 
separating and terminating a relationship provides some structural constraints that are 
not present in gay and/or lesbian relationships (Baber and Allen, 1992; Smart and Neale, 
1999). 'Family' law operates with heterosexist assumptions. Meaningful comparisons 
that do justice to the very different constraints and possibilities (Morgan, 1996) within 
which gay, lesbian and heterosexual families practice kinship could not be made within 
a small sample such as mine. 
Secondly, within the variant forms of heterosexual stepfamilies, it is the 'non-native' 
concept of stepfamily as defined by Haskey (1994) and Ferri and Smith, (1998) which 
has yet to be problematised and which I am therefore targeting. From the research 
evidence (Burgoyne and Clark, 1984) it is in these families, whose members may aspire 
to the model of the 'intact' nuclear family, that tensions are likely to be greater. For 
example, where parents in stepfwnilies co-reside (as they do in my study) it may be 
expected that more tensions surface around the issue of 'contact' than in stepfamilies 
where parents are not co-resident (Burgoyne and Clark, 1984). Similarly, as I suggested 
in Chapter 2 (see also Chapter 7), given that inheritance law operates with a model of 
kinship based on one couple and a direct line of descent, it is again in the model of 
stepfamily I am targeting (where law assumes co-residence means a shared economy 
and relationships of dependency) that tensions around inheritance may be expected to 
surface (Firth et al, 1970). 
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Thirdly, if as the literature suggests, shared history is an important factor in building 
kinship ties and solidarities, then co-resident stepfamilies (some of whom have adult 
children and some of whom have dependent children) are most likely to be able to 
illuminate some of the factors influencing these processes. Related to this is the point 
that some stepfathers in my sample will probably have biological children of dependent 
age who do not have 'residence' with them. Fourthly, given the negative and/or lack of 
attention to kinship ties among cohabiting couple stepfamilies in the research literature, 
as well as their lack of any automatic rights under the intestacy rules in inheritance law 
(see Chapter 7), it is important to explore their reformulated ideas of their family 
relationships too. 
All 30 people in my sample had the experience of stepfamily life I specified. This 
number comprised 12 couples and 6 individuals. Although the partners of these 6 
individuals were asked (either directly by me or via their partners) whether they would 
also like to take part in the study, they declined on various grounds. These included that 
they were 'too shy', 'too busy, ' 'didn't want to' or worked too far away to make it 
practicable. One person told me she had agreed with her partner that only one of them 
would take part so that any differences of opinion between them would not be apparent. 
Of these 30,23 were married, 7 were cohabiting. The majority had been separated or 
divorced prior to moving into their current stepfamily situation, but as I intended, 5 
people in my sample had been widowed. Finding parents in cohabiting couple 
stepfamilies proved especially difficult through my 'snowballing' methods (see below). 
A number of people claimed they could be considered as part of a cohabiting couple 
stepfamily because they had 'onlyjust got married'. I declined these offers but included 
some of them as married couples. 
2) Age of children in sample 
Including some parents who have adult children (biological and/or step-) and some with 
dependent children is relevant for two reasons. First, differences in children's age- 
related patterns of contact may be reflected in different levels of tensions and in how 
parents feel about contact. For example, the younger the child(ren) the more frequently 
parents in 'new' families may have to mediate telephone calls or visits from non- 
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resident parents. Second, given suggestions in the research literature that younger 
children develop closer relationship with stepparents more quickly and more 
permanently than older children do, it is important to make comparisons between the 
experiences of parents with younger children and those with older children. (Burgoyne 
and Clark, 1984; Ferri and Smith, 1998). My sample included 14 people with 
dependent stepchildren, 12 with adult stepchildren. 
3) Age ofparents in sample 
There are two main reasons for interviewing 'older' and 'younger' parents in 
stepfamilies. First, in relation to my final point in 2) above, it was envisaged that some 
of the 'older' stepparents would have had a longer shared history with their step- and 
biological children than some or many of the 'younger' stepparents. Again, this would 
allow similarities and differences to be noted in the quality of relationships between 
parents and children in these different groups. Second, this has implications for 
inheritance. It is more likely that 'older' parents will have something of significance to 
bequeath (Hamnett, Harmer and Williams, 1991). Younger parents in stepfamilies who 
may have separated and/or divorced more recently, may have inheritance issues on the 
agenda (National Stepfamily Association, 1993) because solicitors have invited them to 
think about making a will. 18 parents in my sample were aged under 50 years. 
4) Ethnicity 
While I did not intend to make any formal comparisons between minority ethnic groups, 
again because a sample of thirty does not permit me to do this adequately, I intended 
where possible to include people from ethnic minorities. One black (non-British) 
couple I approached declined to take part in the study primarily because they thought I 
would be unable to understand family life in their culture. They were also uneasy about 
discussing inheritance. Another British couple of Asian origin initially agreed to talk to 
me but later declined because they were 'having some financial problems'. Although 
for them too the issue of inheritance seemed to be particularly worrying, I also felt that 
they (or more specifically the male partner) regarded me as inappropriately placed - as a 
white woman who did not share their religious affiliations - to speak to them about such 
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matters. As Phoenix (1994) argues, whatever the theoretical debates about the impact of 
an interviewer's ethnic difference, the expressed preferences (and, I would add, the 
implicit preferences) of interviewees in this respect are important in themselves (1994: 
67). 1 felt uneasy about pursuing the matter further. Although I interviewed one parent 
whose child from a previous partnership was black, my sample was composed entirely 
of white British parents. 
5) Gender 
In the initial stages of designing my research project, I had decided to interview a greater 
proportion of women than men. This decision was taken on the grounds that studies 
suggest that women do most of the kin work (see Finch, 1989; Stacey, 1991) and that 
men are more reluctant than women to be interviewed, particularly on family matters 
(Chandler, 1990: 123; Edwards, Ribbens and Gillies, 1997). On reflection, given how 
men responded in my pilot study (which included two woman and three men) these 
reasons no longer provided adequate grounds for targeting women and men in that ratio. 
In addition, as I argued in Chapter 2, given the negative stereotyping of stepfathers, it is 
important to explore their understandings and experiences of (step)family life. This led 
me to revise my initial quotas and target an equal number of women and men. Two 
women declined to be interviewed. The first declined because she didn't 'agree with 
sociologists prying into people's private lives', while the second said she had only very 
recently moved into her stepfamily situation and felt 'unsure about whether it will 
survive'. My sample included 14 men and 16 women. 
6) Class 
Although initially I did not set quota targets on class, I aimed to include people with 
differing socio-economic statuses. I was uncertain at first how to approach the task of 
defining respondents' class position. Existing ways of defining class, for example, on 
the basis of occupation or level of consumption are too rigid given the degree to which 
social mobility is a recognised feature of individual biographies. In particular, in 
situations of relationship change, many people - especially women - experience some 
downward social mobility (Maclean, 1991). 1 therefore began by asking people to 
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define their own class position and, because they had no difficulty in doing this I 
decided (following a stock-taking exercise after eight interviews) to continue in this 
way. At this point I also decided that in order to make meaningful comparisons in 
relation to inheritance, it seemed important to interview people whose resources were 
significantly different. To this end, I began to target people more widely in terms of 
occupation, as well as those who were unemployed or retired. In addition, I revised my 
initial plan to focus solely on homeowners and began to target people in rented 
accommodation too. My sample included 14 working-class and 16 middle-class 
parents. 
Achieving a sample: snowball sampling 
In order to compose a sample which achieved my quota targets (including my revised 
ones), I required a method of sample selection which was practicable, safe, ethical and 
which would allow access to appropriate numbers of relevant sampling units. This 
required some kind of 'sampling frame' (Mason, 1996: 102) from which a smaller 
sample could be taken. As stated above, in my case there was no discrete parent 
population from which suitable, cloned offspring could be drawn. While it is possible 
that the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which commenced in 1991 may 
eventually generate very useful quantitative data on stepfamilies, the type of large-scale 
data set from which a statistically representative sample could be drawn does not exist at 
the present time. An alternative avenue I could have explored was through the 
Stepfamily Association. I rejected this on the grounds that its members may tend 
towards a more uniform or 'corporate profile' (through attendance of the association's 
meetings, reading of its literature or pamphlets) which might obscure some of the very 
differences in stepfamily practices I was keen to explore. 
For these reasons I decided to generate my own sampling frame through 'snowball' 
sampling. Starting with one sampling unit, that is, one person with the experience of 
stepfamily life defined above, I then asked them to put me in touch with others who also 
had this experience. Snowball sampling has been criticised for being used uncritically 
and unsystematically, that is, for taking people who are in some way linked and for 
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'taking each person who comes along'. However, as I demonstrate below, I am not 
being 'opportunist' in this respect. By making my quota targets directly relevant to my 
research question I made strategic and systematic use of the links and flexibility this 
approach affords. As Sayer (1992) argues, use of this method is not intended as 
justification for 'empty-headed fishing expeditions' (1992: 244-5). 
Having a range of quota slots to fill allowed me to get the ball rolling easily at first. 
However, because the first snowball gathered three or four middle-class contacts (in 
terms of occupation, place of residence and resources at their disposal), I decided to set 
another four snowballs rolling. Two of these were started by me, one via a contact in a 
rural area, and one via my city-based hairdresser. I also accepted two offers of help 
from friends. One, who works as a teacher in an inner-city primary school put me in 
touch with four potential respondents, all parents of her pupils. The other, a probation 
officer, mentioned my research to some of his clients, two of whom said they would be 
interested in taking part. All four put me in touch with other people in a similar 
situation. In taking these routes, it meant that many people I interviewed had no 
personal links with each other. An exception to this was my decision to seize the 
opportunity of interviewing five members of the same kin group in which the parents 
were in a stepfamily situation and so too were each of their two adult (step)sons. 
As I explain below, this method of using an intermediary worked well and had distinct 
ethical and practical advantages. From the point of view of achieving a sample which 
fulfilled a substantial proportion of my quota targets, setting several snowballs rolling 
proved effective. It gathered enough potential respondents to allow me to make 
systematic choices among them. Sometimes this was difficult because it entailed 
'turning down' people who wanted to take part. The exception to this, as I describe 
above, was my failure to include people from different ethnic groups. However, this has 
less to do with my sampling method than with my inability successfully to negotiate 
their participation once initial contact had been made. 
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The research process 
Designing and doing qualitative interviewing 
Qualitative interviews tend to be fairly informal, either loosely or semi-structured, what 
Burgess calls 'conversations with a purpose' (1984: 102; see also Maynard and Purvis, 
1994). Because the interactions between interviewer and interviewee are the data 
sources from which analysis and explanation proceed (Skeggs, 1994; Mason, 1996), 
they require a range of both intellectual and social skills. In addition, as a number of 
writers have argued, qualitative interviewing also raises important ethical issues, some 
of which can be anticipated in advance, some of which arise unexpectedly in the 
interview situation. 
Several weeks planning work went into devising an interview schedule that would 
enable me not only to 'get at' some of the issues and complexities posed by my 'big' 
research question, but would also be (what seemed to me at least) ethical and non- 
directive. These considerations implied devising a schedule that was relatively informal 
(and this I think was as much with my own comfort in mind as that of my interviewees) 
at the same time as being structured enough to ensure that certain key issues and topics 
were adequately covered. This task covers question of substance, style, scope and 
sequence (Mason, 1996: 43) and the challenge it posed was one I underestimated. I 
frequently found that in getting one dimension of the interview schedule 'right', I was 
getting another dimension 'wrong'. In particular, it seemed that in trying to meet my 
ethical requirements that questions were not too insistent or intrusive, I was not meeting 
intellectual requirements that certain topics be covered in-depth. 
Gradually, by breaking down my main research question into a series of smaller related 
ones, I was able to develop ideas about converting these smaller questions into possible 
interview topics. I then tried to frame possible interview questions around these topics, 
trying also to imagine how well these would translate into an interview situation. From 
these I developed my interview schedule (see Appendix 1) with questions designed to 
generate data which link back directly to my research question. It was for these 
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purposes that, in my own mind, I divided the interview into four parts. It was not 
intended that these parts must follow a rigidly preconceived order. 
Thus, although its format is quite structured and its questions break down key topics 
into quite fine detail, many of these questions follow logically from each other. I 
therefore anticipated (as proved to be the case) that some people would move from one 
topic to the next without needing to be asked. For example, when asking people 
whether they had previously been married, in all but one case they told me too about the 
children they had from that relationship. On the other hand, my scheduled question also 
triggered responses which were unanticipated because they were specific to a 
respondent's own situation. I was able to explore these in more depth as seemed 
appropriate in the light of my research question. In addition, depending on what I 
already knew about a respondent's circumstances, some questions which were obviously 
inappropriate or irrelevant were not asked at all. In this sense my schedule could be 
used both flexibly and as a reminder of the topics I needed to cover. I used it in both my 
pilot study and my main study. Because it worked well in the former, I included my 
pilot interviews as part of my main study. Sections 1,3 and 4 cover household, a brief 
history of intimate relationships and inheritance respectively. 
Section 2 incorporates a 'visual chart' (see Figure 2) of ten concentric circles. This, too 
was used in my pilot study and was enthusiastically received both there and in my main 
study. Following suggestions from respondents in my pilot study, I changed the size of 
paper from A4 to A3. The chart is designed to illuminate how people (re)conceptualise 
emotional 'closeness' and 'distance' in their family relationships in the light of 
separation, divorce and repartnering. With their own names written in the innermost 
circle, respondents were asked to write down the names of anybody they 'think of' or 
'-wish to include' as family. They were asked to locate people in terms of emotional 
closeness, that is, 'how close' they felt to each person. 
Closeness and distance are represented visually according to how near or far people's 
names were placed in relation to respondents' own. Those defined as 'closest family' 
were located in circles nearer to the centre; those considered less close were located in 
circles further out. Comparative distance and closeness could also be represented by 
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leaving intervening circles empty, or alternatively, by placing a number of people in the 
same circle. In addition, people were told they could include people who had died if 
they so wished, and that they could delete or add names as they wished in the course of 
the interview. Finally, they were asked to write down (in one comer of the paper) the 
names of anybody they felt uncertain or ambivalent about including. 
My rationale for focusing on emotional closeness as a defining feature of family and kin 
relationships (rather than, say, contact or frequency and amounts of support) derives 
from my reading of the research literature on 'close' ties and solidarities. It was seen in 
Chapter 2 that these ties are assumed to arise 'naturally' and 'for life' between those and 
only those, related by 'blood', in particular between parents and their biological children 
(Schneider, 1968). In asking parents in stepfamilies to rank family members in terms of 
emotional closeness, I wanted to see how far findings from my study support or 
undermine these claims. Had I asked about closeness in other terms, different rankings 
may have emerged. However, as I show in later chapters, these dimensions are not 
discrete. In talking about emotional closeness parents invariably illustrate their accounts 
with reference to these other dimensions. 
This chart is not intended as any kind of 'objective' measurement of closeness. It is 
unlikely, given the specificities of people's experiences that they will understand the 
concept of closeness in the same way. However, since I am gathering data on the 
process of the task as well as its outcomes, I am in a position to understand some of the 
variations in interpretation and meaning which emerged. It is designed for comparative 
purposes, in particular to compare parents' positioning of their biological and step- 
children and the implications of this for how they handle contact and inheritance. In 
making this my aim rather than focusing strictly on kin-counting, there are some 
similarities between my approach and Firth et al's (1970) distinctions between the social 
significance for people of their named, effective and intimate kin (see Chapter 2). 
However, in designing it I made one important and wrong assumption, namely, that all 
adults can read and write. Noticing that one interviewee did not pick up the pen I put 
down for him, I grasped quite quickly (but too late) what the difficulty was. I said 
(untruthfully) that some people had asked me to fill the chart in for them, telling me 
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what to write and where to write it. I asked him which he would prefer. He told me he 
would like me to do it because he could not write. From that point onwards (after about 
twenty interviews) I explained the task in such a way that left this issue 'open'. All 
other respondents filled in their own charts. 
From what other respondents said, filling in this chart not only focused their minds on 
the content of the interview, it also helped to ease some initial difficulties in talking 
about things they would usually share only with intimate others. This raises a number of 
questions around power relationships between the researcher and researched. Although 
semi-structured or in-depth interviewing may be 'useful' in getting people to talk about 
sensitive topics and has been found to work particularly well between women 
respondents and interviewers (Finch, 1984; Maynard and Purvis, 1994), this 'easy 
intimacy' (Phoenix, 1994) does not automatically ensure that the situation is any less 
exploitative (Stanley and Wise, 1993; Phoenix, 1994). On the basis of my own 
experience I would argue that this applies to men as well as women respondents. 
For example, I envisaged in the planning stage that interviewees might get 'stuck' 
around unresolved and painful issues related to relationship change and that this would 
scompromise' my access to, and adequate coverage of, topics more 'relevant' to my 
intellectual project. In the interview situation, I tended to let people talk on, even if in 
some cases constraints of time meant more superficial coverage of key issues. As 
Skeggs (1994) says 'But what else can you do? ' (1994: 81). This is an ongoing 
dilemma of doing feminist research. Sometimes, this had less to do with my ethical 
position than my inability (that particular day) to summon the necessary skills to get 
back 'on course'. I was aware at times as I left respondents' houses with stimulating 
intellectual and analytical ideas, that they might be left with less comfortable 
stimulations of uncertainty and worry. Over several months of interviewing, I learned (I 
think) to make distinctions - on the basis of demeanour, body language and more 
explicit articulations - between respondents who found some questions too difficult or 
intrusive and others who found them 'really interesting'. 
At the same time, as a number of writers point out, power relationships do not operate in 
one direction only during the interview process (Mason, 1996; Valentine, 1999). There 
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were times (particularly while interviewing 'busy' academics and people with 'friendly' 
dogs) when I felt powerless and cross. Returning to these busy, barking locations to 
interview partners was an ordeal. More worrying was the emotional cost and isolation 
entailed in being a research student interviewing people on sensitive and sometimes 
distressing topics. This anxiety was heightened by the tendency of some people (though 
by no means all) to see me as somebody who had 'answers' to some of the dilemmas 
which emerged during interview. This misperception derived I think from my combined 
status as both a researcher of stepfwnily life and as a direct participator in that life. 
When asked, or when I considered it appropriate, I gave telephone numbers of 
organisations, for example the Stepfamily Association, which might be useful. 
Negotiating respondent participation, confidentiality and consent 
I have described above the ways in which my sampling methods put me in touch with a 
number of potential participants. If in-depth interviewing is to be understood as some 
kind of conversation (Maynard and Purvis, 1994), then it suggests dialogue between 
those party to it. As Holland and Ramazanoglu (1994) insist, that dialogue should begin 
as early as possible in the research process. Initial contact with potential participants, 
whether made by me or through a third party (on the telephone or in person), began with 
some explanation of what my project was about, what I hoped to get out of it, what 
participation might entail in terms of time or venue, confidentiality and what the 
project's outcomes might be (seminars, publications and so on). Most of these issues 
were raised again and in more detail at the point of interview. It was also at this point 
that people asked about and/or I disclosed my own familiarity with the experiences I 
was researching. In the way people responded positively to this, there is little doubt that 
in terms of getting people to agree to talk to me, my own experience was an enabling 
factor. I recognise of course that this raises a number of ethical issues (see Finch, 1984). 
As stated above in my discussion of quota targets, some people declined at the point of 
initial contact to take part in my study. Although I assured all participants that they 
could withdraw at any point before or during interview, I realised that people found it 
hard to refuse. I repeated this at the point of interview in addition to saying that if there 
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was any topic they did not wish to discuss we could move on to something else. 
(Nobody withdrew during interview; two people requested me to move on to another 
subject). However, given as I have just said that people appeared to find it difficult to 
refuse me in the first place, I cannot be entirely certain to what extent they gave 
'informed consent' to be interviewed or felt free to withdraw. 
In all but one case, it was agreed that interviews would take place in respondents' own 
homes on the grounds that this was most convenient and congenial for them. Where this 
was not so for one woman with two young children, she asked, and we agreed, to meet 
at my home one evening. I suggested that interviews would take between one and two 
hours but possibly longer. I also mentioned that if they had no objections, I would like 
to tape-record their interviews. I raised this point again when I arrived for interview. I 
also said that I would be happy to answer questions about myself, but suggested that we 
leave them until after the interview. Most women (and two men) did ask me quite 
detailed questions about my own relationship changes and transitions. 
At the time of interview I raised again the question of confidentiality. As a number of 
writers point out (Sieber, 1992; Miles and Huberman, 1994), it is difficult to guarantee 
anonymity with the kind of contextual, in-depth data generated through such a study as 
mine. I talked to people about different ways in which my 'findings' may be 
disseminated, for example, through publications or seminars. I asked permission to use 
material from their interviews in these ways, adding that while I would change all names 
and locations of everybody mentioned during interview, I could not offer absolute 
guarantees that their own accounts would not be identified. 
I promised confidentiality, anonymity and privacy in relation to how and by whom their 
'data' (tapes, charts, fieldnotes or transcripts) were seen or handled. I guaranteed that I 
would transcribe all tapes, that I would not transcribe or use any material they asked me 
not to, and that I would not transcribe or use any material that I judged to be against 
their best interests (see Homan, 199 1; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 1 also asked them to 
treat as private and confidential the information I had given them about myself Nobody 
raised objections to my requests, but given that I myself was (and remain) unsure about 
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all the implications of my research in these respects, it is not wholly clear what I was 
promising and what they were consenting to. 
The research process: interpretation, analysis and explanation 
Many texts (Bryman, 1988; Dey, 1993, Silverman, 1993; Mason, 1996, Crang, 1997) 
remind qualitative researchers that if their work is to be convincing to themselves and 
others, their interpretations and analyses must be rigorous, their explanatory logic 
'transparent' (Mason, 1996). Faced with alarmingly large quantities of seemingly 
unconnected material - tapes, transcribed conversations, fieldnotes, notebooks, 
memories, memos, ideas and intuitions - the task of building an explanation which 
meets, or at least makes adequate response to, the intellectual, philosophical and ethical 
requirements raised in this chapter is daunting. 
Given the priority I assign to parents' own accounts, full transcriptions of my interviews 
was a priority. (The qualifier to 'full', as I stated above, was the decision not to 
transcribe anything people had asked me not to, or which I considered to be against their 
interests). Detailed transcription - which included pauses, laughter, silences, 
interruptions and indications of when people were upset (Silverman, 1993: 118-20) - 
put my interviews into a form which facilitated 'readings' of them not only at the 
interpretative level with which I was primarily concerned, but also at a literal and 
reflexive level too (Mason, 1996: 109). 
Although in some sense I probably regarded the task of analysis 'proper' as something 
to begin after transcription had ceased, it is clear - given the focus of my research 
question, my own knowledge of its lived realities, my reading round the topic, my 
planning and implementing of a research strategy and the hundreds of scribbled notes 
and memos I wrote along the way that this process had long since begun. The lengthy 
process of transcribing, mentally re-inscribing as it did the particularity and context of 
each interview, provided further food for interpretative and analytical thought. 
However, since it also generated a growing physical mass of data, the need to keep 
organisational and analytical pace was pressing. 
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Explanatory underpinnings: indexing and categorising 
In order to do this, I had to get some kind of overview of the data set as a whole. Cross- 
sectional indexing (or catcgorising or coding) which 'involves devising a consistent 
system for indexing the whole of a data set according to a set of common principles' 
(Mason, 1996: 111) allowed me not only to retrieve sections of text for the purpose of 
further analysis, it also provided me with initial ideas from which to commence detailed 
analysis and explanations., Indexing required systematic and painstaking, line by line 
scrutiny of my transcripts several times over, and trying to think how it related back to 
my research question and reading. This interactive or 'iterative' process of continuous 
movement between my research question, theory and data (Crang, 1997) was something 
I commenced during my pilot study. As ideas emerged, I jotted them down in the 
margins. These tended to make links and/or distinctions between what people said and 
what I had read in the research literature. They also noted similarities and differences 
between what was said in one interview and what had been said in others. In this they 
began the process of cross sectional analysis. 
Gradually, as jottings accumulated, I transferred them into a separate set of 'theoretical 
memos' (Crang, 1997: 186). From these I gained some ideas of recurring themes in the 
data and what might be worth pursuing. This began a more for-Mal process of indexing, 
developing a range of categories and applying them to different, and sometimes the 
same, sections of the text. Pursuing what might be relevant meant frantic searching 
through various bodies of literature from a variety of related disciplines for theories and 
ideas that made sense of - and did justice to - the complexities of my data. Although 
my theoretical readings in some ways directed me to look for particular issues and to 
develop interpretative categories in the light of them, I was also continually modifying 
these theories as new insights were generated from my data (see Skeggs, 1994). My 
approach was certainly one in which theory, data generation and analysis are 'developed 
simultaneously in a dialectical process' (Mason, 1996: 141; see also Stanley and Wise, 
1993: 155-6). 
Some categories worked well and were retained, others proved unworkable and were 
jettisoned. Those I ditched were those which did not seem directly relevant to the task 
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of building a systematic and coherent response to, or explanation of, the intellectual 
puzzle posed by my research question. It was at one such point that I had (reluctantly) 
to jettison 'space' as an interpretative category on account of its ill fit with the 
explanation I was building. Alternatively, some larger categories - for example, 
'family' - had to be broken down into smaller ones in order to fine tune its meanings. 
Agar (1986) rightly describes this tortuous process as 'maddeningly recursive'. In other 
words, as Crang so aptly puts it, development and progress can be made only through a 
series of 'breakdowns' (1997: 188). Producing a final, consistent and coherent set of 
cross-sectional categories which were supportable and had a degree of robustness, 
entailed processes of developing, defining, redefining, categorising and re-categorising 
(Crang, 1997: 190). 
Through such a series of 'breakdowns' I also learned that not all my data lent 
themselves to cross-sectional indexing with its search for patterns across the whole of a 
data set. For example, the analysis of how a person's childhood experience of being a 
stepchild influenced their role as a stepparent, focuses on complex social processes. To 
give an explanation of these processes, I had to commence with analysis of the holistic 
gunit' or case study (Mason, 1996: 130). This analytical approach is more sympathetic to 
understanding the importance of particularity and context. Taking 'slices' or 'chunks' 
out of such an account in the way cross-sectional analysis requires, is as inappropriate 
and insensitive as it sounds. 
In these kinds of contexts I therefore used non-cross-sectional forms of organising my 
data. Taking this combined approach to indexing was fundamentally important to the 
kinds of analyses and explanations I subsequently developed. Throughout this period, I 
interspersed re-readings of my transcripts with re-listening to my interview tapes. Not 
only did this re-immerse me in the context of specific interviews and familiarise me 
with all my data, it also made me scrutinise what influence my actions (demeanour, 
mood, interruptions, comments) may have had on data generation (see Crang, 
1997: 185). 
Finally, although I could have made use of computer software for cross-sectional 
indexing (it would not have been able to assist me in organising my data in non-cross- 
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sectional ways), I was concerned about how far my analytical activity would be 
inappropriately driven by a logic of variable analysis (see Agar, 1991; Lee and Fielding, 
1991; Miles and Huberman, 1994). More importantly, I wanted to go through, and 
understand, the process of analysis in a way I felt uncertain a computer package would 
allow. An additional concern was my isolated position as a lone researcher living at 
some distance from my academic institution. If things 'went wrong', and according to 
fellow researchers they often did, help would not be at hand. 
Building analyses and explanations 
As suggested above, the purpose behind indexing is linked to the kind of explanatory 
and analytical logic one intends to rely upon. The products of indexing are not an 
explanatory framework in themselves. They are an aid in making sense of materials, a 
means of conceptually organising data (Mason, 1996: 114-5; Crang, 1997: 188). The 
conceptual or interpretative categories generated from my data provided the mechanisms 
through which my interpretation and analysis were gradually made. Having cross- 
sectionally indexed parts of my data set, I was able to make cross-sectional analytical 
comparisons of themes or 'slices' from my data and to build comparative explanations 
from them (Mason, 1996: 117-38). 
Non-cross-sectional indexing supports an analytical logic whereby explanations proceed 
from analysis and comparison of holistic 'units' (or elements of them) rather than from 
slices or themes compared across a data set (Mason, 1996: 130-1). For example, having 
developed an explanation of how in one case parents reached a decision to bequeath 
their property equally to all their (step-) children, I then compared this first explanation 
with the explanation I developed around similar issues in a second case. Crucially, 
whichever analytical approach I took, the logic of my sampling methods which, as I 
showed above, ensured I captured a range of experiences and characteristics relevant to 
my research question, meant that socially meaningful comparisons and explanations 
could be made. 
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In combining these approaches and moving 'horizontally' and 'vertically' through my 
data, that is, building explanatory links across different transcripts as well as seeking to 
explain an unfolding story in one of them, it became clear that the complexity and detail 
of these realities could not be captured in any totalising discourse or 'grand narrative' 
explanation (see Blaikie, 1993; Stanley and Wise, 1993; Hekman, 1995). This is 
evidenced in the way that, at various points, I came across 'negative instances' of 
experiences or processes I was 'on the brink' of understanding and explaining. 
Sometimes this meant refining or modifying an explanation I was developing. 
Sometimes, I allowed these 'negative instances' or contradictions to stand. Following 
Skeggs (1994), 1 did not always use contradictions to refute or modify other evidence. 
Rather, I pursued them as part of the analysis, using them as a basis for further enquiry 
about how contradictions are experienced and lived (see Skeggs, 1994: 84). 
A convincing explanation? 
Trying to build a convincing explanation raises issues of reliability, validity and 
generalisability, concepts which require some redefinition in the context of qualitative 
research. If reliability in a qualitative research context can be taken to mean being 
careful, thorough, honest and accurate (Mason, 1996: 146) with the data one is handling, 
I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter how in my methodology and methods I have 
fulfilled requirements for being careful and thorough. Demonstrating honesty and 
accuracy in relation to my handling of data is a more difficult task, and is I believe, 
something which can more easily be judged in readings of my analysis chapters. It is 
perhaps most evident in how I introduce negative instances into my arguments and/or 
draw attention to the contradictions in what people say (see above). In many respects, 
these issues also relate to the concept of validity. 
Validity 
The question of a valid interpretation revolves in part around judgements about whether 
I have explained what I set out to explain. First, this relates to question about the 
validity of my data generation methods and how well these link to my research question. 
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I have tried to demonstrate that the right connecting links have been used and made. 
Second, validity relates to my interpretation. Although this relies in part on the validity 
of my methods, it goes much further. Specifically, it raises questions about whether the 
quality and rigour of my analysis makes my interpretation more compelling, persuasive 
and convincing than alternative ones. 
Throughout this discussion and in the analysis chapters which follow, I have tried to 
trace the route by which I reached the interpretation I did. A vital part of that travelling 
time was spent in detailed analysis of the data generated through my interviews, that is, 
in reaching an interpreting of respondents' own understandings of their experiences. 
Inextricably linked to this is the knowledge that I began this research J ourney as a value- 
laden, historically and geographically situated woman with her own experience and 
views of the topic under scrutiny. My fundamental standpoint - and on this I am 
probably unshakeable - is that I reject totalising discourses about the realities of 
stepfamily life, including I hope any to which I may be susceptible. In rejecting 
negative discourses as partial, that is, as incomplete and interested, I also reject wholly 
positive versions of that life (if they exist). This viewpoint is reflected in my analysis. 
Just as I reveal parents' ambivalences, uncertainties and negative feelings, I also reveal 
their qualitative opposites. 
Undoubtedly, I could have reached other interpretations had my experiential and 
theoretical routes been different and had I been differently positioned or located in other 
ways. By implication, somebody else's reading of my data would do this. To accept 
this is not to suggest that 'anything goes' or that all interpretations are equally valid. 
There are constraints - cultural, moral and theoretical - on what kinds of interpretations 
are acceptable or convincing (Sayer, 1992; Hekman, 1995; Graham, 1997). To accept 
the possibility of other valid interpretations does not invalidate my own (Holland and 
Ramazanoglu, 1994). If the requirement of a PhD is to produce an 'original' 
perspective, then I am reluctant to downplay or dilute what may be innovative, creative 
and different about my own. 
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Generalisability 
On the basis of my arguments above which defend the rigour and 'reliability' of my 
research methods and analysis, I now consider the possible wider resonances of my 
research. Given, as I argued in my discussion of sampling that no clearly defined 
empirical population of parents in stepfamilies exists, I am unable to make any 
generalisations on empirical grounds. Rather, my sampling approach offered 'a way of 
designing the variation of the conditions under which the phenomena is studied' (Flick, 
1998). In studying stepfamily life and seeing how it 'works' under different social 
conditions, and in developing an argument on the basis of that, my work contributes to 
wider theoretical debates. 
Conclusion 
in tracing the various 'stages' in the research process, this discussion has shown how 
research questions, sampling methods, analysis and explanation are not strictly 
sequential. They are implicated in, and rely upon each other. The requirements and 
definitions - intellectual, ethical, methodological and practical - of what counts as 
relevant are held in tension throughout. To some extent, each is compromised, none is 
fully or satisfactorily resolved. 
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Chapter 4 
Stepfamilies as Moral Places 
'I mean we're not married and it's difficult to get away from that. It's 
everywhere. I won't phone up the school if Liam's off ill or anything 
gcos you get 'Well who are youT 'Well I'm the partner' (laughter). You 
have to go through this whole rigmarole. And I think that people perhaps 
wouldn't (pause) ... maybe trust me or something. 'Cos the immediate 
thing about stepfamilies or boyfriends and things is that they must be 
abusive and all that kind of thing. So on the practical side of things, it's 
an effort to explain the situation. And then there's that kind of stuff 
about people's perceptions. 'Cos I mean they worry me. Yeah, they do. 
Of what people see as being non-married. Or rather, not just being non- 
married, but being a stepfamily. From a personal point of view, that 
people will see me as ... I don't know, some kind of a demon. I mean most 
of the stuff about child abuse is always stepparents, stepparents. Or 
boyffiends. ' (Roger Hunt, aged twenty-seven, emphasis in original). 
Introduction 
I have suggested in earlier chapters that until comparatively recently, theories of family 
and kinship have assumed ties of blood and marriage to be the 'natural' basis for family 
and kin relationships and that similar assumptions inform specific aspects of family law 
and social policy (see also Chapter 7). 1 argued that a single model of 'the family' 
outlined above has remained dominant, namely, that it is heterosexual, built around a 
married couple with their own genetic children who are conceived naturally without the 
use of reproductive technologies (Van Every, 1991/2; Bourdieu, 1996). Closely 
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connected to these positions are ideas that morally binding ties and solidarities, 
responsibilities and commitments are a 'natural' or 'given' feature only of these 
relationships. I also argued that these assumptions have been increasingly undermined 
through certain 'transformations' (Giddens, 1991; 1992) in people's understandings, 
expectations and experiences of their intimate relationships, and that these ideas have 
effected similar shifts in people's understandings, expectations and experiences of their 
family relationships more widely. 
Notwithstanding these changes, the so-called 'traditional' nuclear family remains a 
cherished institution in social and political discourse, serving as a powerful force in 
shaping popular conceptions of what properly constitutes family life. Thus the 
sentiments expressed in Roger Hunt's opening comments are echoed by others in this 
study who at different points in their relationship histories have felt the weight of what 
may be termed 'moral pressure' or 'moral disapproval'. It emanates from a number of 
sources including family, friends, school, church, politicians and the media. In broadest 
terms, 'moral' relates to distinctions between 'right' and 'wrong'. In this context, 
pressure to conform to what is 'right' or disapproval of what is 'wrong' is justified in 
terms of some absolute standard of what 'the family' ought to be and how it ought to 
conduct itself. Its targets are those whose 'family practices' (Morgan, 1996) diverge 
from the model referred to above. As Roger Hunt suggests, this censure may at times be 
explicitly mediated. At others it is implicit, its mediations more subtle, discursive and 
diffuse. 
Yet in the chapters which follow, it emerges clearly that in the ways respondents reflect 
upon the experience of change in their intimate and family relationships, 'moral voices' 
(Hekman, 1995) are indeed to be heard. For many people the processes through which 
family relationships are reordered and family boundaries redrawn cannot be separated 
from their moral thinking about these issues. Given this and given the way that making 
such claims is at odds with the positions outlined above, it is my intention in this 
chapter to justify intellectually the position I take throughout this study, namely, that 
family relationships - howsoever they are constituted - are centrally located in the moral 
domain. 
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In doing this, I draw substantially on the work of three major contemporary thinkers in 
this field: the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1993; 1995), the political and moral 
philosopher Seyla Benhabib (1992), and the political scientist Susan Hekman (1995). 
While this chapter is not intended as an in-depth analysis of material from my data - 
such analyses are made in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8-I do use, where appropriate, some 
illustrative examples from my data to make key points. I begin by defining what is 
meant by morality and ethics. I move then to detailed and critical analysis of Bauman's 
arguments about relationship change. Finally, I examine alternative ways of thinking 
about these issues which better capture the ways they emerge from my data. 
Morality and ethics 
I suggested above that in broadest terms morality relates to distinctions between 'good' 
and 'evil' or 'right' and 'wrong'. It is notable that few contemporary writers in this field 
attempt more precise definitions. Many of them restrict themselves, and morality, to 
debates around justice and care. Pritchard (1991) suggests that while it maybe difficult 
to be definitive about what morality is, it is something with which we are all familiar. 
This is by virtue of being moral agents, that is, through our daily confrontation with 
what we take to be instances of generosity and selfishness, fairness and unfairness, 
kindness, cruelty and so on. He suggests that we are broadly familiar, too, with what 
eighteenth century writers called 'moral sentiments' - resentment, indignation, guilt, 
shame, pride, sympathy, compassion, benevolence, etc. For Pritchard, these sentiments 
constitute an essential part of our 'moral sensibilities' - our self-respect, sense of 
dignity, sense ofjustice, respect for others and concern for others' well-being (Pritchard, 
1991: 1). 
Pritchard is not advancing this model of morality as definitive. He utilises it to convey a 
sense of how morality may be understood to encompass a broad range of issues and 
concerns, and also how it engages our 'moral emotions' (Bauman, 1993,1995; 
Pritchard, 1991). In his view -a view increasingly shared by contemporary writers in 
the field of morality and ethics - morality forms an integral part of our self-identity and 
daily lives. We are existentially moral beings, standing always in a situation of moral 
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choice (Bauman, 1993,1995; Hekman, 1995). What we do, how we deal with these 
issues and translate our concerns into practice, is what is commonly understood by the 
term 'ethics', 'ethical practice', or as some writers prefer, 'moral practices' (a term used 
by some writers to distance themselves from the underlying assumptions of traditional 
ethical theories). 
Modem and postmodem perspectives on morality 
As Hekman (1995) insists, moral discourse is a 'deadly serious business' (1995: 114). 
Almost by definition - as the opening comment to this chapter makes clear - it entails 
the assertion of certain sets of values over and above others. This implies a hegemony 
or hierarchy of moral discourses in which those which are dominant marginalize or 
silence the voices of others (Hekman, 1995: 39). In the context of my research these are 
important issues. 
It is perhaps not surprising that as family forms and boundaries become more fluid, as 
they slip and slide from the 'traditional' norm, their moral status is perceived as 
slippery, too. This perception has resulted in attempts to 'remoralize the family, to 
restore to it the responsibilities for its own welfare and to revive the traditional values of 
family life' (Clarke, Cochrane and Smart, 1987: 138). In political rhetoric, these 
attempts have frequently been framed in a language of return and restoration - 'back to 
basics', 'old virtues, 'traditional' or 'Victorian' family values. And when this cannot 
be achieved through simple exhortation, then family law and policies are implemented 
which may more accurately be characterised in terms of moral regulation than 
supportive family policy (Rodger, 1996). It is as if in the midst of social change and 
uncertainty 'the family' must remain unchanged, 'frozen' in some idealised form 
(Smart, 1997). 
However, I undertake this discussion with the assumption that diversity in 'family 
practices' (Morgan, 1996) is here to stay. Attempts to 'remoralize' families in terms of 
the dominant model outlined above are therefore futile and misguided. At the root of 
such manoeuvres lies a particular view, not only of 'the family', but also of morality, 
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moral agency and human nature, namely, that our ethical competence is minimal. If left 
to ourselves, we will get things 'wrong'. There can be no morality without clear ethical 
rules and codes. On this view, morality is identified narrowly with sexual morality 
(Smart, 1995: 89) and is something that must be imposed from some external source. 
Only thus can we ensure that families get it 'right'. Yet, as Hauerwas and MacIntyre 
(19 83) have noted: 
,... history suggests that in those periods when a social order becomes 
uneasy and even alarmed about the weakening of its moral bonds and the 
poverty of its moral inheritance and turns for aid to the moral philosopher 
and theologian, it may not find these disciplines flourishing in such a way 
as to be able to make available the kind of moral reflections and theory 
which the culture actually needs' (Hauerwas and MacIntyre, 1983: vii). 
As Bauman rightly argues, it is precisely because there is diversity, not uniformity, that 
there is little demand for the skills which ethical and cultural legislators, 'the designers 
and guardians of proper cultural standards', prided themselves on earlier in the modem 
era (1995: 238). It is not that characteristically modem, moral concerns are abandoned. 
What we reject are the typically modem pathways to responding to, or 'solving' moral 
problems - through normative regulation or through the search for philosophical and 
ethical absolutes, universals or foundations (Bauman, 1993: 2-4; 1995: 1). 
Applying these ideas to my study, if dominant moral discourses on 'the family' insist on 
defining people's changing practices in terms of a 'weakening of moral bonds, ' or 
worse, moral bankruptcy, it is unsurprising that those individuals caught at the sharp end 
of such definitions turn away from institutions traditionally associated with explicating 
and validating ethical practice, and seek guidance, affirmation and legitimation from 
alternative sources, including, it may be argued, their own. This is not to suggest that 
we will produce more 'good' and less 'evil' or that our moral dilemmas will be less 
haunting. What Bauman means is that individual men and women have the chance to 
discover in themselves the sources of moral power (1995: 42-43). In arguing thus, his 
vision is compelling. Yet, turning to his discussion of postmodern intimacy, this 
confident and optimistic outlook is all but abandoned. 
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A postmodern morality play: Bauman's four love strategies 
In his two works Postmodern Ethics (1993) and Life in Fragments (1995), Bauman 
makes substantial claims about the intimate life strategies of men and women in late or 
post- modernity. Some of his ideas draw direct inspiration from the work of Giddens 
(1991; 1992) specifically Giddens' concepts of 'pure relationship' and 'confluent love'. 
I suggested in Chapter 2 that while these concepts are suggestive for the analysis of 
certain aspects of intimate and other family relationships, their conceptual adequacy 
remains problematic given other findings to emerge in family studies more widely 
(Finch, 1989; Stacey, 1991; Finch and Mason, 1993; Smart, 1999). 
Following Giddens (1991; 1992) Bauman argues that the modem age has forced men 
and women to become individuals, their lives 'split' into a variety of different roles and 
functions, each to be pursued in different contexts. The gradual loosening of the grip of 
tradition, particularly in the management of individual conduct, has given individuals 
some freedom to choose, to make evaluations about different courses of action (1993: 4- 
6). Bauman contends that these processes have given rise to the distinctive features of 
late or post-modemity: lives that are fragmented and episodic, marked by preferences 
for non-binding commitments and an impatience with anything which limits choice 
(1995: 8-9). Moving from life contexts in general, Bauman carries these ideas into the 
sphere of personal relationships. In a bleak and uncompromising account, he analyses 
what he claims are the now 'common traits' of intimacy under contemporary, late or 
post-modem conditions. 
His main contention is that the 'postmodern experience of intimacy derives its identity 
from eliminating all reference to moral duties and obligations' (1993: 105). Our lives 
are guided by three principles: keeping our options open, avoiding commitment and a 
wariness of mortgaging the future (1995: 80). Ours is the age, he claims, of Giddens' 
&pure relationship' and 'confluent love'. Drawing satisfaction by each partner is the 
only justification for keeping an encounter going. The parallels with Giddens' ideas are 
striking. Relationships, or what Bauman calls 'encounters' (a word which connotes 
what is casual, unexpected, or even conflictual), are by nature 'fragmentary' and 
'episodic'. That is, we do not fully engage in relationships and we act within them as if 
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they have no past and no future (Bauman, 1995: 49). The most important consequence 
of our relationships is precisely their lack of consequences. In other words, our 
relationships do not leave a lasting legacy of mutual roots and obligations. 
Bauman develops this line of argument through four 'love strategies' which, he claims, 
characterise the postmodem. era. In what amounts to a postmodern morality play, these 
strategies are presented through a series of extended metaphors in which ýPlay' and 
'inconsequentiality' are recurring motifs. In the way we conduct relationships, we are, 
he suggests, 'strollers', 'vagabonds', 'tourists' and 'players'. Together, these four 
figures reflect our horror of being bound and fixed. Like the stroller or 'flaneur' of the 
modem city, we act towards each other as strangers in a crowd, viewing human reality 
as a series of episodes and events without a past and with no consequences. As 
vagabonds, we are wayward and erratic, unsettled and unstable. Like players, we enjoy 
a world of risks in which each game has a beginning and end and no consequences. 
Partners and players must beware that what they do is just a game' and justify their 
moves accordingly. Finally, as tourists, we are always on the move, seekers of new 
experience, difference and novelty (Bauman, 1995: 91- 100). 
Separation and divorce: 'just a game'? 
Compelling as these metaphors are, in the context of this study (and it may be assumed 
Bauman's arguments are aimed directly at those who separate and divorce) they remain 
little more than figures of speech. Against his fundamental claim that we are against 
4strings attached' and that we aim at relationships that are discontinuous and have no 
consequences (1995: 100,155) respondents make it clear that this is neither possible nor 
desirable. Relationships with children and - surprisingly perhaps - those with former 
partners are viewed as being hugely consequential. 
Relationships with formerpartners 
It emerges clearly from respondents' accounts that separation and divorce do indeed 
leave a lasting or long-term legacy. This is evident in how men and women reflected 
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(unprompted) upon their movements into and out of relationship and how they attempt 
to make coherent sense of their partnership histories. This is captured in the following 
illustrative examples: 
'There appears to be a presumption that we can, or we ought to be able 
to, manage endings of events like this in a way that is not only civilised 
but 'all right'. And the events, certainly for me, are not all right, in terms 
of what I expected and wanted and thought. And so that's very hard ... It's 
some combination of what we had together, and anxiety, guilt, I don't 
know ... for me it's still not resolved. There are lots of these things that 
are still there, about how it might have been, and what if I'd done this... 
(Charlie Summers, aged fifty-three). 
Similarly: 
'It's quite hard, I come from a church tradition which really finds divorce 
very difficult ... I think my views have changed. I think I regard it as 
possible now, whereas at the time I didn't think it was possible for me ... I 
had to think that one out ... And it took a while ... Otherwise I guess my life 
would have been very different. I might have been divorced a long time 
ago ... I'm not sure I can ever view the whole thing with total equanimity 
and feel that this is now totally satisfactory .. It's not what I would have 
wished (Mike Morton, aged fifty-four)'. 
In the following extract, Maijoric Phillips compares her feelings about her two previous 
marriages, the first of which ended in death, the second one in divorce: 
'To me, divorce is far more painful than death, because you feel a failure. 
I felt a failure. I felt that death, the death of my first husband, was 
something I could understand. Death was just one of those things that 
happened ... you're not responsible for it. But with a marriage breakdown, 
I feel, you know, that in some way, you're at fault as well' (Maijorie 
Phillips, aged fifty-six). 
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It is clear from the above examples that it is precisely because these relationships were 
not 'just a game' or 'played with the intention of inconsequentiality' that they do leave a 
lasting legacy, and continue to pose moral dilemmas for people. And although it may be 
argued that those aged fifty and above are more likely to be concerned about the moral 
stigma of divorce (given they reached adulthood only as divorce rates began to increase) 
this link is not straightforward (see Chapter 8). If in Bauman's terms these people have 
'failed' in the 'art' of episodic encounters, it is clear their 'failure' is to be understood in 
terms of having aimed at, and expected, a very different kind of encounter from that 
proposed by Bauman. In asserting that we aim at short-term intimate relationships 
Bauman imposes a conceptual framework which fails to distinguish between intentions 
and outcomes. In other words, the moral significance of relationships - the meanings, 
investments and commitments we bring to them - cannot be 'read off or inferred in any 
straighyorward wayfrom the duration orfrequency of them. 
The above examples suggest that we can no longer (if indeed we ever could) chart a life 
journey or the trajectories of our relationships and be certain of their outcomes. If 
people continue - as they do in this study - to believe that long-term commitment in 
relationships is both possible and desirable, even though experience has taught them it is 
not always obtainable, then this shows they are able to live with contradictions in their 
lives. In following Giddens' emphasis on agency - undeniably a crucial concept to 
retain - Bauman also overestimates the amount of control individuals may have over 
their life strategies, and underestimates the various constraints which may be imposed 
upon them. As Maclean and Eekelaar (1997) observe, we live in an age where there are 
deep uncertainties about what marriage means. If it is not a long-term commitment, if it 
is not enduring, then it raises the question of what its purpose is (1997: 10). 
Although at one point Bauman does concede that social forces militate against the 
achievement of lasting friendships, marriages and partnerships (1995: 100-101), and 
does recognise that society sets limits on the life strategies which can be practised, he 
remains unimaginative about what those limits and constraints might be. In alluding 
solely to capitalism he appears ignorant of wider constraints, those experiences of 
poverty, death, violence, mental illness, unemployment and sheer misery which haunt 
the relationship histories of women and men in this study. 
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Most importantly, Bauman, like Giddens (1991; 1992), fails to recognise the role of 
children in adults' relationships and the constraints children impose upon them. As I 
argued in my review of the literature, pure relationships - and the postmodern love 
strategies - connote individuals who are, and remain, curiously free-floating, who move 
from one encounter to another with no pain of detachment, untouched and unhampered 
by relationships with family or children. It is in listening to parents' accounts of their 
relationships with children that the most serious challenge to Bauman's claims is posed. 
Moral dimensions of relationships between parents and (step)children 
Children at the 'moralparty' 
The core of Bauman's argument is that pure relationship is pure not just because it is 
emancipated from the social functions - reproduction, kinship and generation - which 
intimate relations once served, but also, and primarily, because it 'neutralises' the moral 
impulse and denies the moral significance of intimate relationships. Through the 
practices associated with the various love strategies, we 'suspend' our identity as moral 
subjects for the duration (1993: 106). Central to Bauman's position is his claim that 
with the inevitability of choice, the moral responsibilities of the actor become profound 
and consequential (1995: 6-7). 'Following the moral impulse means assuming 
responsibility for the Other, which in turn leads to the engagement in the fate of the 
Other and commitment to her or his welfare' (1995: 100, italics in original). It is this 
relationship of emotional engagement, of caring for others, which creates moral 
intimacy or what Bauman calls 'the moral party of two'. Only through emotional 
engagement do we make ourselves responsible for others and for the choices we make 
in relation to them (1995: 61-63). 
These ideas raise some difficulties. First, Bauman's conclusion that in relationship we 
suspend our identity as moral subjects awkwardly contradicts his earlier arguments that 
we are existentially moral beings. Nor does he suggest how and at what point that 
identity may be picked up again. Secondly, and more importantly, his assertions that 
children are often discounted are seriously undermined when placed alongside empirical 
studies in this field (see for example Maclean, 1991; Maclean and Eekelaar 1997; Kier 
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and Lewis, forthcoming). This is made plain in the following example where Dave 
Hughes reflects upon the implications of his relationship with his new partner and her 
young son from her former marriage: 
'I did think about all these things before getting married ... I've been 
around since before Joseph was born, since Marion was six months 
pregnant with him. And from the time he was born, every day I've 
looked after him, cleared up after him ... I knew all along when I was 
going out with Marion that it wasn't just about going out with her, it was 
always about Joseph too. He was part of everything we'd done 
really ... And I didn't mind that at all. It just didn't seem an option 'cos 
Marion had been left before Joseph was born. And she and Joseph are 
very close, and I don't think she would ever consider going out with 
someone who didn't recognise that. The getting married was a big thing 
in acknowledging that side of things' (Dave Hughes, aged twenty-seven). 
There is clear evidence here that Dave Hughes is knowingly mortgaging his future. Nor 
does he seem uneasy about the kinds of commitments and obligations he is building. 
Certainly his young stepson, Joseph, is not discounted as the mere 'side-effects' of his 
new partner's former marriage. This is reflected in my data more widely. It will be seen 
in Chapters 5 and 6 that children and their interests - at least when they are of dependent 
age - are centrally positioned in people's representations of their close family 
relationships. Invariably this is expressed in the moral language of obligation, 
commitment and responsibility. This language also characterises the following example 
in which Ken Phillips, a stepfather of twenty-five years' standing, recalls his movement 
into that role and relationship with his two young stepsons: 
'It was the first time I got married, see. But they was well 
behaved ... They weren't causing any bother ... And well, I did want to 
marry the mother. And I accepted that if I wanted one, I would have to 
have the other. But I was willing anyway. But she was a bit dubious 
because she thought it was a lot for me to take on. So she kept on, when 
I said about us getting married, two or three times she said 'No'... But she 
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might've thought that after a couple of years he'll be walking out like the 
other one did because he can't cope with all this. 'Cos if you've had it 
happen to you once, you wouldn't want it to happen to you again. Not 
really. Once is enough. So I can understand from that point of view that 
she wanted to be a bit cautious' (Ken Phillips, aged fifty-eight). 
These examples demonstrate how these relationships have from the start an inescapably 
moral dimension. Against Bauman's complaint that nothing solid is sedimented by 
relationships, children's 'solidity' and the heavy demands their physical presence makes 
on resources, challenges such a notion. As Smart (1997) remarks 'Children stop 
confluent love in its tracks' (1997: 314). Their presence requires newcomers on the 
scene to engage at once with the practical, emotional and moral implications of, not just 
one relationship, but possibly several. New partners face stark choices between 
commitment avoidance or mortgaging their futures; between taking on the whole 
'package' of parent and child or keeping their options open and losing the chance of a 
particular relationship altogether. 
What is striking about these examples then, and follows from the logic of what people 
say both here and in later chapters, is that children are centrally located in people's 
conceptions of moral responsibility, central that is, to that relationship of emotional 
engagement, caring and commitment which in Bauman's view creates the 'moral party'. 
This suggests that in the same way women and men in this study challenge Giddens' 
notion of a reflexive project based solely on the sey' , they similarly challenge Bauman's 
notion of a moral party based solely on membership of two. Data generated through my 
research indicate that commitment and responsibility reach beyond Bauman's 'moral 
party of two', beyond those two adults most immediately and intimately caught in 
relationship change, to include other family members, primarily children, but others too. 
I draw on this 'enlarged' version of Bauman's concept of 'moral party' at several points 
below and in subsequent chapters. 
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Stepparents: latecomers to the 'moralparty' 
There are glimpses too in some of these examples of the beginnings or early stages of 
those processes Finch and Mason (1993) have identified whereby family members - in 
this case new partners - begin to build up moral reputations and moral identities. 
Following Becker's (1960) insights, Finch and Mason argue that these are developed 
through the kinds of commitments or 'investments' people make to other family 
members over time. In this way, moral reputations are 'negotiated' (1993: 158-159). 
Evidence from my data more widely suggest that in many cases the moral and material 
'valuables' respondents created through association with their 'old' families have indeed 
been lost. People are perceived to have abandoned their commitment to a particular 
relationship path. Not only that, but as Bauman (1993; 1995) claims, they are perceived 
to have abandoned any consequences or responsibilities associated with that 
relationship. Experiences of separation, divorce, remarriage or repartnering are not yet 
widely associated with the development of a 'good' moral reputation. 
Arguably, parents in all families have concerns about their moral reputations. But given 
the question mark under which parents in stepfamilies may perceive themselves to be 
living - in relation to their capacities for responsibility, trustworthiness, stability and 
commitment - it is conceivable that their anxieties about moral reputation are 
experienced in a particularly acute form. 'Latecomers' to the moral party have not yet 
had the opportunity to build or negotiate their moral identities and reputations with their 
6new' families. This suggests some pressure on them to invest heavily in their 'new' 
relationships in terms of these kinds of capacities. They therefore have to be prepared to 
make a substantial commitment to all those, including children, who are already there. 
There may be little room for manoeuvre or negotiation as far as the moral terms of their 
relationship with a new partner is concerned. 
Stepfamilies and moral reflexivity 
Moral issues are forced onto the agenda in stepfamilies which force parents to confront 
a series of dilemmas for which there are few normative guidelines. In Bauman's view, 
it is precisely this kind of dilemma - one for which there is no ethical blueprint - which 
distinguishes late or post-modem morality from more orthodox understandings of moral 
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life. Ethical theories of the modem age are ill-equipped to cope with the range and scale 
of moral choices now facing us (1993: 2-4). This suggest that if we want to understand 
the significance of people's moral thinking in these contexts, we need to stop talking 
about family moralities in terms of what families are not doing or ought to do, and look 
instead at what they do. 
I am not of course claiming that stepfamilies are more moral than other families. Rather 
I am suggesting that because stepfamilies are required to confront certain issues which 
do not arise in 'intact' families, they are likely to engage critically with moral discourses 
on 'the family' which ignore the specificities and complexities of the contexts in which 
their own ethical decisions are made. In this study it will be seen that such issues 
include the comparative significance of blood ties and step-ties; assumptions that 
divorce and separation sever ties of attachment and responsibility towards family 
members some define as 'ex'; the divergent interests of children and parents in relation 
to contact, and the concept of fairness and how this is to be (re)fonnulated in relation to 
inheritance. In negotiating these issues, in being forced to question the values and 
scrutinise the assumptions of hegemonic moral codes designed for the 'traditional' 
nuclear family, stepfamilies are likely to become practised in being morally reflexive. 
In the following section I examine the work of other key writers in this field. In doing 
this, I acknowledge a huge and prior debt to the work of Carol Gilligan. Contemporary 
debates in moral theory - as well as those in the related fields of feminism, 
epistemology, methodology and theories of the subject - were revolutionised by 
publication in 1982 of her work In a Different Voice, an empirical study of the decision- 
making process of young women confronted with a series of moral dilemmas (Gilligan, 
1982; see also Hekman, 1995). Against Kohlberg, who concluded that women's 
inferior moral reasoning left them at a lower stage of moral development than men, 
Gilligan argued that the women she interviewed articulated their moral dilemmas 'in a 
different voice', one which is equal, not inferior, to men's. 
While both critics and defenders of her work have been fierce in their response, many 
would agree that her lasting contribution to moral theory is in terms of making us aware 
of the implicit models of selfhood, autonomy, impartiality and justice which are 
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sustained and privileged there (Benhabib, 1992: 170). Most importantly for what I am 
arguing here, her work on the 'different voice' gives a new perspective on relationships, 
one which in her words, 'expands the moral domain' (Gilligan, 1982: 173). It is her 
work with its insights into the relational - and by implication, familial - dimension of 
moral life, which enables 'voices' heard in this study to press for inclusion. 
Morality begins at home 
Moral subjects and moral domains 
As Hekman (1995) argues, Gilligan's work in moral psychology and moral philosophy 
may be viewed as evidence of a 'sea change' in late twentieth century thought. As I 
argued in Chapter 3, in almost every branch of intellectual life there has been a move 
away from the universalism and absolutism of modernist epistemology towards 
conceptions which emphasise particularity and concreteness. The focal point of this 
shift has been the centrepiece of modernist, Enlightenment philosophy and 
epistemology: 'man', the rational, abstract, autonomous constitutor of knowledge. In 
opposition to this (Cartesian) conception of the subject, many twentieth century thinkers 
advance a subject who is embedded or situated, constituted by language, culture, 
discourse and history (Hekman, 1990,1995; Weedon, 1987). 
Given the importance of the former model in moral philosophy, particularly since the 
eighteenth century, it is unsurprising that this discipline has proved one of those most 
resistant to change. The paradigm of this tradition is Kant's self-legislating moral 
subject, one whose moral development is understood in terms of the evolution of an 
autonomous, separate and rational self, removed from relationships and the 
connectedness of everyday life, who eventually becomes capable of applying abstract, 
universal principles to moral problems (Hekman, 1995: 4,30). Crucially, as Tronto 
(1993) points out, in conceptualising the moral subject as separate and autonomous, the 
moral realm is also defined in terms of a separate, autonomous sphere. For as Gilligan 
(1982) has shown - and in this lies one of her major themes and contributions - 
selfhood and morality are intimately linked. Subjects develop moral voices as a 
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function of the emergence of selfhood. Their definition of the moral realm, and of what 
constitutes a moral problem in the first place, is necessarily structured by the conception 
of the self that informs it (Gilligan, 1982; Hekman, 1995: 5-6). 
Kant's emphasis on separateness and autonomy structures his notion of morality and the 
ethical life. Morality has to be severed from its social and political connections because, 
it is argued, these are matters of personal rather than moral interest. What he and others 
term the 'moral point of view' consists of principles that are impartial, of universal 
applicability, concerned with matters of public justice and rights (Tronto, 1993: 27-28). 
On this view, the link between morality and men's traditional sphere of activity - the 
polity or public realm - is evident. As Held (1987) has said, these moral agents 
resemble adult, male heads of households acting in the market-place with like others. It 
is from here that Kohlberg derives his notions of moral development and maturity. And 
as Gilligan and other feminist writers have been swift to point out, a moral point of view 
which so privileges economic or political man, and justice and rights, thereby renders 
morally invisible and morally inaudible women's traditional sphere of activity - the 
domestic, the familial, the relational. 
For what is extraordinary about the Kantian paradigm is its neglect of what Held (1987) 
has called the genealogy of the self. In other words, it ignores the reality that we are 
children before we are adults. As Benhabib (1992) assumes, the moral subject is a 
human infant whose body can only be kept alive and whose 'self' can only develop 
within the community. It becomes a 'self', capable of speech and action, only through 
human interaction. As children, we can only survive and develop within networks of 
dependence on 'concrete' others - family members, friends, and others we know in the 
community. Not only as children, but as adults too, as concrete, embodied beings, with 
needs and vulnerabilities, desires and emotions, we spend our lives caught in what 
Gilligan (1982) calls networks of 'care and dependence'. From these networks, we can, 
as autonomous adult individuals begin to consider the moral claims of 'general others', 
those beyond family and friends (1992: 5,10,50). 
Despite its associations with Kantian theory, Benhabib, like others (Pritchard, 1991; 
Hekman, 1995) is reluctant to jettison entirely the concept of moral autonomy 
87 
(particularly in rclation to women) because of its associations with agency, 
accountability, intentionality, and resistance. She argues that it can be retained if it is 
understood as the process, not of moving out of relationship, but of growth, change and 
moral maturation within it. It is for these reasons that she resists a more explicitly 
postmodcrn perspective on subjectivity or a strong version of the 'Death of the Subject' 
argument. Thus she would reject a subject strategy such as Butlcr's (1990) or Hckman's 
(1995) whose discursive subject emerges entirely through discursive relations, and for 
whom agency is a product of discourse, on the grounds that it insufficiently explains 
how the individual can be constituted by discourse and yet not be determined by it 
(Bcnhabib, 1992: 214-218). 
Through these 'contingent processes of socialisation' an individual's self-identity 
develops and 'becomes capable of projecting a narrative into the world of which she is 
not only the author but the actor as well' (Benhabib: 1992: 5,126; see also Hekman, 
1995: 7-8). The link between narrative and selfhood has of course been explored by a 
number of writers. And indeed, as I shall show in later chapters, the ways in which 
individual men and women position themselves in relation to intimate and more distant 
others in these domains, are central to their understandings of their narrative histories. 
Following Gilligan's lead on the link between selfbood and morality, these stories have 
also to make moral sense to the teller or author. Importantly, because women's sphere 
of activity has traditionally been concentrated in the domain where children are raised, 
human relationships maintained, traditions handed down, the female experience has 
been more attuned to the narrative structure of experience and the standpoint of the 
'concrete other'. In dealing with concrete individuals, their wants and needs, 'women as 
primary caregivers have had to exercise insight into the claims of the particular' 
(Benhabib, 1992: 14; see also Hekman, 1995: 125). 
The importance of drawing attention to both 'concrete' and 'general' others means that 
we must not privilege justice in the moral domain as traditional theories have done. The 
moral domain includes life in the family no less than life in the state. On these grounds, 
Benhabib rejects - as I do - Kohlberg's view that 'the spheres of kinship, love, 
friendship and sex that elicit considerations of care are usually understood to be spheres 
of personal decision-making as are, for instance, the problems of marriage and divorce' 
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(Kohlberg: 229-230). She insists that to view these as personal rather than moral issues 
runs counter to our moral intuitions. The moral issues which preoccupy us most - and 
this is made plain by respondents in this study - derive not from problems in the 
economy and the polity but precisely from the quality of our relationships with others. 
On this view, responsibility and relations of care are at the centre, not the margins of 
morality (Benhabib, 1992: 153,184). 
Resisting an essentialist or definitive morality 
In foregrounding the familial and relational context of moral subjectivity and moral 
practice, it is not my intention to frame a morality in oppositional terms nor build a 
different set of essentialist criteria or definitive claims. Critics and defenders of Gilligan 
have become obsessed with the hierarchy of justice and care. Defenders of modernist 
theory argue justice subsumes care. Feminist critics say Gilligan perpetuates women's 
inferiority by emphasising traditional differences. Feminist defenders enlist Gilligan as 
an ally in their arguments for the superiority of the care voice. Following Hekman's 
lead, this obsession is not only unhelpful, it is ultimately futile (1995: 10). 
For as Tronto (1993) has shown, these rigid 'moral boundaries' were not drawn until 
relatively recently, that is, since the close of the eighteenth century when a series of 
social transformations required people to re-think existing moral boundaries. At that 
time - and indeed considerably earlier if one considers Aristotelian ethics with its view 
that the moral life is a virtuous disposition - morality did concern itself with the local 
and particular. The local and particular was the only world people knew. Context and 
connection were important for shaping individuals' dispositions or inner qualities. 
Thus, the 'moral sentiments' referred to earlier - resentment, indignation, guilt, shame, 
pride, sympathy, compassion and benevolence (Pritchard, 1991: 1) - started from daily 
moral life and formed as much a part of men's moral thinking as women's. 
But as Tronto goes on to argue, with the emergence of global, commercial societies, 
concerns for and about distant others became morally relevant. Moral criteria resting on 
a particular social context appeared inadequate. Universal moral criteria became 
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increasingly relevant and important. While a universal morality need not assume 
proximity amongst members of the same moral community, it did assume a shared 
commitment to the same rules. This was useful in the context of a geographically large, 
diverse and market-oriented world, implying as it did that one did not need to fear the 
immoral conduct of intimate or distant others. The historical circumstances of the 
eighteenth century thus led to the development of arguments which contained both 
women and moral sentiments within the domestic sphere. In these ways, Tronto 
suggests, more domestic understandings about moral development became gendered 
(Tronto, 1993: 26). 
While it may be argued that Tronto's arguments oversimplify the processes through 
which gendered understandings of morality emerged - and by implication the processes 
through which they may be eradicated - they make the point that in any age, moral 
theory addresses the kinds of moral questions that seem most urgent at the time. What 
constitutes morality or the moral domain is shaped by the historical, social, political and 
intellectual aspects of life at any given time (Tronto, 1993: 28). Morality is not 
therefore something fixed or immutable, but arises, as Tronto suggests, out of the 
ongoing practices of a group of people (1993: 62). 
Specifically, Tronto's account challenges gendered ideas about morality. If historically, 
men as well as women have been morally attuned to the concrete and particular, this 
means that we have to stop talking about 'women's morality' in terms of care and the 
non-rational. By implication (and as I suggested in chapter 2 in my review of the 
research literature), this means that we cannot view 'men's morality' solely in terms of 
justice and rights. We need to try and displace oppositional thought about justice and 
care and view both as having a relational basis, and both as being primary dimensions of 
moral development and maturity - for women and men (Hekman, 1995: 10,24; 
Benhabib, 1992). 
Furthermore, we need to move away from preoccupations with 'the' different voice and 
talk about different moral voices. As I suggested in Chapter 3, multiple subjectivities 
imply multiple moral voices (Hekman, 1995: 65). Without denying the significance of 
gender as a factor in the development or constitution of moral subjectivity, it 
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nonetheless remains but one factor. We need to address the implications for morality of 
other factors - class, ethnicity, age, and culture (1995: 21). Hekman's conception of 
subjectivity as discursively constituted means, as others argue, that morality is culturally 
constituted and culturally located. 
Importantly, Hekman makes the point that although moral beliefs vary across cultures, 
this does not mean they are arbitrary (1995: 159). Cultures provide us not only with a 
moral practice but also with characteristic parameters to it. This brings me back to my 
earlier point that stepfamily moral practices are likely to incorporate many of the values 
- responsibility, commitment, stability, fairness - which inform. and preoccupy moral 
practices in 'intact' families. Wolfe (1989) suggests that morality may matter most 
during certain highlighted moments in the life course - marriage, death and, as I am 
arguing, divorce, remarriage or repartnering - those points of passage from one 
structural status to another. These are 'bracketed moments' in people's lives and they 
make it possible for people to account for what they are doing by reflecting on the moral 
consequences of their actions and experiences. The 'moral passages' people go through 
help them make sense of the situations they find themselves in (Wolfe, 1989: 214-215). 
Conclusion 
While moral values in stepfamilies are not likely to be oppositional to dominant moral 
values, they are likely, as Hekman's arguments suggest, to be re-worked to meet the 
demands of the more complex family situations in which people find themselves. We 
do not all speak the same moral discourse. We use the discursive tools available to us to 
create an ethic or moral practice appropriate to our needs. What we fashion will differ 
according to a range of factors - class, age, gender and so on. Moral practices are 
therefore flexible and evolving rather than static and fixed. And if, as Hekman 
contends, moral practices like languages are subject to change, not so much from 
external pressure, but from practitioners, then individuals' narratives of their moral life 
provide a valuable resource for exploring such change. It is to some such moral 




Inclusions and Exclusions,, Commitments and 
Contingencies 
'It's difficult. I know I'm contradicting myself .. I don't really know what I 
think ... I still think of Lizzie as my niece really, but if that's the case, then she 
should be on this chart somewhere ... It's very complicated ... I don't think it's just 
the divorce. It's also the remarriage, Alan remarrying and me remarrying. It 
changed things, more than I thought it would ... I think it would have been far 
easier to stay much more in touch with Lizzie and her mum, to stay close to 
them, had I not got involved with someone else ... All I know now is that I can't 
look on them as family .. I think of them as 'ex-family'. At takes time for things to 
settle down when they've all been thrown up in the air ... But apparently his new 
wife's pregnant and I don't know how that might affect his contact with Joseph. 
So things are changing again (laughter)' (Marion Hughes, aged 33, emphasis in 
original). 
Introduction 
It was shown in Chapter 2 how until comparatively recently many social and 
anthropological theories have assumed ties of 'blood' along with those of marriage, to 
be the 'natural' basis of family and kinship in western cultures and societies (Schneider, 
1968). This chapter explores how, in the light of separation, divorce and repartnering, 
people's perspectives on who or what constitutes 'family' are fundamentally revised or 
changed. As the opening comment to this chapter indicates, these experiences 'change 
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things' in a number of unwelcome and unanticipated directions. In many cases, 
people's assumptions that ties of blood and marriage are the 'natural' and stable basis of 
family and kinship are forcibly and painfully overturned. It takes time, as Marion 
Hughes explains, for the different relationships to resolve themselves into some kind of 
pattern or shape -a shape, moreover, which many people would not previously have 
recognised as 'family'. 
In particular, parents' desires to make a 'fresh start' as a 'new' family are often held in 
tension with the recognition that their children have interests in maintaining contact and 
sustaining relationships with members of their 'first' or previous families - not only 
with a non-resident biological parent, but also with the grandparents, cousins, aunts, 
uncles, and 'honorary' members associated with that family. And indeed, as will be 
seen in this chapter, parents', too, may desire to maintain these relationships at some 
level. They, too, express regret for family relationships lost or unaccounted for along 
the route of their changing partnership histories. Thus, whether it be on account of their 
own needs and interests or those of their children, working out to what extent 'former' 
kin can be incorporated alongside 'new' kin, requires parents in stepfamilies to adopt a 
flexible and dynamic approach in their understanding of family and kinship, one which 
is able to accommodate, as well as bear the loss of, complex sets of relationships. 
Family change is thus processuaL Separation, divorce and repartnering are not events 
which happen neatly, discretely or resolutely - even if the legal 'orderingý of 
relationships seduces people initially into the belief that they are. The endings and 
beginnings of these relationships are often blurred and contingent, accompanied by 
feelings of uncertainty and ambivalence. That this is so - and it is a finding which 
emerged during every single interview - it is unsurprising that people's revised 
understandings of 'family' and their 'family relationships' are also marked by 
uncertainties and contradictions, and in some cases, the reluctant observation that in 
some ways these revisions are themselves contingent, open to the possibility of further 
revision and change. 
In the analysis which follows I examine four types of relationship which, in diverse 
ways and combinations, emerge as most significant in people's understandings of their 
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reordered family relationships: those based on 'blood' ties, those based on step-ties, 
those between former partners, and those based on friendship. In doing so, I explore 
people's perceptions of what it is that underpins these relationships, what it is that 
makes people regard them as unconditional significant, or indeed, expendable. I begin, 
however, by focusing on one aspect of 'family' which all respondents identified as 
fundamental. 
Consolidation and commitment: core relationships 
Notwithstanding the fluidity and uncertainty of family relationships following 
separation and divorce, it is important to emphasise that these are not perceived to be 
attributes of all these relationships. On this point respondents were unanimous. 
However equivocal, contradictory or unresolved people's feelings were about some of 
their family relationships, and however much people diverged in their understandings of 
what family is, all respondents commenced discussion of their families with reference to 
a core unit minimally comprising themselves, their current partners and their children - 
the last group appearing in various combinations of biological and step. It was notable 
that in all cases this was done without hesitation or uncertainty. 
It is only as people move out from discussion of this core set of relationships regarded 
as close, committed and stable and reflect upon those relationships which are contingent 
- about which they are ambivalent, less certain and less secure - that differences, 
contradictions and tensions begin to emerge. It is at this point, when people are trying 
to unravel what precisely it is that distinguishes close and more distant family 
relationships, and what it is that makes or unmakes someone as a family member, that 
the process becomes what some described as 'hard'. Importantly in distinguishing 
certain relationships as key and the embodiment of their 'close family', people were able 
- despite the ways contact with former partners and their families disrupts this process - 
to realise at some level the 'fresh start' as a 'new' family which many said they sought. 
A second important and related point is that while commitment to these core 
relationships is linked in people's minds with a shared household, it is not linked to a 
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particular marital status. In other words all respondents, whether married or cohabiting, 
articulated the quality and depth of their commitment in broadly similar ways. Indeed, it 
may be argued further that commitment to a core set of family relationships is not linked 
to any partnership status, since (as will become clear in the course of this analysis) 
respondents refer to a core unit of themselves and their children when recalling their 
earlier experiences of living without a partner. In all cases, partners are perceived as 
expendable. Children, specifically younger ones, are not 
And if, in singling out a core family unit in this way, parents in stepfamilies appear to 
endorse or converge upon a model of Iwnily' which approximates closely to the model 
of the 'traditional', intact, nuclear family referred to elsewhere, it is also the case - in 
their inclusion of stepchildren and 'ex' relatives at the heart of family life - that their 
model of 'family' is divergent in a number of important ways. 
Bonds between parents and biological children 
It was shown in Chapter 2 how ties of 'blood' are ascribed an almost 'mystical' power 
and status in western cultures, attributes which are further endorsed in legal statutes. In 
particular, it emerged that the 'parent-child' bond - the bond, that is, between biological 
parent and child - is regarded as primary or one of the closest (Finch, 1989; Strathem, 
1992,1992; Finch and Mason, 1993; Allan, 1996). Importantly however, and on the 
basis of their own research, Finch and Mason (1991,1993) make the point that while 
this bond does indeed frequently emerge as primary, it cannot automatically be assumed 
to be significant solely on account of its genealogical basis. While similar findings 
concerning the bond between biological parent and child emerge from these data, the 
overall picture is more complex, given that multiple sets of relationships - biological 
and step- are involved. There are therefore, important qualifications and distinctions to 
be noted which appear to be specific to the context of stepfamily relationships. 
95 
Parents and younger biological children 
Children are more likely to reside with their biological mothers than with their fathers 
following the separation or divorce of their parents (Maclean and Eekelaar, 1997). This 
was so in the majority of cases in this study. It was particularly striking that in those 
cases where parents separated during either the mother's pregnancy or during the early 
months or years of a child's life, the bond between biological mother and her child or 
children was expressed in very close terms, sometimes in terms of inseparability. This 
was visually represented by placing children in the same circle, or in the one 
immediately adjacent to the innermost circle, containing the mother's name. In the 
following passage, a mother talks about her relationship with her eleven-year-old son: 
'I was on my own before Liam was born ... I'm very protective towards 
him ... But there's 
Andrew now ... Whereas before, it used to be just Liam 
and I ... It's always been the two of us from the day of Liam's birth. So 
then Andrew came along and he'd got to get through this (pause) barrier 
of Liam and I ... Andrew's relationship with Liam is different to mine. I 
don't know how to put it but Liam is mine. And I don't know if Andrew 
understands fully what I meant by saying that, if he thought he was being 
excluded. And that wasn't what I was saying at all ... If Andrew goes 
tomorrow, Andrew goes ... I've lived without a partner for seven years but 
I've not lived without a son. As long as I've been on my own, I've been 
on my own with Liam. So our bond (pause), there was none of this 
maternal bond, you know, straight away. There was none of that. But 
over the years ... (Emma Marshall, aged thirty-four, emphasis in original). 
Emma Marshall does not specify what she considers to be the precise nature of the bond 
between herself and her biological son. While she does not explicitly deny the 
significance of so-called 'blood' ties, she does deny the notion of an immediate or 
automatic, maternal bonding based on biological or genetic connection. Rather, in her 
phrase 'But over the years... ' there is the suggestion that it is as much their experience of 
shared history as any bio-genetic 'shared substance' (Schneider, 1968) which creates the 
close bond between them. Here, as elsewhere- and it will be seen to emerge consistently 
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in these data - shared history is regarded as constitutive of close family bonds or 
relationships, a significant and fundamental basis on which people are either included or 
excluded as 'family'. 
While there are a number of other examples in my data where mothers prioritise the 
bond between themselves and their biological children, there is an important point on 
which some of them they diverge. The significance of shared history may account in 
part for this difference. Where a new partner appears on the scene in a child's infancy, 
mothers feel no concern that a new partner will feel 'excluded'. Yet this concern is 
made explicit by Emma Marshall above. It is notable that it surfaced in all interviews 
with women whose biographies similarly included lengthy periods of what they 
invariably, if euphemistically, described as being 'on my own with the children'. This is 
powerfully expressed in the following extract, where a mother talks about the close 
bond which continues to exist between herself and her two daughters. She recalls the 
time ten years earlier when she moved into relationship with her current partner. In 
doing so she makes an important point about why she and her children in some way 
excluded her new partner at that time: 
'I'd been the sole parent, and I didn't like somebody else stepping 
in ... For instance, if Susie and Gemma were rude to me, he'd say 
something to them, and then we'd all turn on him basically. At the time I 
didn't think I was being nasty. It's awful really ... But the girls and me, we 
thought of ourselves as a family ... That was important at the time ... I had 
to work quite hard to loosen up and let John in ... And even now if we 
were all on a sinking boat, I would put them first. I guess that will 
change. I hope it will. I feel as if it ought to change and that I should put 
John first ... I've always felt guilty about that because I'm sure he would 
put me first ... And it's nothing about trying to hurt somebody. It's just 
how it is I suppose' (Deb Casson, aged forty-seven). 
What is implicit in Emma Marshall's account and is made explicit here by Deb Casson, 
is that mothers who have been 'on their own with the children' have a strong sense of 
family identity. Although the composition of their families has been altered by the 
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departure of one partner and the arrival of a new one, this is not to suggest its former 
composition of lone parent and children was any less constitutive of family. This 
corresponds with findings discussed above on people's core relationships. That is, 
although respondents display diversity in whom they define as 'family', and although 
many recognise how these inclusions and exclusions shift over time, all of them include 
a core unit of parent(s) and child(ren) (in varied combinations of biological and step-). 
This suggests that however normally chaotic (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim 1995) love 
relationships may prove to be, people in my study dislike chaos in their lives (Bauman, 
1993) and work hard to return familiar order to them. 
However, the burden of bringing order to this chaos does not fall equally on men and 
women. This work - what Bourdieu (1996) describes as 'constant maintenance work on 
feelings' - falls mainly to women. Arguably, this maintenance or repair work is 
particularly important during the kinds of transitions dealt with in this study. These 
gendered differences of experience in this regard are important, reflected as they are in 
some of the commitments and contingencies men and women subsequently identify in 
their family relationships. 
It is unsurprising that women, who often spend several years living without a partner at 
the same time as being primary carers of children, emerge as those who work creatively 
and resourcefully to develop close family relationships centrally comprising themselves 
and their children. At the same time, as will be seen in the section below on friends, in 
this significant phase of their biographies women are creative and resourceful in their 
approach to family relationships more widely. Thus, as, Emma Marshall makes plain 
above, although her designated 'close' family currently includes her new partner, if he 
goes tomorrow, 'he goes', but she and Liam remain. Her family identity would remain 
intact retaining as it does the key figures of herself and her child included in its earlier 
composition. 
Similarly, in all but one instance, men too represented their younger biological children 
as being emotionally very close to them. This was particularly striking in two cases 
where fathers also had older, biological children from their previous relationships. In 
neither case were their older children represented as close to them emotionally as their 
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younger ones. Other factors, including that of age, come into play. These are dealt with 
more fully in the section immediately following where parents speak about their 
relationships with older biological children. Similarly, it will be seen that age also 
emerges as a significant factor in relations between parents and their older step-children. 
In the one case where a father did not place his young biological child as closely as his 
other children, a quite complex series of step- and biological relationships was entailed. 
He placed his three young stepchildren (triplets, aged two years) as closer members of 
his family than either his older stepson aged six years, or his biological son aged eight 
years: 
'Kenny, my son, shouldn't really be out there (on chart). But in a sense I 
feel a lot closer to the little ones (three of his stepchildren, triplets, aged 
two) than to Simon, their older brother, or to Kenny ... The little ones were 
six months old when I first met them. But the way I feel is that Kenny 
and Simon are included there. They're my children. But as I say, it's 
more so with the little ones because they've never had anybody else. I've 
been their father ... But having said that I had a lot of contact with Kenny 
when he was little ... The contact order now is that I pick Kenny up twice a 
week from school and he stays with us till about seven o'clock ... At the 
moment, I think the little ones are more emotionally forthcoming than 
Kenny is. I mean he's an eight year old boy with all the stereotypical 
things (laughter) ... So the two-way thing is there with them. With Kenny, 
the two-way thing hasn't stopped, it's just sort of different. But I'd do 
anything for any of them if I could, no matter what. They're all my 
children' (Jamie Singleton, aged thirty). 
This passage raises a number of points. First, Jamie Singleton's reference to his son's 
behaviour as 'stereotypical' of an eight year old boy is something which emerges with a 
number of parents as a possible explanation for why they may feel more or less close to 
some of their children than to others, regardless of whether these are biological or step- 
children. In making distinctions on the grounds of stereotypically gendered behaviour, 
parents indicate that other factors - specifically the quality of the relationship - are 
important in how close they feel to children. At the same time, Jamie Singleton and 
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other parents are keen to qualify these distinctions. Parents emphasise that if they do 
distinguish between their children in terms of how close they feels towards them, this 
should not be taken to mean they do not hold them in equal regard or would not act 
equally on their behalf This is clearly demonstrated in Chapter 7 on inheritance where 
parents rarely make any distinctions between their children. 
Secondly, given the emphasis parents place on shared experience or shared history in 
how closely children and others are included as family members, the reduced contact 
between Jamie Singleton and his son may, arguably, be another contributory factor to 
the less close relationship he shares with his son Kenny. And indeed, this is a point he 
makes later in his interview. As Janet Walker (1992a) points out, for 'absent parents', 
the majority of whom are men, the extent to which they are able to take a lead or equal 
role in parenting is circumscribed by the fact that they are not living with their children 
on a daily basis (I 992a: 25). 
There were a number of other differences in how men perceived their relationships with 
their younger, biological children. First, they more frequently placed partners (rather 
than children) as those immediately closest to them. Secondly, in reflecting on the 
period between the ending of their previous partnerships and the beginning of their 
current ones, they did not explicitly talk about themselves and their children in terms of 
being a 'family'. This was so even in the three cases where children had their main 
residence with their biological fathers (in two cases, this followed separation and 
divorce; in the third it followed the death of a partner). However, all three fathers 
described their biological children as very close to them. Thirdly, and this may be 
related to the fact that so few fathers were main carers of their children, they did not 
express concerns that new partners may feel excluded from the relationships they had 
built up with their biological children. 
This discussion emphasises feelings of closeness felt by biological parents towards their 
younger children. In doing this, the significance of shared experience is also 
emphasised. However, parents of young children did not entirely ignore the issue of 
genetic links. This was raised unprompted. Biological ties were variously described as 
'inexplicable', 'different' in some indefinable way from other bonds. In the following 
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extract, a mother talks about her two year old son's reaction to the prospect of a visit 
from his non-resident biological father whom he sees every six weeks or so: 
'He's very excited when Paul comes, as if he knows he's his daddy. And 
we don't know why that is at all (laughter) because he didn't have very 
much time with him at all when he was little ... We often sort of say, we 
wonder if it's something sort of biological (laughter). But how? 
(laughter). They're all very excited, the girls, too' (Linda Townsend, 
aged thirty-five). 
Similarly, another mother reflects upon this phenomenon: 
'Joseph is more in the picture with Alan, his father, than anyone ever 
thought he would be ... I don't know why really ... Except that what's very 
obvious, and must be very obvious to him, is that Joseph looks just like 
him ... So I don't 
know whether that is anything to do with it. I mean, I'm 
sure that when Alan and his new wife go out visiting with Joseph, people 
must say 'Oh doesn't he look like his Dad'. And it must have an effect on 
Alan ... I've often thought 
it creates some sort of bond between 
them ... Perhaps I'm making too much of 
it, but I think it probably is a 
factor' (Marion Hughes, aged thirty-three). 
Notwithstanding the socially recognised significance of 'blood ties' and, as Marion 
Hughes hints, the influence they may have on the development of relationships between 
children and their non-resident biological parents, closeness between parents and their 
younger children is rarely expressed in straightforward terms as being based on bio- 
genetic links. Shared history and feelings of protectiveness towards young children 
figure more prominently as the basis on which close links are forged during the 
transitions from one set of family arrangements to another. 
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Parents and older biological children 
In considering people's reflections on their relationships with older biological children, 
a different and more complex picture begins to emerge concerning the connection 
between biological ties and 'family'. One third of those interviewed whose biological 
children were now adult (five parents out of fifteen), placed one or more of them further 
out than their other biological children, their stepchildren or other family members. In 
all of these cases, lack of regular contact was initially given as parents' reasons for 
doing this. All parents, however, wished to elaborate on this - albeit with some unease 
and hesitation - making it clear that lack of contact was regarded as neither a sufficient 
nor primary reason for making these distinctions. This is illustrated in the following 
extract, where a father reflects on the reasons he distinguishes between his elder, 
twenty-seven year old son, and his younger, fifteen-year-old son in terms of closeness: 
'Son 'one' is older and lives on his own in London, and I see less of 
him ... So it's partly that (long pause) ... I always feel closer to the younger 
one than to the older one, but it's not that significant ... The second is 
placed there simply because he's fifteen, and therefore, he is a lot more 
dependent on me than the other one. It's probably mainly that (long 
pause). He's also an easier child (laughter), if it's all right to say so' 
(Mike Morton, aged fifty-four, emphasis in original). 
In two cases, fathers who had both older and younger biological children from previous 
and current partnerships, distinguished between them in terms of closeness. While in 
one instance, older children were entirely excluded as family members, in both cases, 
their younger biological children from their current relationships were included as very 
close family. Both these fathers (aged sixty and fifty-one years) were no longer working 
outside the home - one was retired, one was unemployed. As a consequence, they both 
spent substantial amounts of time with their younger children, taking them to and from 
school or playgroup, cooking meals and so on. They were aware that this was in marked 
contrast to the amount and quality of daily contact they had had with their children from 
their first marriages. During their first marriages, one father had been in full-time 
employment; the other had spent many years in prison. 
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While both fathers considered these variable amounts of contact to be a significant 
contributory factor to the relative distance and closeness they felt towards their different 
children, it was clear that neither of them believed these differences could be wholly 
attributed to this factor. Again, although lack of contact with their older children was 
initially given as the reason for making these distinctions, with elaboration, more 
complex narratives began to unfold. This is apparent in the following extract, where a 
father's four, adult, biological children from his first marriage are entirely excluded as 
members of his family, although his oldest child does appear in the 'ambiguous' section 
of his chart: 
'Since 1981, when my first wife emigrated with the kids, I didn't have 
anything to do with them right up until three years ago ... I hadn't seen 
Ben and Micky since they were two and four, and then when I saw them 
they were fifteen and sixteen. Paul, the oldest, I did see once or twice, 
because he came back over here ... I wasn't sure where to put him on 
here ... And the reason 
he isn't in the circles is I don't trust Paul, and that's 
important ... You know, 
if I talk to him in confidence, I can't trust him 
enough not to tell anybody. To me, when you've got a friend, you can 
tell them something and it'll go no further. And loyalty. I don't think 
he's got the loyalty for family I think he should have ... And funnily 
enough, my first wife (whose name also appears in the 'ambiguous' 
section), she's very, very loyal' (Steve Thompson, aged fifty-one). 
Sometimes parents were explicit in their awareness that infrequent contact followed 
from, rather than preceded, more distant relationships with their older biological 
children. This was most clearly evidenced in the accounts of the four parents for whom 
remarriage had followed the death of their previous partners. The negative reactions of 
older and adult children's to this event - and the reduction in contact which ensued - 
emerges as an important factor in parents' reasons for regarding them as less close than 
formerly. One man, whose two, adult, biological daughters were represented as less 
close than his first wife's sister and husband, provides an illustration of this: 
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'My first wife, Pamela died. She had cancer. That was the end of '94. 
We'd been married forty-three years. I remarried in '95. And Pamela's 
sister and husband, I suppose they're the closest to me on my side of the 
family. Pamela was ill for two years, and they gave me a lot of help. 
They were very supportive. But that relationship has always been very 
strong, since about 1950. And I suspect it was probably hardest for her 
sister to accept me getting married again. But she was very good about 
accepting Mary, my new wife. She was the one person who really helped 
me by accepting Mary. That's why I've put her in before the kids. The 
children didn't accept her so well' (George Gallagher, aged sixty-eight). 
These comments suggest it is less the lack of contact than the unsatisfactory quality of 
the relationship which leads parents to exclude or distinguish between their adult, 
biological children. For these parents, the 'blood tie' - howsoever it is understood and 
defined, be it in bio-genetic or psychological terms - by itself is no longer an adequate 
basis for close or continued family membership. It appears from what is said here that 
parents hold expectations of their adult children - trust, loyalty, emotional support - 
those qualities of relationship which, as Steve Thompson states, resemble those he 
expects from his relationships with friends. Or, as Giddens (1991,1992) argues, these 
data indicate that elements of the 'pure relationship' are present in these family 
relationships, too. Finally, in identifying family relationships with friendships, Steve 
Thompson raises an important issue regarding family relationships, a point addressed 
more fully in the final section on friends. 
Bonds between stepparents and stepchildren 
It was seen in the preceding section that while the so-called 'blood tie' emerges (in all 
but one case) from these data as a primary bond between parents and younger children, 
its overriding significance cannot be assumed. Parents state both implicitly and 
explicitly that shared experience, shared history and the overall quality of the 
relationship are key considerations in who is included or excluded as family, and where 
they are located in terms of closeness. Thus, as already noted, these data support Finch 
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and Mason's (1993) arguments that the degree of closeness accorded to different family 
members cannot be 'read off in any straightforward way from their genealogical 
position. This is further supported in this section which explores the bonds between 
parents and their stepchildren. 
Younger stepchildren 
It was striking how stepparents' reflections on their relationships with their young 
stepchildren resembled those of parents on their younger biological children. In those 
instances where stepparents had appeared on the scene before a stepchild was born, or in 
the child's early infancy and childhood, these children were represented as very close 
members of their stepparents' family, a part of the core family unit discussed above. 
One stepfather describes his relationship with his eleven-year-old stepson thus: 
'I think of Liam as my son. It's a continuous process. It's not something 
that one day he's not my son, and the next day he is my son ... it's very 
kind of blurred. But the more involved we are, and the more we spend 
time together and that kind of thing ... I introduce Liam as Liam. I 
wouldn't introduce him as my stepson ... And if anything happened to 
Emma, I'd like me and Liam to stay together. And he might, I suppose, 
want to go and live with his biological father ... Liam would have to make 
the decision in the end. Now it would hurt if he didn't want to stay with 
me, because that bond is very strong, even if anything were to happen to 
his Mum' (Roger Hunt, aged twenty-eight). 
For Roger Hunt, the role of biology in forging enduring, close family relationships is 
less significant in this relationship than long-term commitment and support. While a 
number of parents in this study expressed similar sentiments, it was notable that in cases 
where parents subsequently had a 'child of their own' (Burgoyne and Clark, 1984) in 
their 'new' family, there was evidence of a slight tension or uncertainty in this regard, 
even though on their charts, stepparents visually represented their biological and 
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stepchildren as equal. In the following example, there are hints of these uncertainties in 
how another stepfather reflects upon his relationship with his stepson: 
'I don't make a point of saying Joseph is my son or anything but that is 
how I think about him. It's the thing of time, how much time you spend 
with them and over what kind of timespan ... And I would hope that 
Joseph would always think of me as Dad ... And now there's Matthew his 
brother. A mean I try my best not to differentiate between the two of 
them ... I think the thing 
is they're both at different stages. Matthew is 
only one and a half, a loving and happy little lad, smiling all the time. 
But when you talk to Joseph, he's grumpy (laughter). I mean I wouldn't 
say that I never think that they are different, but it's not something that 
preys on my mind' (Dave Hughes, aged twenty-seven). 
What begins to emerge from the above example and emerges forcefully from the data 
more widely, is that stepparents not only have concerns about treating children equally, 
they also have concerns aboutfeeling equally about them. This is a 'tall order' for any 
parent. Another father, who also positioned his biological daughter and three 
stepchildren equally in terms of their membership as close family, none the less 
distinguished between them in terms of how he 'got on' with them. He identified a 
number of reasons for making these distinctions, which he explains in the following 
way: 
'I try to treat them the same as such, and I don't think I treat them any 
different to the way I treat Becky (his biological daughter) ... I probably 
don't feel quite as close to the older two, Evie and Shelley, as I do to 
Sam and Becky. I think it's the age. I very much put Sam and Becky 
together. The two of them are going through their very early formative 
years, both of them with me. And again that's complicated. Because 
Becky's my own blood as it were, but I only see her two days a week. 
Sam isn't my blood but I see him seven days a week. And it kind of 
balances out. So it's very different when you take a child on from that 
age, from say when they're older, like the other two. And if at the 
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weekends I devote more time to Becky, that's not so much the blood 
thing, it's more to do with time, because she only has two days and he 
has seven. I'm harder on Sam, but I think that's more to do with gender, 
because he's harder work. But I'm sure that isn't because he isn't my 
blood. I'm sure it's a gender thing (Tom O'Hare, aged thirty-three, 
emphasis in original). 
Again, this passage demonstrates parents' concerns about equality of treatment for their 
children, and the difficulty of achieving this given children's different needs, ages, and 
the differential time constraints surrounding contact. Tom O'Hare also raises the issue 
of gender, noting - as did parents in the preceding section - how stereotypically 
gendered behaviour in children can influence their parents' relationships with them. 
In one case, a father did not include his two young stepsons as family. Nor did he 
include his older, biological children from a previous marriage. The only child he did 
include, and this was as a close member of his family, was his six year old, biological 
son from his current partnership. He is aware of contradictions in doing this: 
'Seeing someone a lot is part of what makes family ... But that's a 
contradiction isn't it with Dean and Gary 'cos I see a lot of them [his 
stepsons]... 'cos to be honest, I've got to be totally honest, I don't think of 
Dean and Gary as family, possibly because they're not my own ... I mean I 
love them to bits, but I don't think of them as mine, as family. It's 
different with Ryan 'cos he is, he's mine ... But I haven't got the love for 
Dean and Gary that I've got for Ryan. It's just there with Ryan, 
regardless of whether I'm telling him off, putting him to bed or whatever. 
It's just still there ... it's very hard to treat them all the same. But it's 
important to try and treat them all the same because of the jealousy and 
upset it would cause between the three of them ... and I don't want that' 
(Steve Thompson, aged fifty-one). 
The above examples highlight some of the tensions underlying the steprelationship. In 
particular they demonstrate some of the tensions experienced by stepparents in trying to 
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meet certain expectations, held both by themselves and others. As Ochiltree (1990) 
remarks, we expect a great deal from stepparents. We expect them to assume parental 
responsibilities, yet these parental roles and responsibilities are not clearly-defined 
(Walker, 1992a). From what is said by parents in this study, it is clear that from an early 
age, children carry memories and histories from their 'old' families into their 'new' 
family situations. Parents recognise this and acknowledge the wider frame of reference 
such children have. In these circumstances, as Ochiltree (1990) says, 'instant' love 
between even relatively young stepchildren and their stepparents is both unlikely and 
unrealistic. 
Together the above passages show a complex interweaving of factors - age, gender, 
durations of relationships - which together form the basis of qualitatively different 
relationships between parents and their younger stepchildren. This mirrors findings in 
the section above where qualitatively different relationships also emerge in relationships 
between parents and younger biological children. Evidence from family studies more 
widely indicates that such differences are present in all families (see Morgan, 1996). 
However, given the specifically negative discourses surrounding stepparents, it is 
unsurprising that they, in particular, feel unsafe or uneasy, not only about disclosing 
these differences, but about acknowledging their existence in the first place. This 
reluctance is especially marked when the children concerned are young. Again, as was 
argued in the previous chapter, it is clear that people's reflections on their reordered 
family relationships are inseparable from their moral thinking about these issues. 
Older stepchildren 
In analysing relationships between parents and their older stepchildren, there are striking 
similarities with what emerged between parents and their older biological children. In 
the same way some parents distinguished between their older biological children in 
terms of how closely, if at all, they include them as family members, stepparents, too, 
arc more likely to distinguish between their older stepchildren in the same way. This 
did not emerge as a pattern in relationships between parents and younger children. In 
other words, a more complex picture emerges, one in which both parents and children 
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have expectations concerning the quality of relationship between them. This is well 
articulated by Rachel Cunningham, where she describes her relationships with her two 
stepsons, David aged sixteen years, and Jeff who is twenty-seven: 
'I've put David there about the same as my brother. He's quite 
significant ... He's been quite a big part of my life and we get on very well. 
I've known him since he was a little boy, since he was eight (long 
pause) ... Jeff, Mike's older son, em, he would be (long pause) ... No, (long 
pause) I don't include him. No (laughter). I thought 'yes' I would, 
because I see him more than these people whom I hardly ever see. And 
part of what family is, is contact. But I don't have any real relationship 
with him, any emotional connection. He'd already left home when I 
married Mike. And before he left home he was rarely around, so I didn't 
really know him at all. And he's not very close to Mike. He sort of 
comes up occasionally, usually when he needs something ... But when 
everything's fine in his day-to-day life, we don't hear a word' (Rachel 
Cunningham, aged thirty-two, emphasis in original). 
There are resonances in Rachel Cunningham's comments of what parents said earlier 
about their relationships with older biological children - particularly in their indication 
that elements of the 'pure' relationship' are present in a variety of family relationships. 
Stepparents with older stepchildren often cited a lack of emotional connection or 
emotional ties as the reason they positioned them further out than their biological 
children or younger stepchildren. Further, if the 'two-way', mutual quality of a 
relationship is important, then time shared is perceived as an important factor in 
determining how the quality of that relationship develops. Given the emphasis placed 
on shared history throughout this discussion, it is unsurprising that here, too, it emerges 
as an important factor - or even a prerequisite - in allowing relationships with older 
stepchildren to develop in a mutually satisfying way. In decisions to include or exclude 
someone as a family member, relationship and shared history each play a major role. 
An emphasis on the importance and continuing significance of shared history surfaces 
again in the context of those who repartnered following the death of a previous partner. 
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In the same way that this created tensions in relationships between parents and their 
older biological children, it emerges, too, as an explicit cause of friction between parents 
and older stepchildren. In the following extract, Mary Gallagher explains how this 
tension makes it impossible to include her three adult stepdaughters as family: 
'I would if they'd let me (laughter). I mean it is very hard for 
them ... They were very close to their mother. It was only sort of six 
months after she died that George asked me to marry him. So that's why. 
I think we just need time. I've only met two of them. We're trying to 
work at it and we keep in communication as far as we can, you know, 
presents to grandchildren, birthday cards' (Mary Gallagher, aged fifty). 
Here, the brevity of the shared history between stepparent and stepchildren cannot begin 
to assert a significance to match the twenty or thirty years these adult children shared 
with their biological mother. Not only that, but it is clear that an appropriate length of 
time is not perceived to have elapsed between the 'ending' of one family history and the 
'beginning' of another. It is interesting that for the four people in this study who had 
been bereaved, the 'one year of mourning' associated with dominant or traditional moral 
discourse continues to be influential. For three of the five people who had been 
widowed, repartnering within the first year had created serious difficulties between 
themselves and their new partners' families. 
The absence of shared history thus helps to explain why the majority of parents whose 
stepchildren were already adults when they arrived on the scene, tended to place them 
'further out" in terms of closeness than their biological children, or (as in the case of 
Rachel Cunningham above), to exclude them altogether. However, there was one 
notable exception to this. In contrast to the above examples, Meg Chandler (see 
opening comment to Chapter 2) explains that it is precisely because her relationship 
with her adult, biological daughter is not 'two-way' - in spite of the long history they 
share - that she regards her as a less close family member than her adult stepdaughter. 
Arguably, the significance of Meg Chandler's case lies not only - or indeed primarily - 
in its affirmation of the steprelationship, but in the range of contradictory claims it 
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makes concerning what constitutes family. Given the emotional, practical and financial 
investments they have made in building stepfamily relationships, parents in stepfamilies 
are unlikely to overstate the significance of biological ties between parents and children 
at the cost of underplaying the important role played in their children's lives by social or 
step- ties. In addition parents also voiced concerns about fairness and the importance of 
equal regard and treatment for children (biological and step-). Moreover, it is possible 
that negative discourses around stepfamilies which focus on stereotypes of 'wicked 
stepmothers' and 'abusing stepfathers' make it seem difficult or even 'dangerous' for 
stepparents to make distinctions in terins of 'how close' they feel towards their step- and 
biological children. These concerns were noticeably more marked in the discussion of 
younger stepchildren whose status is perceived as especially vulnerable. 
Finally, in addition to the significance of emotional connection and shared history, it is 
evident from the above examples that geographical distance is also an important factor 
in how relationships between parents and their older stepchildren develop (as it does in 
relationships between parents and biological children). This has of course been noted in 
a number of family studies (Finch, 1989; Finch and Mason, 1991; Finch and Mason, 
1993). Stepfamily arrangements coming into existence when children are adult 
inevitably means their 'shared history' is of a briefer duration. The difficulties of 
developing close relationships are then compounded by adult children's geographical 
mobility and distance. This is made explicit in the following extract where a stepfather 
reflects on his relationships with his adult stepdaughters: 
'I'm closer to Mary's daughter, Annie, who is quieter, very shy. I spent a 
lot of time with her when she was getting a place of her own. It was me 
went with her to see the flats. So that sort of bonded us ... But Helen, her 
sister, is a completely different kettle of fish, quite aggressive ... Thoughin 
a way, she's closer now, a lot better now than she was before ... She's still 
less close than Annie, but she lives further away and that makes a 
difference in the closeness ... So there is a relationship with Helen but I 
can't develop it because of the geographical distance. It's personality as 
well. It's geography and personality ... Annie and Helen are chalk and 
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cheese. Just as different in a way as my three daughters' (George 
Gallagher, aged sixty-eight). 
In his last two sentences, George Gallagher makes a crucial point about stepfamily 
relationships. Stepchildren, like biological children have different personalities, needs 
and interests. Indeed, it was striking how often the views of both stepparent and 
biological parent converged on these points in relation to a specific child. Children, 
younger and older, are not passive receivers in relationship, whether this be with stepkin 
or biological kin. They are active in the processes of creating kinship. Claiming kinship 
is a two-way process for parents and children. 
Parents' recognition of this illuminates and reinforces their moral thinking about 
relationships - their responsibilities and commitment to their children's welfare - 
discussed in the preceding chapter. It is clear, as some stepfathers said, that in 
contemplating the choices facing them, the closeness and protectiveness felt by mothers 
towards their children leaves little room for manoeuvre as far as the moral dimensions 
of these relationships are concerned. Responsibilities and commitments in relation to 
children are an inescapable feature of the whole relationship 'package'. Again, they 
illustrate how children cannot be understood as mere onlookers to the 'moral party' 
(Bauman, 1993,1995), but rather how they are, and remain, central to it. 
Former partnership ties 
It emerges clearly from these data that ties with former partners and their families 
present people with some of their most difficult dilemmas in terms of reformulating 
their ideas on 'fwnily' and family relationships. It is around these relationships, and the 
moral and emotional issues they raise, that the greatest diversity of opinion and 
understanding exists. It is here that contradictory discourses and the contradictory 
impulses they give rise to, lie uneasily juxtaposed. Thus, desires to rescue what is 
'good' in a relationship may run with demands to 'leave it all behind'. The myths, 
memories and losses of the marriage that ends in death rest uneasily alongside those 
associated with marriages which end in divorce. Commitments to 'new' family 
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relationships must be developed while retaining firm loyalties to 'old' ones. It was 
shown through some of the illustrative examples in Chapter 4 that parents in 
stepfamilies are only too aware that it is 'wishful thinking' to assume that 
disengagement from former relationships can be effected easily and resolutely. Often, 
the link between these contradictory impulses is children, and the losses or gains 
entailed for them in choosing one line of thinking or one course of action over another. 
While the majority of those interviewed specifically excluded former partners as 
members of their families, a minority (seven out of thirty people) did include them. Of 
these, four had been divorced; three had been widowed. In the following extract, 
Charlie Summers, divorced from his first wife, reflects upon why he still includes her as 
family: 
'And that's Becky, my first wife ... I've put her in capitals there 'cos I 
can't, I (pause) em, I don't know where to place her ... I, I find 
it very 
difficult. I certainly can't do what a lot of people do, and talk about my 
sex'. I find that very uncomfortable, and I think, I don't think I'm easy 
with the nature of me and Becky really .. So I've deliberately used capitals 
4cos it's very large ... I don't feel it's settled, or in order, or 
resolved ... Which is why her name straddles. these circles' (Charlie 
Summers, aged fifty-three). 
Later in his interview, Charlie Summers contrasts the tensions which continue to exist 
between himself and his former partner with the kind of relationship he perceives to 
exist between his current partner and her first husband: 
'Ros talks to her former husband, Tony - he rang up the other day and wanted to 
talk to one of the children. There was this conversation going on, and it was a 
very mutual conversation, no tensions or anything. I mean I can't but be aware 
of the fact that although this is now a very neutral conversation, that actually this 
bloke (laughs) was the centre of her life for twenty-five years or more ... And I'm 
not worried as I might have been in other relationships that she's still got some 
hankering to be with him ... But it's peculiar (laughs) isn't it, that there's this man 
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with whom she shares this life history. You can't pretend it isn't there. It's 
there, as it is with me and Becky ... And I suspect there are limits to what you can 
do by talking about it. I mean it just is there' (Charlie Summers, aged fifty- 
three, emphasis in original). 
These extracts suggest that for Charlie Summers, it is the inescapable fact of a shared 
history which leads him to include his first wife as family. In his view, the impact of 
shared history is something which cannot be erased or 'talked' away. And this is so, 
whether - as in his case - aspects of the former relationship remain unsettled or 
unresolved, or, as is the case with his new partner and her ex husband, things appear 
'neutral', with 'no tensions'. In the following example, Rachel Cunningham, divorced 
and now remarried, makes similar observations about the significance of shared history 
and some of the tensions this may raise with new partners. Despite these difficulties she 
continues to include her first husband as fairly close (fourth circle) family: 
'Chris is my first husband. We still keep in touch but I think that's more 
to do with the fact that a large part of my life was bound up with this 
person ... As time goes on ... we 
keep in touch less. So gradually, I think 
he'll probably go, move outwards (laughter). But he's still quite a 
significant person, though we were married only four or five years. 
We've known each other a long time, and they were kind of formative 
years. We usually ring up. We used to be quite close after we separated, 
but since he got another partner it's slightly more difficult. I always feel 
she might not like it. Mike (respondent's current husband) finds it 
unusual ... I don't think he minds but I don't think he particularly likes it 
(laughter) ... Chris didn't come to our wedding. I think Mike would have 
drawn the line there (laughter). I wouldn't have minded if he'd been 
there, but I didn't feel strongly about it. It's difficult, people don't talk 
about it' (Rachel Cunningham, aged thirty-two). 
The above two extracts testify to an awkwardness in handling relationships with former 
partners, even where these appear to be straightforward. The presence of new partners 
contributes in some way to this uneasiness, although neither Charlie Summers nor 
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Rachel Cunningham are quite clear as to why this is. There are hints that what people 
sometimes feel about their former partners is at odds with what they and others think 
they 'ought' to feet in these situations. What they do both know, and this is supported 
by what others in this study say, is that there are social constraints, often subtle and 
difficult to identify, which inhibit discussion of these issues in a more open way. 
Pressure from current partners is only one direction from which constraints may be felt. 
Another striking feature suggested by what people are saying here concerns the quality 
of relationship between those adults most immediately concerned. It is difficult to 
detect the antagonisms and adversarial qualities assumed by many to be an inevitable 
feature of post-separation or post-divorce relationships. This is not to suggest that all 
those interviewed conformed to this model of relationship. On the other hand, open 
hostility emerged on only one occasion. That the above examples are taken from 
interviews with people whose experiences of separation and divorce had occurred 
several years earlier is probably an important factor. It is important to draw attention to 
these aspects of relationships, given, as Morgan (1996) also argues, many critiques of 
'the family' and much of the research literature on divorce ignores, or pays scant 
attention to these more positive aspects of family life. And if, as Beck and Beck- 
Gemsheim (1995) argue, there are changes in process and people are learning new ways 
of living together and apart, it is unsurprising that transitions which - uncommonly it 
seems - include less confrontational and adversarial forms of relationship with former 
partners, may prove uneasy or awkward for people to handle. 
What is also interesting to note, is that while the presence or absence of conflict between 
former partners can be related to how contact is handled, there is no straightforward 
connection - as one might possibly expect there to be - between either conflict or 
contact and the inclusion or exclusion of someone as a family member. Often, those 
whose contact arrangements were working well, were also those who explicitly and 
emphatically excluded their former partners as family, regardless of whether this 
relationship was conflictual. It is, moreover, difficult to pinpoint or isolate the issues 
which feed these exclusionary processes. On the whole, people were unable or reluctant 
to elaborate upon them. If people had not already broached the topic, the question was 
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asked 'Would you include your former partner as family? ' The commonest response 
was an emphatic 'No'or 'No, not at all'. Sometimes, these brief replies were amplified: 
'... there's no emotional attachment whatsoever ... Three years ago ... she 
would have been on this' (Jamie Singleton, aged thirty). 
Here, emotional connection or attachment again emerges - as it did in earlier sections of 
this chapter - as a key element in family relationships. And occasionally, as this 
passage also illustrates, people draw attention to the fact that if former partners are not 
included at the point of interview, they would have been had the interview taken place 
some time earlier. Mary Gallagher makes this point in the following passage: 
'... because when you're on your own, OK, you've got friends, but you 
don't move on very much ... I just couldn't let go for a long time ... thinking 
that things might alter ... I did think of him as family then. But then the 
new relationship comes along, and suddenly you think 'Oh, I can let go 
of that now (laughter). This has come and this is better (laughter). But 
yeah, I would probably, definitely have put him in then as family (Mary 
Gallagher, aged fifty). 
What the above two examples suggest is that inclusion or exclusion of former partners 
as family is linked in part to the quality of emotional engagement or cut-off which 
currently exists between them. And as Mary Gallagher implies, this in turn may be 
linked to whether or not former partners have yet moved into another significant 
relationship. However, it is not only the current emotional state of play which matters. 
Inclusionary and exclusionary processes revolve around a number of issues. These 
included the recognition that former partners continue to be the parents of their children; 
consideration of former partners' attitudes towards contact with those children; the 
quality of the relationship between former partners at earlier stages in its history; the 
grounds on which that relationship had been ended and by whom; the kinds of support - 
practical and financial - fonner partners currently offer. These issues also appeared to 
influence people's decisions to include former partners in the ambiguous section of the 
chart. 
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Many of these examples are important, too, in their allusions to how someone's position 
in a family may gradually 'move outwards', demonstrating as this does people's 
awareness of how things can shift and change with family attachments. On the basis of 
data in this study, it is in connection with fon-ner partnership ties that awareness of this 
possibility is most marked. However, if these examples indicate certain contingencies 
in people's thinking about their reordered family relationships, they also demonstrate, 
contrary to central tenets of Giddens' (1991,1992) and Bauman's (1993,1995) 
arguments, that intimate relationships continue to have an impact on partners' lives long 
beyond the point of separation. Specifically, these data undermine his claims that 
relationships are continued only as long as each person derives satisfactions from them. 
Many of the above examples, together with what has been said in earlier chapters, 
suggests that mutual satisfactions have long since disappeared. What remains is the 
inescapable fact of shared history, a huge part of which is children. Although the 
examples above do not specifically allude to the significance of children in parents' 
decisions to include their former partners as family, it is a link which is made explicit 
elsewhere in their interviews, as well as in those of other respondents. The following 
provides an illustration of this point: 
'I think she's probably achieved her position now in my little universe 
(laughs, indicating chart) ... I'm more likely to think of her as the mother 
of Jeff and David than my 'ex' or 'former' wife, and therefore 
inextricably linked to me through them, because she'll always be their 
mother ... Inevitably I shall hear less about her and what she's doing, I 
guess. But we do see each other through the children. We have to ... So 
you can't wish them away when they're not. That's wishful thinking' 
(Mike Morton, aged fifty-four, emphasis in original). 
In the case of Mike Morton, as with others, it is precisely the link between his children 
and their mother which leads him, not only to include her as a member of his family, but 
also - and amongst those who had divorced, this was exceptional - to reject notions of 
any change or gradual drift outwards in her position there. For him, remarriage and a 
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new partner are not perceived as justifiable reasons for altering this. Thus, while there 
is evidence here and elsewhere to support Giddens' argument that relationships are 
currently based on 'confluent love', a contingent love which jars with the 'forever' 
qualities of romantic love, there is much, too, which contradicts these claims or requires 
some modification. As Smart has stated in connection with her own research with 
families, 'children stop confluent love in its tracks' (1997). 
Former partners who have died 
Discourses around marriages which end in death - whether enshrined in inheritance law, 
informing the manuals of 'self-help' literature, or articulated through well-meaning 
friends and relatives - all carry assumptions that because the death of a partner is 
unsought, these unions are inherently harmonious and trouble-free. People whose 
marriages last until death are placed in a different moral category from those whose 
marriages end in separation and divorce. Bauman's arguments on postmodem intimacy 
which formed the basis of critical analysis in Chapter 4, exemplify this approach. 
Morally, the bereaved are discursively constituted as resilient, committed and caring, 
while those who separate and divorce are flighty, irresponsible and self seeking. It 
follows that those who seek the comforts of another relationship following bereavement, 
are perceived as taking a wholly appropriate course of action. And it is assumed, again, 
that somehow these new unions will be comparatively straightforward and 
unproblematic. 
At the same time, as will become clear in the course of this discussion, there are 
conditions attached to this moral approbation. It is interesting to note, therefore, that in 
handling relationships with the families of their former partners, no fewer tensions were 
evident amongst this group than amongst those who had separated and divorced. Rather 
it is in the nature of these tensions that differences between these groups may be noted. 
Those who repartner following bereavement thus face social pressures of a different 
kind. It was notable how for three of the four respondents in this study who had been 
widowed, inclusion of their previous partners as close family members was immediate 
and spontaneous, with no suggestion, moreover, of the possibility of a gradual 'move 
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outwards'. An important factor here appeared to be the duration of a particular 
relationship: 
'Can I put my first wife in the same circle as myself and my second 
wife? ... We'd been married 
forty-eight years... ' (George Gallagher, aged 
sixty-eight). 
At the same time, it is clear from what emerges later in this (and other) interviews, that 
it is not solely or primarily the duration of a relationship which leads people to include 
their deceased partners as family. Nick Carter, whose first wife died two years earlier at 
the age of forty-six, is now remarried to Jenny: 
4 ... although my relationship with my 
first wife was not perfect (pause), 
you know I miss her and I love her still. And I know the children loved 
her too ... It's difficult for people to realise that just because I'm loving 
Jenny, it doesn't mean I'm not loving Clare, too' (Nick Carter, aged 
forty-two). 
Thus, as others also insisted, if first marriages were not 'perfect', they were none the 
less remembered as 'happy' or 'good'. It is the quality of relationship shared with first 
partners, together with links to them through their children, which leads people to 
include partners who have died as family. This relates to earlier findings, where similar 
reasons for including former partners were given by those who had separated and 
divorced. Yet, as the above passage also indicates, loving two partners is socially 
problematic. A recurrent theme during Nick Carter's interview was the mismatch he 
perceived between his own understandings and experiences of the processes of 
bereavement and those of other people. These were most marked between himself and 
members of his first wife's family (whom he continues to include as members of his). 
As stated earlier, while people are generally sympathetic to those who repartner under 
these circumstances, this sympathy is not, he makes clear, unconditional: 
'Sasha, my first wife was one of six children. I view them all the same 
but more remote than other members of my family .. That's because of 
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their attitude towards me since I've remarried. I've been 
excommunicated (laughter) ... I think it's basically all about time and the 
perceived quickness of my remarriage ... It really hurts ... It makes me 
angry, too... '(Nick Carter, aged forty-two). 
For those in this study who have repartnered following bereavement, it is, as Nick 
Carter describes above, the perceived quickness with which they move into another 
relationship which is the commonest cause of tension between themselves and their 
former partners' families. This, together with what emerged among those who had 
separated and divorced, suggests that it is in the handling of memories that one of the 
major differences between these groups lies. By whatever routes people have arrived at 
their current partnership status, whether it be through separation, divorce or the death of 
a partner, memories are integral to understanding these transitions. This is demonstrated 
during interview, when descriptions of partnership histories necessarily entail processes 
of recall. 
In contrast to those who separate and divorce, those who are widowed often have 
memories and relationships they - and their families - wish to celebrate and recall. 
Respondents described these memories as 'good' or 'excellent'. And ironically, it is 
because these are 'good' and the 'imaginary co-presence' (Urry, 1990) of former 
partners is so powerfully sustained, that tensions arise. And as was seen above these 
tensions sometimes triggered a less close relationship between adult children and a 
newly remarried biological parent. Nor are the difficulties in dealing with this 
imaginary co-presence confined to former partners' families. Tensions also surface 
between current partners. 
On the basis of these data, then, marriage even where it lasts till death, carries no 
automatic guarantee that those party to it will include each other as family members. 
Similarly, no more can it be assumed that separation and divorce automatically entail 
exclusion of former partners as family. As a number of writers (Cancian, 1987; Clark et 
al, 1991; Baber and Allen, 1992; Allan, 1996) argue, marriage as an institution appears 
to be evolving, moving from a social and legal act of contract to a symbol of personal 
commitment (Allan, 1996: 11). Elements of the 'pure relationship' and 'confluent love' 
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- mutual satisfaction, emotional congruence, trust - constitute some of the major 
expectations people have about contemporary intimate relationships (Giddens, 1991, 
1992). In the section which follows, it will be seen that it is precisely the presence of 
these elements in close friendships which leads people to include friends, too, as family. 
Finally, this section has focused on ties between former partners. It should be noted, 
however, that tics with former partners' families also emerge as significant. It is not 
within the scope of the current discussion to explore these many relationships in 
equivalent detail. It may be noted, however, that for eight out of thirty people 
interviewed, former partners' sisters were named as those whose changed status 
following separation or divorce was a cause for regret because of the loss of relationship 
entailed. Often, they were still included as family. Others included former parents-in- 
law, speaking of their continued support and relationship both with themselves and with 
their grandchildren. Again, in the way people reflect upon these issues their 'moral 
voices' (Hekman, 1995) are clearly heard. Their 'moral parties' (Bauman, 1993,1995), 
as I argued in Chapter 4 include a range of people for whom they feel a sense of 
responsibility and commitment. 
Friends as family 
In this final section, attention is drawn to the significance of friends in people's 
reformulated ideas of family relationships. It was shown in Chapter 2 that normative 
assumptions about 'family' and 'friends' have focused on the notion of 'choice' as one 
of the key distinguishing features of these relationships - friends can be chosen, family 
cannot. This dichotomous way of thinking about these relationships is rejected by 
parents in this study. As I showed in chapter 2 some writers (Weston, 1991) have 
shown that family relationships cannot or do not rely solely on bio-genetic or legal 
connections for their social recognition. In these contexts people rely heavily on friends 
for membership. In addition, a focus on friend as family emphasises the importance of 
commitments and obligations built up over time (1993). 
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Together, these different studies make important contributions to understanding the 
processes through which friends feature in stepfamily relationships. It was immediately 
striking how gender was a significant factor in this regard. Only one out of fifteen men 
interviewed included friends as family. By contrast, almost all the women included 
friends. And for a number of these women, friends were identified as very close 
members of their family, often as 'sisters'. It was suggested above that differences 
associated with the post-divorce biographies of women and men, particularly in relation 
to their levels of parental responsibilities, means that women often spend several years 
'living on their own with the children' - that is, living with children but without a 
partner. 
In this, women have neither the possibility of leading the independent lifestyle 
associated with single people, nor the shared lifestyle of the stereotypical couple. In 
these situations, as Stacey (1991) also found in her study of post-divorce families in 
California, women have to be resourceful in mobilising other forms of support. Often, 
this exceptional and unconditional support comes from other women. The significance 
of these friendships for people is well captured by Joan Harker: 
'I feel close to her. I mean there has been a long period during which we 
didn't see each other, but I feel close because I feel she knows me and we 
can talk about anything. And even if I'd done something really wrong, I 
mean I've no sisters, but I feel it's like having a sister ... I mean if 
something happened, I'd feel she was always there. I remember when I 
was alone, before Bob, she was very supportive and used to come and 
visit me in the evenings. But we go back a long way. We've known 
each other through our marriages, our separations and divorces. I feel I 
wouldn't have to say anything if I just popped up. I could just say, 'I feel 
really awful' (Joan Harker, aged forty-eight). 
In some respects friends seem to take on the role of partners. It is clear that in their 
post-separation or post-divorce lives, many women find themselves in situations where 
they have maximum responsibility without a corresponding degree of autonomy and 
freedom. In the absence of partners and other family members, they are able to seek out 
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other women, often in similar situations, who may be relied upon and called upon in 
good times and bad. As one woman said, such friends are crucial for enabling one to 
'climb out of the situation'. And it is this, the unconditional support these friends offer 
- practical, emotional and sometimes financial - which leads some people to regard 
them, not only like family, but sometimes as family. 
What also emerges is that the arrival of another partner on the scene invariably signalled 
changes to these relationships, ostensibly because contact at its previously high level 
could not be maintained. While reduced contact was partially accounted for by 
geographical distance (a factor which emerged earlier in this chapter), more often there 
were other constraints, too. Deb Casson's reflections on these, quoted at some length in 
the extract which follows, capture the experiences of a number of women in this study at 
the point they moved into another significant relationship with a man: 
'It's also because of my relationship with John ... When Kath and I have 
been on the 'phone at eleven or twelve o'clock at night for an hour, John 
(laughter) would be in bed next to me, and he'd either want to be 
cuddling or reading his book, and I'd be annoying him by laughing or 
giggling on the 'phone, or moaning on. So at times, I'd go downstairs. 
But basically Kath stopped phoning because I think she caught on I was a 
bit on edge. It's very difficult to weigh up the two relationships and not 
have jealousy. If it hadn't been for John, I think things would have been 
very different. We'd be 'phoning a lot more ... And if I was still living in 
Manchester, there would be a lot more popping in to see each other' (Deb 
Casson, aged forty-eight, emphasis in original). 
Although these friendships become more attenuated over time, as women move into 
longer term relationships with new partners, these data do not suggest in any 
straightforward way, a corresponding decrease in their emotional significance for the 
parties involved. In this respect, these relationships may be compared with those 
between parents and their adult children. Decreasing amounts of contact as children 
leave home or move into relationships with partners do not necessarily imply a decrease 
in emotional closeness or significance. In other ways, the changes in women's 
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friendships described above - the jealousies and uncertainties - are more readily 
associated with relationship change between partners. Howsoever they may be 
characterised, these relationships continue to be regarded as emotionally rewarding, 
even if subject to geographical and other constraints. 
As with many family relationships, the history shared by these friends continues to exert 
a powerful hold on the present. It is the quality of relationship this shared history 
evokes - loyalty, trust, and unconditional acceptance - which provides the major 
impulse towards including these friends as family. As Baber and Allen (1992) argue, a 
postmodem analysis of women's experience in families requires critical reconsideration 
of marriage and a recognition that women's intimate relationship are not static or fixed. 
Evidence on women's friendships and extra-marital relationships suggests their primary 
emotional attachment is not necessarily with their husbands or partners (Baber and 
Allen, 1992). 
The above examples are important for the insights they offer into how women handle all 
their family relationships. Separation, divorce and repartnering are not regarded as 
sufficient reasons in themselves for severance from relationships. In this respect, 
women's actions provide qualified support for Giddens' arguments on 'pure 
relationships'. While it cannot be said - given the continuing significance and sense of 
commitment a shared history appears to impose - that these relationships are continued 
'purely for their own sake', it is the case that their continued existence is not contingent 
upon legal or other definitions of their status, but on the mutual, if changing, 
satisfactions they continue to provide for the parties concerned. 
At the same time, as Deb Casson indicates above, the commitments generated by these 
friendships are held in tension with those emerging from the new relationships or 
partnerships into which women may subsequently move. Trying to achieve a 
satisfactory balance is problematic and may be represented as part of women's ongoing 
struggle to create or sustain a 'life of their own' alongside other family relationships and 
commitments. Women's relationship trajectories, embedded as these are in children's 
lives and the family relationships associated with them, do not tend towards the 
124 
unconnected, 'free-floating' destinations suggested by Giddens (1991,1992) in a 
treflexive project of the self'. 
Conclusion 
It has been argued in this chapter that experiences of separation, divorce and 
repartnering 'force' people to be reflexive about their social ties (Beck, 1992). Women 
in particular emerge as creative and resourceful in mobilising relationship resources 
where they can and choose to. There is, too, evidence from these data to lend some 
support to Giddens' (1991,1992) claims that elements of the 'pure relationship' are now 
present and discernible in a number of family relationships. While Giddens specifies 
the relationship between stepparents and their adult stepchildren as that which most 
exemplifies this shift - and this is supported by what was said in the section on step-ties 
- he suggests, as this analysis also demonstrates, that elements of the pure relationship 
may also be identified in relationships between parents and their older biological 
children. Further, it is precisely the presence of these qualities in their relationship with 
former partners and friends, which leads people to include them as family, too. While 
'blood' and 'shared history' emerge as key elements of 'family', a number of other 
factors emerge as important too - mutuality, trust, loyalty, unconditional support and 
contact. It has also been shown that people's definitions, understandings and 
expectations of 'family' are inseparable from their moral thinking on this subject, 
particularly in relation to younger children. These concerns are carried through into the 




Reaching for a Collaborative Ethic 
'All I could think about is what's best for the children really .. I didn't want to 
stop him seeing them ... I think you're torn sometimes 
because you just want to 
cocoon yourselves in an airy-fairy way. But you know it can't be. You do know 
they've got a history... ' (Linda Townsend, aged thirty-five). 
Introduction 
Bauman suggests that moral choice is both our 'bane and chance' in contemporary life 
(1995: 8). In confronting the choice between good and evil, there is an inherent 
ambivalence: the possibility of making a 'wrong' or unwise choice. Moral dilemmas 
have no ready-made solutions. The necessity of choice comes with no certainty of 
making the best choice. Attempts to do 'good' must be undertaken with no guarantees 
that either the intentions or the results are good. Uncertain outcomes, unintended 
consequences do not promise a comfortable life. For Bauman morality is full of internal 
contradictions. Few moral choices are unambiguously good, the majority are made 
between contradictory impulses (1993: 10-13; 1995: 4-7). In this study, these ideas are 
vividly realised in how parents reflect upon and handle the issue of 'contact': contact 
between a child and her or his non-resident, biological parent. If the preceding chapter 
revealed some certainty in parents' understandings of responsibility and commitment in 
relation to their children's welfare, this chapter reveals their ambivalence and 
uncertainty as to how these values or 'principled positions' (Connor, 1993) are to be 
translated into practice. 
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While there exists a variety of routes to setting up and establishing arrangements for 
contact between children and their biological parents, these are unlikely to specify 
(except in cases where residency and/or contact is contested) more than the frequency 
and duration of that contact. In other words, the 'statements of arrangements' for 
children which are currently drawn up in the event of divorce do not contain detailed 
directives on how, where and by whom this contact is to be negotiated, mediated and 
maintained. Given, as I showed in Chapter 5, that data from this and other studies 
(Maclean, 1991) indicate that in the event of separation and divorce, children are most 
likely to reside with their biological mothers, it is women who are most likely to be the 
mediators and maintainers of contact, often over a period of years. 
These arrangements have implications for all family members, particularly when 
gnewcomers' - new partners and their children - appear on the scene. Pre-existing 
arrangements for contact which worked poorly, adequately or well may have to be 
renegotiated or reworked in the light of 'new' family formation. It will be seen that the 
processes through which decisions about contact are made are not morally neutral; they 
are morally weighted in complex ways according to how the relationships at their centre 
are prioritised. Specifically, while responsibility for the child remains pivotal, it is 
recognised that the balance of that responsibility shifts over time as children develop 
their own capacities for making (morally) informed decisions about who and what is in 
their best interests. 
Contact: 'bane and chance' 
Given that biological and step- parents have their own wants, needs and interests to 
consider - in relation to themselves as well as to the children they 'share' - and given 
that these may not coincide, it is clear that contact has the potential for highlighting any 
tensions in this regard and for being a disruptive force within a particular relationship 
field. In their study of stepfamily relationships in Sheffield, Burgoyne and Clark (1984) 
found that many stepfamilies had a fundamental desire to 'start over' or make 'a fresh 
start' as a 'new family'. Some fifteen years later, this desire emerges as a similarly 
important goal in relation to men and women in this study. Contact inevitably militates 
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against the achievement of such goals. Variously described by respondents as 
'stressful', a 'hassle', or more vividly, as a 'a spanner in the works of family life', it is 
clear that it is precisely in its potential for disruption that contact may be characterised 
as the 'bane' of stepfamily life. One stepfather describes his feelings thus: 
'I suppose in my heart of hearts, I mean I think anyone would prefer the 
contact not to happen (long pause). I mean I don't mind. Well I do mind 
him coming round but only because I don't like him (laughter). It's not 
because I resent Sam going off with him. That's up to Sam. Until he 
tells us he doesn't want to go, then we have to assume that he does want 
to go ... I can't do anything about it ... But it's a hassle. You have to fit in 
round him ... And it'll be months between visits ... I feel obliged for Jane's 
sake to be here when he comes. She finds it difficult to see him ... I mean 
I feel on the periphery when he comes in, because there's no relationship 
between him and me. It's difficult, yeah ... And these are things you don't 
normally talk about to anyone' (Roger Hunt, aged twenty-eight, emphasis 
in original). 
Even where relations between current and former partners appear to be amicable, there 
is scope for tensions of a different nature to surface: 
'I hate it honestly (laughs) ... They completely change. They're allowed to stay up 
until ten or eleven o'clock at night-They've got two sets of values. If I could 
stop them going, yes I would. Then they'd just have one set of rules ... And I get 
on all right with Bill, their Dad. He's all right in his own way... ' (Steve 
Thompson, aged fifty-one). 
Moreover, even in those cases where contact had never, or no longer, featured as part of 
a family's life (for example, where children were adults and had now left home), its 
disruptive potential was still recognised in comments such as 'I just always wonder how 
people manage and cope' or 'I don't know how some stepparents cope with that 
contact'. Martin Hunt, a stepfather for whom contact was a short-lived feature of his 
life some fourteen years ago recalls it in the following terms: 
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'Well, just after I moved in, they did have some contact, but only about 
twice ... I mean I wasn't resentful at the time, 
because at the end of the 
day, I was the new partner, if you like. But now after all these years 
(pause), I would not be able to handle any contact between Jason and his 
dad, his biological father. It would be like a kick in the teeth. Basically 
I've brought Jason up, and then, if he's seeing his biological father, it 
would, I would feel like I'd been kicked in the teeth (long pause) ... And 
you can imagine all the problems you could get, where I tell Jason to do 
something and he says 'No, you're not my Dad, I'm not going to'. You 
know that would be very hurtful. Yeah, I would feel very hurt. 'Cos 
although there might not be any problem, it might be fine, I couldn't see 
it, not really .. It would upset our family life. It'd be like throwing a 
spanner in the works' (Martin Hunt, aged thirty-one). 
These different comments raise a number of points. First, it is evident here (as it is in 
the data more widely) that contact between children and their non-resident, biological 
parents does indeed entail some degree of intrusion by former partners into the 'new' 
family's domestic space and a disruption of both long-term and more recently 
established routines and practices. These may take the form of visits, telephone calls or, 
as Steve Thompson explains, different sets of values and ground rules. 
Secondly, it emerges that it is not only the practical and organisational aspects of contact 
which have to be worked at, but people's feelings and emotions too. Disruption and 
intrusion are not only to be understood in terms of former partners' access to the 
household space of the 'new' family; they signify, too, their access to the affective space 
of that family. For many, it is this emotional dimension which represents the most 
significant hurdle to overcome when confronted with choices about how to handle 
contact. As Roger Hunt suggests above, feelings of hurt, resentment or anger may be 
compounded by perceptions that 'these are feelings you don't normally talk about' 
because in some way they fall short of what the respondents as well as others may 
consider acceptable or appropriate. Moral pressures to find space for the emotional 
claims of former partners sit uneasily with current partners' hopes that space might also 
be found for their own. 
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Thirdly, it is clear from the above examples that new partners feel constrained to 'fit 
round' and support existing contact arrangements, while at the same time being 'on the 
periphery' of them. This suggests new partners perceive that their arrival on the scene 
has little impact. In reality, as will become apparent in the course of this discussion, 
arrival of a new partner does effect some discernible shifts in people's positions, 
although this cannot be visualised crudely in terms of their movement from periphery to 
centre or vice versa. That these shifts are often gradual suggests another reason why 
they may not be apparent to those most recently involved. It cannot be assumed, 
therefore, that feelings of having to 'fit round' other people's priorities are confined 
solely to newcomers on the scene. There is some evidence that these feelings, and the 
tensions and discontents associated with them, feature amongst 'old' partners too. This 
suggests, although it cannot be stated with certainty, that the non-resident biological 
parents associated with these families may share these feelings too. This poses a moral 
dilemma for both step- and biological parents in terms of deciding who, if anyone, 
should stand 'on the periphery' when it comes to decisions about contact. 
Finally, given these difficulties, it is striking that in all cases where arrangements for 
contact were currently in place, respondents' views about these were not wholly or 
straightforwardly negative, but elicited a decidedly ambivalent response. If parents' 
views about contact can be understood as existing along a continuum between those 
who would like it to continue and those who would like it to cease, all parents, both 
biological and step-, were adamant that to stop it or obstruct it would be wrong. This 
was so (as in the examples above), even in cases where the 'ideal' situation was 
envisaged as a complete loss of contact: 
'My ideal would be if Joseph lost contact with Alan. But I know I can't 
really say that. That's their decision and it would be wrong of me to 
push that in any way ... But if I had the choice ... (laughtcr)' (Dave Hughes, 
aged twenty-scvcn). 
Exceptions to the view that impeding contact is 'wrong' arose only in limited and 
specific contexts. First, they arose in one case where contact had already ceased some 
years previously (see comment by Martin Hunt above). Secondly, they arose in two 
situations where children had themselves decided they wished contact to cease (see 
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below). Thirdly, absence of contact was justified in two cases where it was perceived 
by the biological mother that either herself or her child was at risk from violence. Even 
then, in one of these cases, an effort was made to accommodate contact in some 
mutually acceptable form: 
'I was having my first night out after Amy was born and her dad came 
over and asked me 'Do you know if she's mine yetT. 'Cos she hadn't 
got her colour then and the other bloke I was seeing was white. And the 
next minute, his new girlfriend glassed me. I had a bottle over my head 
and I was on the floor. And I thought 'I'm not putting up with this'... So 
really, it's like she's stopping him coming to see Amy. And of course I 
won't let him take her up there. Because I mean, she's had a go at me, so 
you don't know what might get into her. So he's said he'll take her up to 
his mother's. And I know his mum and I trust them on that' (Lesley 
Morrison, aged twenty-one). 
Contact: for the sake of the children 
Together, these passages provide some illustration of Bauman's point that many moral 
decisions are made between contradictory impulses. But if contact is haunted by 
difficulty, ambivalence and uncertainty, then it raises the question of why parents go to 
such lengths to accommodate it. In reflecting on this, there was a discernible shift from 
positions of ambivalence to the positions of certainty which marked parents' views in 
the preceding chapter on relationships. It emerges unequivocally that contact takes 
place 'for the children's sake' because parents believe it's what's 'best for the children'. 
One biological mother captures the mood of many respondents when she says: 
'I just think it's worth having the contact for the children's sake. I think 
it's really important. A mother's and a father's. And the children know 
where they're coming from themselves, so they have a stability. And if 
you're not together, at least they know each side of their family and they 
are stable in their own home' (Joan Harker, aged forty-eight). 
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Similarly, a stepfather: 
'I mean what we do here ... it's only because we believe it's best for the 
children. I'm not saying that as the years go by and the kids are older, if 
we were doing something as a family and their Dad was coming up, then 
they wouldn't necessarily get invited round as they do now. I mean I 
wouldn't say we consider them as friends but there's no animosity' (Tom 
O'Hare, aged thirty-three). 
In talking about why parents believe contact is important, two respondents (both men, 
who happen also to be brothers) raised the question of the relationship between contact 
and Child Support or maintenance payments. Both expressed the view that there was 
some correlation between the payment of maintenance and the kind of contact which 
ensues. Martin Hunt recalls the time that Jason's biological father was paying 
maintenance: 
'He did pay for a little while, but when it stopped we didn't push it. We 
didn't want him to start again because that money, if you like, gave him 
access to Jason ... And when the money stopped, he stopped coming. He 
didn't even try and contact Jason ... They're saying, if I'm paying for a 
child, I want something for my money ... But that's the wrong reason for 
wanting to see their kids. But the money gives them contact ... I mean if I 
was paying all that money, I would want some influence on the child's 
upbringing (Martin Hunt, aged thirty-one). 
Martin's brother, Roger Hunt, views the implications of maintenance in very similar 
terms: 
'I think in most cases the paying of maintenance is like saying 'I have 
automatic access on my terms to the'children'... which is why, although I 
agree with maintenance, I don't think it should be linked to access ... It 
just changes the whole attitude. If you pay, then that payment is more 
than just money ... Financial isn't just financial. Oh no, I don't think so. 
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Definitely not. There are what are perceived as certain rights which go 
with the paying of maintenance. So there are implications there, very 
much so, for people in new families' (Roger Hunt, aged twenty-eight). 
The view advanced by these two brothers is that 'money is never just money' and that 
child support payments do in some way 'buy into' relationships between non-resident 
biological parents (most of whom are fathers) and their children. Because this is seen to 
prioritise financial interests over children's interests, both men regard this as the 
gwrong' reason for contact to take place. While there is little direct evidence from the 
data in this study to support such views, it may be supposed, as Roger Hunt claims, that 
both contact and child support payments do have implications for 'new families', and 
that some of these implications relate to family and kinship boundaries in the longer 
term. These views are to some extent supported in research literature elsewhere 
(Maclean and Eekelaar, 1997). 
It is clear from all these examples that the question of why parents have contact is to be 
distinguished sharply from questions of how theyfeel about it. And in the way some 
parents spontaneously drew this distinction themselves, they showed they were aware of 
the contradictions in what they did. Sometimes awareness was implicit as in the 
following case: 
R: 'Joseph started getting rather unsure about going after Matthew had 
been born. And the first time my ex-husband came to pick him up, he 
wouldn't go ... It went on for at least six months ... We talked about it, him 
not going, refusing to go. So during that time, it got to the point of my 
ex-husband coming to the house and playing with Joseph at the house, 
while I (laughter) skedaddled. Sometimes his new wife came as well. 
1: Oh (laughter). Did you feel OK about that? 
R: No, not really ... It was a bit awkward. We were there lurking in the 
kitchen and they were feeling very awkward in the lounge (laughter). 
But I did it (pause) because Joseph quite enjoyed having him on his own 
territory, rather than having to go out to a strange place ... So to keep 
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everybody happy .. You know, rather than to just shut the door. Not that 
Alan wants to stay out of the way. He's always wanted to see Joseph, 
even if it's only once a fortnight. I just felt it was better for Joseph to see 
something of him ... And now he's happy to go again ... Alan's obviously 
bonded with him more, become a bit closer by coming into Joseph's 
house to play with him ... I feel 
it's got to be better for Joseph' (Marion 
Hughes, aged thirty-three). 
At other times, awareness of the contradiction was explicit. Here, a stepfather who has 
just described how he 'hates' contact and would like it to cease (see above), almost 
immediately retracts: 
'But you know, I contradict myself here, because I know what it's like to 
have your kids, sort of taken away, if you like. Because that's what it 
would be ... And Bill would 
hurt, it would hurt him. It's the same thing 
with my kids from my first wife ... I was really hurt when she emigrated 
and I couldn't see them ... But a couple of months after we split, I got into 
trouble again and went into prison again. And that was the end of it. 
She'd had enough and I don't blame her (laughter). She just went ... There 
was no way I could see them. There was nothing I could do about it. 
And it was years that I didn't see the kids ... So unless Bill came up here to 
see them, then he wouldn't see them. 
1: And would you mind if he came up here? 
R: No, not at all ... he does come to see them here. 'Cos that's what's best 
for the kids (pause). You know, I'd like to get it, do it right' (Steve 
Thompson, aged fifty-one). 
What emerges clearly from all these examples is that parents' concerns about contact do 
not derive solely or primarily from legal requirements in this regard. It seems, as Steve 
Thompson says, that doing 'what's best for the kids' is the key motivation behind 
parents' desires 'to get it' or 'do it right'. Interestingly, he draws on his own experience 
of being 'on the periphery' in decisions about contact as a resource enabling him to 
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decide what is the best course of action in the current situation. This is an important 
point (and one to which I return in Chapter 8). 
Moral reputations 
At the same time, there are hints in what people say that 'what's best for the kids' is not 
the only issue at stake. There are suggestions that concerns about moral reputation may 
be another motivating factor in 'getting it right' in this context. In Chapter 2, attention 
was drawn to Finch and Mason's (1993) arguments that moral reputations in families 
are negotiated over time through the kinds of commitments people make (Finch and 
Mason, 1993: 158). It was suggested that parents in stepfamilies may feel under 
pressure to invest heavily in their new relationships in order to negotiate - or renegotiate 
- the kinds of moral reputations they aspire to. And as Roger Hunt points out in the 
opening comment to the preceding chapter, this may be particularly important in the 
case of stepparents given the negative stereotypes of them in existence. 
Drawing on Howard Becker's ideas, Finch and Mason also argue that people make 
investments or 'side bets' (Becker, 1960) in relationships. Through this process of side- 
betting, moral and material 'valuables' (Becker, 1960) are created which may be lost if 
people withdraw from relationships or fail to continue along a committed path (Finch 
and Mason, 1993: 93-94). These ideas seem particularly apposite for what is happening 
here. Having set out along a particular path of commitment with their 'new' families, 
stepparents in particular are aware that if they hinder contact, it might as one stepfather 
suggests, 'work against me in the long run' and have repercussions in precisely the ways 
Becker suggests. Another stepfather voices similar concerns: 
'It's difficult when you're coming into a situation like this. I mean you 
can't turn round and say 'No, I'm not having it'. I can't do that ... It would 
affect my relationship with Emma and with Liam, too, of course. If I 
didn't take this kind of passive role ... 
if I made things more difficult, it 
could be used against me ... It could jeopardise our relationship, Liam's 
and mine' (Roger Hunt, aged twenty-eight). 
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Roger Hunt's views on contact are shared by his partner, Emma Marshall, who is 
Liam's biological mother: 
'... if they want a relationship, they will have to work at it. And I've 
given them the access to do that and that's as much as I can do, and that's 
as much as I want to do (laughter). And I suppose really that I know that 
either Liam or his father can turn round to me and say 'Because of you, I 
have no relationship with my son or father'. So, if I had my own way, I 
would say 'No. you don't see him again'. But ... (long pause)' (Emma 
Marshall, aged thirty-four). 
What is important to observe here is that the way in which contact is handled is assumed 
or acknowledged to have some influence on the child's kin relationships. It is also 
interesting to note here is that it is children's role in the process of negotiating moral 
reputations which emerges as a major concern for parents. This follows from what 
parents have said earlier about relationships with their children. Alongside, or prior to, 
their relationships with current partners, it is relationships with children which are most 
valued and which parents are most reluctant to jeopardise. As I argued in my discussion 
of the moral subject, as children grow older, they too learn the moral language of their 
culture and develop moral skills and moral knowledge accordingly. Although Finch and 
Mason (1993) do not specifically include children (those aged eighteen years and under) 
in their schema of family negotiations, it may be argued that these children do have an 
important role to play in negotiating the moral reputations of their parents, particularly 
when their parents separate, divorce and introduce new partners. Certainly this is the 
perception of parents in this study. The role of children may be particularly signiflcant 
in the context of reordered or stepfamily relationships where negative images of 
stepparents' moral reputations are also on the agenda. 
Discourses focusing on the continuing responsibilities of all parents for their children's 
welfare in post-divorce situations point to contact as a key means through which these 
responsibilities are to be realised (see Maclean and Eekelaar, 1997). By implication, 
this suggests it is a key means through which parents in stepfamilies can create 
'valuables' in terms of the moral reputations they build and negotiate. If parents' 
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handling of contact must secure not only their children's interests but their own moral 
reputations as well, then to 'get it' or to 'do it right' will require more than the minimal 
effort implied in legal definitions of contact. For this reason, if contact is the bane of 
parents' lives, some are alert, too, to its opportunities. Contradictory though it may 
seem, contact can provide parents in stepfamilies with the chance to 'get it and do it 
right', to reach for an ethic which puts into visible form the 'principled positions' 
(Connor, 1993) of responsibility, engagement and commitment which they advocate in 
relation to their children's welfare. In what follows, I explore the processes through 
which some parents achieve this. 
'Moral conversations' 
While there arc many ways in which parents handle the organisational and practical 
aspects of contact, there arc some common features in how people approach the 
decision-making process, specifically in how they put aside or overcome their feelings 
of ambivalence. In conceptualising this process, aspects of Bcnhabib's (1992) work 
provide some valuable insights. She proposes a universalist discourse ethic based on an 
'interactive' universalism, where the emphasis is on process rather than outcome 
(Benhabib, 1992: 37). In doing this, her conception of a developmental, relational 
moral subject remains central. The core idea behind her reformulation of the 
universalist tradition in ethics is the construction of the 'moral point of view' in terms of 
'the model of a 'moral conversation' in which the capacity to reverse perspectives and 
be willing to reason from the other's point of view, and the sensitivity to hear that voice 
isparamount'(Benhabib, 1992: 8). 
Central to the art of moral conversation and a reversal of perspective is what Benhabib 
calls 'enlarged thinking': thinking in the company of others and attempting to see things 
from theirpoint of view. Importantly, the goal of a moral conversation is not consensus 
or unanimity, but reaching some form of practicable agreement. Insofar as we are 
willing and able to practise this art, we can claim to be taking a 'moral point of view'. 
She suggests that respect for others, or 'reciprocal recognition' is key to what binds all 
social groupings or communities, whether members of a kin group, religion or whatever. 
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It is an attitude and moral feeling acquired through socialisation and corresponds to the 
'golden rule' of 'Do unto others as you would have others do unto you'. It is this 
universal rule which enjoins us to reverse perspective among members of a given moral 
community' (Benhabib, 1992: 31-32). And again - and herein lies the importance of her 
position for what I am arguing - she locates this process firmly in 'those ethical 
relationships in which we are always already immersed in the lifeworld', including that 
is, family relationships (10). 
She argues that to be a family member means to know how to reason from the 
standpoint of the 'concrete other'. The process begins, she claims, in admonitions to 
children - and I would add, admonitions between children - which begin 'What if 
someone threw sand in your face? How would you feel then? ' Indeed, she contends 
(over optimistically, perhaps, if one considers family studies more widely), that one 
cannot act within these ethical relationships without being able to think from the 
standpoint of our child, our spouse, our sister or brother. It is not, of course, my 
intention to engage here in debates about discourse ethics. Rather, it is my intention to 
show how the (familial) processes through which Benhabib claims such an ethic may be 
put into practice are relevant in the analysis of how parents in this study reach for some 
workable agreement about contact. 
Reversing perspectives: contact and the locational interest of children 
It is clear from what has already been said that one of the key concerns for parents is 
where contact should take place. In other words, the locational interests of children in 
relation to contact, and how these may change over time, are regarded by parents as an 
important aspect of their overall responsibilities for their children's welfare. It has been 
shown that, despite the disruption caused, contact sometimes takes place within the 
household space of the 'new' family unit. This willingness to put one's domestic space 
at the disposal of former partners because it is believed to be in children's best interests 
emerges as not unusual in these data. In the passage which follows, Tom O'Hare, a 
cohabiting stepfather with three stepchildren and one, non-resident, biological child, 
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talks about contact arrangements between his three stepchildren and their biological 
father: 
'And he comes up to see them on average about once every six 
weeks ... So that's quite an 
isolation from the kids. But I suppose the way 
he does contribute, and in a large way, is that he does give us 
maintenance ... And it was Sam's second 
birthday just a few weeks ago, 
and they came up ... They came round to the house 
in the evening on 
Saturday to see the kids. And we did a bar-b-q for Sam's birthday. And 
they stayed ... So it's quite a 
friendly situation. I mean obviously we have 
things which are important for the two of us. But whenever we think it's 
really important for the kids, we try to make sure it works for them ... And 
yeah, they used to come and use the house at one point. We would move 
out ... and 
let him and his partner have the house with the kids. The idea 
being for the kids, that they weren't having to move house all the time; 
we were. And it gave him time with them. And again, he wasn't 
working at that time, so, you know, he had very little money. Em, so 
yeah, it was for the kids' (Tom O'Hare, aged thirty-three). 
Applying Benhabib's model of a 'moral conversation' to the above passage, it is evident 
that for those who are party to this conversation, a primary concern is how responsibility 
for, and commitment to, their children's welfare are to be realised in decisions about 
contact. Working out and reaching agreement on the children's locational interests 
while at the same time acknowledging the financial input and economic status of the 
biological father, requires imaginative and collaborative effort. Leaving aside for now 
the possible implications of the biological father's financial input and its link to access, 
it is clear that the key to this process is precisely, as Benhabib argues, the capacity to 
reverse perspective, a willingness to be able to reason from another's point of view. In 
doing this, in seeing not only the children, but also their biological father, as a 'concrete' 
other, with particular endowments and needs, this 'moral party' (Bauman, 1993) reaches 
a workable agreement or what may be termed a collaborative ethic. 
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Here again, Bauman's 'moral party' includes not just two people, but all those who take 
part in a moral conversation, is intentional, conveying as it does the way in which family 
responsibilities, almost by definition, entail consideration of more than one other. What 
parents made clear there, Tom O'Hare reiterates in the passage above: responsibility for 
children, engagement with their fate, and commitment to their welfare, almost always 
entails some involvement in those ethical relationships in which that child is 'always 
already immersed in the lifeworld' (Benhabib, 1992: 10). In the context of stepfamily 
relationships, that means, by definition, being involved across a series of 'new' and 
'old' family relationship, history, and household boundaries. 
At the same time, recalling the ambivalence which marked respondents' discussions of 
contact earlier, it may be imagined that reversing perspective - and acting on it - is not 
easy. The costs of its moral demands, in both emotional and practical terms, are high. 
Tom O'Hare makes this explicit in how he continues: 
R: 'I mean it's hard in certain respects. And like when they come now 
we tend to let them go in and see the kids and we stay in the kitchen ... you 
have to step back and out in all kinds of ways (long pause). 
I: And why is that do you think? 
R: Em (long pause), it's a combination of things. Partly it's my own 
insecurity that maybe sometimes I'm not sure that the way I deal with 
Tom is the best way. And maybe his father would deal with him 
differently and wouldn't like the way I'm doing it ... But it's also to do 
with the fact that I think Paul deserves the respect because he's the 
father. Because if the situation were reversed, I would like to be given 
the respect myself. If for some reason I went round and I spent time 
seeing Becky at Nina's place ... I would like to think that whoever was 
there would give me and Becky a bit of space. So I think when Paul's 
there, he should have the opportunity to deal with the situation first. And 
I think under the circumstances, and the person he is, I think he does the 
best that he can. And that's why I'm prepared to give him the respect. I 
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mean if he was someone who'd walked out and abandoned them for 
several years and never seen them and suddenly wanted back in, then I 
may feel different. But that isn't what's happened' (Tom O'Hare, aged 
thirty-three years). 
Again, this passage reveals that while it is indeed difficult to stand back and see things 
from other people's points of view, it nonetheless emerges as the most reliable route for 
reaching a practicable solution which not only meets the children's needs but also gives 
some recognition to the position of the non-resident father. With regard to the latter, it 
appears there are two dimensions to Tom O'Hare's respect for the biological father. 
First, in putting himself in Paul's position, his respect corresponds to the 'Golden Rule' 
alluded to earlier. Against the charge that such motivation for moral action is too self- 
referential, it may be argued that precisely for that reason, it is likely to be 'good 
enough' for achieving its moral objective: contact that is comparatively 'tension-free' 
and which exists on a regular, ongoing basis. If, as Wolfe argues, morality is a learned 
practice which entails a great deal of trial and error and imperfect moral decisions 
(1989: 233), it follows that moral motivations, as an integral part of moral practice, are 
likely to be similarly 'imperfect' or messy. 
Secondly, Tom O'Hare's respect for Paul derives from the latter's consistent approach 
to contact. Given that Paul has migrated some 250 miles from where his children 
reside, his visits to see them every six weeks or so are seen as evidence of considerable 
commitment. Consistency emerges as an important value in parents' moral thinking 
about contact. As Tom OHare says, he 'may feel different', less amenable to contact if 
the children's biological father was someone 'who'd walked out and abandoned them'. 
In the case of another stepfather, Martin Hunt, he does indeed 'feel different' for 
precisely these reasons. It was seen above that the possibility of his stepson's biological 
father 'wanting back in' after having abandoned contact for fourteen years, was a 
difficult prospect to deal with emotionally. Nonetheless, he reaches here for some 
understanding of the situation from his stepson's point of view: 
'I can't see it happening now ... but if anything, it would be Jason's sort of 
instigating the contact, as being like he'd want to know - because he's 
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growing up - what the score is. 'Cos possibly if it was me, I might want 
to know about my biological parent. 'Cos it's different, isn't it, 'cos I 
would be the child then, not the parent. And children want to know. Id 
just want to know (long pause) where I came from (long pause)' (Martin 
Hunt, aged thirty-one, emphasis in original). 
Again, it is interesting to note (and this is a point I return to in Chapter 8), that Martin 
Hunt's own experience of being in a stepfamily from the age of five or six years old, 
emerges as an important factor in his emphasis on the importance of consistency from 
both parents, biological and step-. 
A question of values: stability 
It is clear from the foregoing examples that closely connected to concerns about contact 
and the locational interests of children are concerns about stability. Stability emerges as 
a fundamental value or starting point in moral conversations about contact (as indeed it 
does in parents' moral conversations more widely). A reading of these data indicates 
that parents in stepfamilies are often aware that charges of family instability are likely to 
be amongst those most frequently levelled at them. That some here reach contact 
'solutions' which are considered least disruptive to their children, albeit most disruptive 
to themselves, suggests again that 'stepfamily' moral values are not oppositional to so- 
called 'traditional' family values, but remain firmly in line with them. Such a finding is 
unsurprising in the light of Hekman's (1995) argument that morality may be understood 
as a set of practices which members of a given culture are likely, in many respects, to 
share. We have therefore, as Hekman insists (following Butler, 1990) to fashion a 
moral discourse with the tools available to us. 
Applying these arguments here, while parents in stepfamilies may share widely held 
views on the importance and desirability of stability, they are likely to speak about it in a 
different 'moral voice' and give it a different shape in moral practice. In dominant 
moral discourses on 'the family', family stability is linked to a particular view of 
household: stable families are families where parents and their biological children co- 
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reside. In families whose relationships have been reordered through separation and 
divorce, this is most often not the case. In addition, as has become clear in the course of 
this discussion, contact undermines the possibility of this kind of stability even further. 
Parents are only too aware of this: 
'Somebody out there rockin' the boat ain't stabilising the family. I mean 
that could split 'ern up' (Martin Hunt, aged thirty-one, emphasis in 
original). 
In other words, not only are dominant versions of stability unlikely to serve stepfamilies 
well, but unless they resist these definitions, they are inevitably setting themselves up to 
'fail' on the basis of such criteria. Stepfamilies therefore have to reformulate stability in 
different terms and create a different practice around it. 
From what has already been said, parents do this in two ways. Some interpret stability 
as a need for children to remain in one household while non-resident parents visit them 
there. Here stability is identified mainly with location. This occurred in those cases 
where children were younger, not yet at an age where it was considered appropriate or in 
their best interests for them to travel between households. In other cases, where 
children were older, there emerges an understanding of stability which emphasises 
routine and consistency in the frequency of contact. Location, in these instances, is a 
secondary consideration. In crafting different discourses or perspectives on the meaning 
of stability, parents are, in Hekman's (1995) terms, employing the discursive tools 
available to them and reshuffling them for their purposes. In doing this, parents create a 
moral space in which they can define an ethical practice appropriate to their needs. It is 
this creative practice or creative opposition which many regard as the mark of moral 
agency (see for example Wolfe, 1989; Pritchard, 1991; Benhabib, 1992; Bauman, 1993, 
1995; Hekman, 1995). 
Keeping the moral conversation open-ended 
It is apparent that, sometimes, the costs of reversing perspectives are too high: 
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'And for the first few years after we split, he always used to come for 
Christmas dinner. But the first Christmas after Bob arrived on the scene, 
Pete wasn't actually going to come for Christmas dinner. You know, I 
can remember being a bit worried about whether he would be expecting 
that. He rang me and said he'd been, but Bob's car was there and he 
wasn't going to come in. And I said 'well Bob's gone to work now'. 
And he said 'No, I just can't come. You'll have to explain to the 
children why I can't come'. So he wouldn't come that Christmas 
day ... And I thought 
he should have come in to see them. I mean I'd been 
through a lot with his relationships. But for the children, I'd let him 
come and go, just for them. And I felt they were expecting him and they 
wouldn't understand (Joan Harker, aged forty-eight). 
While the explicit target of Joan Harker's moral disapproval or moral resentment 
(Pritchard, 1991) is her former partner's refusal to act as 'he should' one Christmas 
morning, its implicit target is his refusal or inability to practise the art of 'enlarged 
thinking' (Benhabib 1992): a refusal to put himself in the position of his children and try 
and see things from their point of view. There is the suggestion that if he had done this, 
a different outcome would have ensued. From the perspective of Joan Harker, his 
inability to do this results in foreclosure of the moral conversation, and a situation where 
not only consensus, but practicable agreement, too, remains out of reach. 
If this suggests that reversing perspectives is indeed the key process through which 
agreement can be reached, it also highlights how there is no mechanism inherent in a 
moral conversation to ensure this. Benhabib's assertion, quoted earlier, that we 'cannot' 
act in family relationships without reversing perspectives now returns to haunt her. It is 
clear that we can and do. Perhaps it is in recognition of this that she later emphasises 
how a willingness to reverse perspective and reason from the other's point of view 
cannot in itself guarantee consent or agreement. In order to reach beyond impasse, 
beyond the real and irreconcilable conflicts of interest which may exist amongst those 
party to a moral conversation, the conversation must, as Benhabib insists, remain 'open- 
ended'. That the moral conversation between Joan Harker and her former partner 
remained open-ended is implicit in how she continues: 
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'But the year after that he came. And he comes in now for about an hour 
and a half on Christmas day, and he often brings his dad too ... and Bob 
offers them a drink when they come in ... And I think it's for the children I 
do it' (Joan Harker, aged forty-eight). 
It is notable that in keeping this moral conversation open-ended, those party to it reach a 
workable agreement which goes beyond what was initially envisaged as possible or 
desirable. While it is unclear exactly how this change was brought about, it does imply 
that if the freedom to make moral choices may sometimes result in 'wrong' or unwise 
choices (Bauman, 1993; 1995), an open-ended process of reversing perspective, 
reciprocal recognition, and 'thinking in the company of others' may be one way of 
minimising such outcomes. Certainly, a reading of these data indicates that contact 
arrangements 'work better' or have fewer tensions when these moral criteria are 
operative. 
As Wolfe suggests, morality is a negotiated process, something we learn through the 
actual experience of trying to live together. Individuals, by reflecting periodically on 
what they have done in the past, try to ascertain what they ought to do next (Wolfe, 
1989: 216). Following Wolfe's ideas, a more helpful - because less polarised - 
understanding of 'getting it right' emerges, one in which being moral or leaming to 
choose more wisely is viewed as the acquisition of certain skills, a learned practice. 
And indeed, this ties in with Benhabib's view that the ability to reverse perspective is 
achieved only through the practice of enlarged thinking. 
Keeping the outcome flexible 
Newpartners on the scene 
Implied in what Joan Harker says in the passage above, is not only the importance of 
keeping the moral conversation open-ended, but the importance of being flexible about 
its outcome during the various stages of its existence. In this study, the importance of 
flexibility as a factor in easing tensions around contact emerges in two situations. First, 
as Joan Harker implies above, it is important at the point a new partner appears on the 
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scene. This was alluded to earlier where new partners voiced their ambivalence towards 
existing arrangements for contact. Here, Tom O'Hare recalls the point at which he and 
his new partner 'went official': 
'But when we actually decided we were going official as a couple, when 
we worked out that I would be able to take over the mortgage, we also 
made it clear at that point, because we were going to be establishing this 
as our family home, that we didn't think it would be right, the correct 
thing for them to come and use the house, I mean to stay here. And Paul 
agreed. In fact he said in his own words that he'd been anticipating this. 
And when he came up the next time, I was actually quite surprised 
because we didn't ask, but he actually gave Linda his keys. He said 
'You'll be wanting these'... And I was really impressed by that to be 
honest. I didn't expect it. And I was really impressed' (Tom O'Hare, 
aged thirty-three, emphasis in original). 
There is evidence here that this moral conversation is both open-ended and flexible 
about its outcome. In practising the art of enlarged thinking and reversing perspectives 
those party to it are able to take account of each others' altered positionings. What was 
formerly 'right' or appropriate for contact arrangements is no longer considered to be so. 
There is reciprocal recognition of the need for a change in practice. This implies that 
some ethical outcomes to moral conversations may be transitional. In Benhabib's terms, 
people are demonstrating that ethics needs to be 'contextually sensitive'. The 
'principled positions' (Connor, 1993) agreed during a moral conversation - in this case 
responsibility for children and a commitment to their welfare - remain unchanged. 
Another interesting aspect of the example above is the question of what motivates the 
reciprocal recognition or mutual respect between the step- and biological father. It does 
not appear to be straightforwardly a mutual respect of persons. It appears also to be a 
mutual respect of property. There appear to be two important points in effecting this 
shift. First, Tom O'Hare is taking over the payment of the mortgage so that the property 
is no longer Paul's in financial terms. Secondly, in doing this the 'old' matrimonial 
home is now established as the 'new' family home. The changes in arrangements for 
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contact which result are in line with dominant discourses on 'the family' which stress 
ownership rights and the 'privacy' of 'the family'. Yet Paul continues to visit the 'new' 
family's home, albeit on different, more formalised tenns. 
This raises the same question as was raised earlier in relation to child support payments: 
namely, whether there is any correlation between paying maintenance (as Paul is doing) 
and the kind of contact arrangements which ensue. As stated earlier, two respondents 
make it clear that in their view maintenance payments in some way 'buy into' 
relationships between non-resident biological parents and their children. There is no 
hint here, nor in his interview more widely, that Tom OHare perceives such a 
correlation to exist. Indeed (see above), he regards these payments as a mark of Paul's 
commitment to the children. 
Children's decisions about contact 
Secondly, flexibility is essential at the point children themselves make it clear what they 
want to do. Possibly one of the most difficult dilemmas facing parents is deciding at 
what point the balance of responsibilty for making decisions about contact should shift 
towards the children involved. It was seen above that even when children are very 
young they are sometimes able to make it plain that existing arrangements for contact 
are not appropriate for their needs. As Dave Hughes says of his stepson Joseph who is 
aged five years: 
'In fact it's up to Joseph entirely what sort of contact he has. It's purely 
his decision. But he is still very young to make that decision' (Dave 
Hughes, aged twenty-seven). 
Yet even when children are older it is envisaged that such decisions may not be entirely 
straightforward. Tom O'Hare, whose biological daughter is only three years old, 
reflects upon the prospect of facing this dilemma. Experience of his three stepchildren's 
abilities to change their minds has made him acutely aware of these difficulties: 
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'There's a part of me ... that if when she's older, Becky said 'I want to 
come and live with you', then I would fight for it. But I wouldn't do it 
until she'd made that decision because I don't think that would be at all 
just or fair. But if she'd made that decision and I knew it was what she 
really wanted, then yes, I would be prepared to risk the relationship I 
have with Becky's mum at the moment which works reasonably 
well ... But then again, that's difficult, because even at eight and ten, they 
change their minds completely from one minute to the next, you know 
(laughter). So I don't know when you decide a child is old enough to 
make these decisions' (Tom O'Hare, aged thirty-three). 
Respondents thus appear to be aware of children's equal claims, if not abilities 
(Benhabib, 1992) to be considered in decisions affecting their interests. This is so even 
in those cases where children are not yet able to join verbally in the moral conversations 
about them. These examples also illustrate that parents recognise the force of Bauman's 
point that the moral relationship of responsibility or caring is fundamentally a power 
relationship, with the ever-present risk of stealing the other's autonomy. And as he has 
also said, moral choices have to be made without the certainty that either the intentions 
or outcomes are good. Sometimes children's capacities to make these decisions are 
more apparent and are respected accordingly: 
'But you see, contact was so rare. Months between visits. But I do 
remember the last time they went on holiday and Roger must have been 
quite small. They went for a week's holiday, both the boys. And you see 
after that Roger didn't ever want to go again. And I never stopped him 
from going but I didn't feel I had to insist he went. And he didn't want 
to go, and so he didn't go' (Maýorie Phillips, aged fifty-six). 
The above examples demonstrate that if moral conversations about children and contact 
are not to 'shout down' children's own feelings in the matter, parents need to be 
sensitive to the point at which children's 'moral voices' are ready to be heard. These 
concerns are made explicit in the following passage where a mother recalls some of the 
tensions surrounding these shifts in responsibility: 
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'They saw their father in the school holidays ... At first the girls wanted to 
go, then they got past wanting to go ... I encouraged them to go at first. I 
don't know why, I wouldn't again. I thought it was my duty because I 
didn't want to upset him. And when they wouldn't go once, I took them 
down the motorway and he met us there, and Gemma wouldn't get out of 
the car ... She was about eight then and she 
definitely didn't want to go. I 
had to mediate between the two cars. It was crazy-They would have 
gone if I'd insisted. And so I brought them back again. But I felt like I 
was shirking my responsibilty. That's how I felt about it at the time. 
And he was terribly upset of course. And I said I'll have to take them 
home. I'll talk to them and see what I can do. And I drove them home 
and talked to them and I did try to persuade them, but they wouldn't go' 
(Deb Casson, aged forty-eight). 
Conclusion 
The costs of the moral demands in relation to contact - of keeping the moral 
conversation open-ended, of being flexible and creating a contextually sensitive ethic - 
are high. It requires an ongoing willingness to think in the company of others, to see 
things from another's point of view, to practise reciprocal recognition and enlarged 
thinking, not only in relation to one other, but in relation to several others. Given that in 
the majority of cases, children reside with their mothers following the separation or 
divorce of their parents, it is women who are most likely to be the major mediators and 
maintainers of the contact relationship. But there is clear evidence too that while men in 
this study are not often the initiators in moral conversations about contact, they do take 
active part in putting these principles into practice. These morally reflexive qualities are 
evident too in parents' handling of inheritance, the issue with which the following 
chapter is concerned. 
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Chapter 7 
Stepfamilies and Inheritance 
'Cos the problem is, we made a will recently, and Roger and Martin have 
got their father's name, but our daughter's got my name, a different 
name ... We would 
like them to have equal amounts, equal shares if 
anything happens to us. So we actually took this will out and got it done 
so all three get exactly the same, regardless of what their name is. But 
they did tell us when we went to do it, that if we didn't do that, my 
daughter could claim the whole lot. We wanted to get to the position 
where nobody would have to go to the solicitor to try and get a bit 
(laughs). So we thought that if it was all clear, there can't be no 
problems. And we've told them, all three, what we've done ... No, see, if 
people just leave it and see what happens to it, some people are likely to 
get nothing. Not under the present law, unless it's changed. They'd 
have to take the other one to court. That's the only way they'd get any if 
it weren't already down. So we can sleep easy tonight, see (laughter), 
knowing that if anything happens it's all written down' (Ken Phillips, 
aged fifty-eight, emphasis in original). 
Introduction 
It has long been recognised that in a society based upon the private ownership of 
property, inheritance is a key mechanism through which the social and economic order 
(and its privileges) are reproduced. In particular, as Engels argues, the transmission of 
property from one person to another and from one generation to the next - either during 
the lifetime of both parties or through inheritance after death - enables wealth to remain 
in the hands of a small number of families (Engels, 1985 edition; Scott, 1982). 
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However, the spread of home ownership in the UK in the thirty-year period between 
1960 and 1990 (from one-third to two-thirds of households) together with a range of 
other demographic changes - fertility rates, the ages at which parents have children, 
increased longevity, and increased rates of divorce and remarriage - mean not only that 
more people have something substantial to bequeath, but also - and this emerged clearly 
in the preceding chapter - that the shape and composition of families from which 
testators are drawn are likely to be different from in the past (Hamnett, Harmer and 
Williams, 1991; Finch, 1994). 
In these processes wills play an important role. As Finch, Mason, Masson et al (1996) 
point out in their major study on inheritance, wills are unique documents. Not only do 
they constitute personal statements of a deceased person's wishes and intentions, but - 
provided they are drawn up in ways prescribed by law - once probated they become 
public documents and carry the force of law. In this, they represent a distinctive form of 
communication between the living and the dead. Further, since family members figure 
prominently as beneficiaries, a will can offer insights into a person's family 
relationships (Finch, Mason, Masson et al, 1996: 1-7). 
However, while their study does acknowledge the fluidity of contemporary family 
relationships, and in particular how bequeathing patterns in stepfamilies are little 
understood (1996: 6), they do not address these issues specifically or in detail. Given 
the complexity of family commitments - financial, practical and emotional - with which 
people in stepfamilies have to deal, it is not surprising that inheritance issues often come 
onto the agenda earlier in stepfamilies than they do in other families (National 
Stepfamily Association, 1993; Finch, 1994). It thus becomes pressing to explore the 
ways in which inheritance is handled when a complex series of steprelationships is 
entailed. It is precisely these processes and the insights they offer into people's 
reformulated ideas about family and kinship, which provide the basis of this chapter. If, 
as was argued in Chapter 2, patterns of English kinship are diverse and changing, then 
those processes may be reflected in cultural expectations about inheritance (Finch, 
1994), too. 
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Building on the arguments and findings of earlier chapters - specifically those which 
demonstrated the links between people's moral thinking on family relationships, the 
inclusions and exclusions they make on this basis, and the centrality of children's needs 
and interests in this regard - this chapter shows how, through the mechanism of 
inheritance, these links are forged in striking and illuminating ways. It is necessary first 
to consider inheritance in its legal context. It is only by examining key aspects of 
inheritance law, and in particular the assumptions underlying it, that the significance of 
what many parents in this study are proposing can be more fully grasped. 
The legal context of inheritance 
The law relating to inheritance, otherwise known as the law of succession, is founded on 
the two pillars of testate and intestate succession. In the first, distribution occurs 
according to a valid will. In the second, where there is no will or the will fails 
completely, distribution is governed by the inflexible rules relating to intestacy 
(Mellows, 1993: 3; Jones, 1993: 57). That the law does have a role to play in regulating 
wills is an expression not only of a strong public interest in who gets ownership and 
control of wealth, but also in who supports members of a deceased person's family in 
the event that adequate provision for them has not been made. In addition, there is a 
public interest in expediting these matters in a way which is both reliable and cost 
effective (Finch, Mason, Masson et al, 1996: 20,32). These same interests lie, too, 
behind the intestacy rules (Buck, 1990). 
Testate succession: theprinciple of testamentaryfreedom 
Fundamental to understanding this aspect of inheritance law is the principle of 
testamentary freedom. If as a principle it implies that a person has an inalienable right 
to dispose of property as she or he pleases, in practice it survives today in few, if any, 
countries. It is argued that the rights of the testator are less important than the duties to 
certain members of her or his family and the state. Jurisdictions have limited this by 
three different means. Some, like France, give members of the deceased's family rights 
to fixed shares of the estate. Others, as in most American jurisdictions, allow family 
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members to claim a fixed share if they so wish. The third method, adopted by English 
law, is a system of judicial discretion, where testamentary freedom exists subject to the 
courts' power to scrutinise and modify the will if reasonable provision for certain 
persons has not been made (Oughton and Tyler, 1984; Ross Martyn, 1985). 
Thus, absolute testamentary freedom has only existed under English law from 1833, 
when it became possible for a man to dispose of all his property without being subject to 
'dower', his widow's right to a life interest in one third of his land, until 1938 and the 
enactment of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act. Full equality for women was only 
effected by the Married Women's Property Act 1882, when they too acquired 
testamentary capacity without being subject to the rights of 'courtesy', a widower's right 
to a life interest in all of his wife's land. Both before and after this period, restrictions 
have been imposed (Mellows, 1993). 
Given that restrictions focus on testators' obligations to provide for close family 
members, particularly a spouse, and given the presumption in law that where a 
relationship is specified in a will the only persons to take are those related by blood, it is 
clear that this area of law functions to protect the socially recognised criteria of family 
and kinship: blood and marriage. Thus, while in earlier periods these obligations were 
understood primarily in terms of the essential link between 'blood and soil' (Glendon, 
1989), expressed through the doctrine of tenure and the principle of primogeniture, they 
did encompass, too, concerns about provision for a surviving spouse, usually a widow, 
as well as any (biological) children of the marriage (Oughton and Tyler, 1984; Hoggett 
and Pearl, 1991; Mellows, 1993). And while land gradually became less significant as 
the sole or major asset in matters of inheritance, the importance of passing property 
from one generation to the next within the (genealogical) family, at the same time as 
ensuring adequate provision for a surviving spouse, continued to occupy a central place, 
particularly in twentieth century law. 
Twentieth century limitations on testamentaryfreedom: family provision legislation 
What is most striking, following twentieth century reforms to inheritance law, is the way 
the legislative balance has shifted, so that the position of the surviving spouse has 
steadily improved at the expense of the deceased's blood relatives (Glendon, 1989). 
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Thus the Inheritance (Family Provision Act) 1938, and the more extended powers of the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 both gave the courts 
discretionary powers to award reasonable financial provision for the maintenance of 
certain dependants if the will or the rules of intestacy (see below) failed to do so. Both 
emphasised, in keeping with twentieth century ideas about companionate marriage 
(Clark, 1991; Finch and Summerfield, 1991), that inheritance is as much about marriage 
and the financial responsibilities between spouses as about passing property down the 
generations (Hoggett and Pearl, 199 1; Mellows, 1993). 
In the debates surrounding the 1975 Act, the easier availability of divorce was an 
important influence. It was recognised that increasingly, testators may have more than 
one spouse or ex-spouse who may feel entitled to make a claim on their estates, as well 
as the interests of children of more than one marriage to consider. Prior to this Act, 
there was no provision whereby a stepchild who had not been adopted by the deceased 
could make an application. This is now conferred by s. 1(1)(d) under the heading 'a 
child of the family'. While this has meant that the step-relationship has indeed begun to 
draw a number of legal incidents to itself (Glendon, 1989; Cretney and Masson, 1990; 
Jones, 1993), concerns have been expressed that given the significance of the 'blood 
tie', the claims of stepchildren may well be 'weaker than those of true children' (Ross 
Martyn, 1985: 41, my emphasis). 
Indeed, in two leading cases where provision has been made in favour of an adult 
stepchild, the court was strongly influenced by the fact that the deceased's estate derived 
in part from the applicant's 'natural' parent (Green, 1988). This suggests that 
devolution of property along the blood line was the major consideration. Significant, 
too, is that 'child of the family' is a concept which applies only to parties to a marriage; 
it does not apply to unmarried unions (Hayes and Williams, 1995: 557). This places 
adult stepchildren from cohabiting couple stepfamilies in an ambiguous position when 
making a claim for provision from the estate of a deceased stepparent. 
With regard to cohabitation, the 1975 Act for the first time made it possible for a 
cohabiting partner, as 'a person maintained by the deceased', to apply for provision 
(s. 1(3)). Here too, the notion of dependency is key, creating, as Masson has noted, the 
154 
'absurd paradox' that the more deserving an applicant is (that is, the less financially 
dependent), the less likely she or he will qualify (Cretney and Masson, 1990: 300). In 
recognition of this, the Law Commission's Report (1990) recommended that cohabitants 
of at least two years' standing, living in the same household 'as husband and wife', are 
made a discrete class of applicant under the 1975 Act. These recommendations were 
enacted in the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995. 
Yet, despite the Act's extension to entirely new classes of applicants - including former 
spouses (if they have not remarried), all children including stepchildren, and cohabiting 
partners - it is the disinherited spouse who, if successful, is rewarded with enhanced 
material gains (the surviving spouse standard) relative to other applicants (the 
maintenance standard). As Cretney and Masson (1990) points out, the fundamental 
point about this legislation is not to decide how the available assets should befairly 
divided. Rather it is about dependency and how someone put into a position of 
dependency by the deceased may be left without financial support. It will be seen that 
this position is strikingly at odds with the concerns of parents in this study for whom 
fairness - to partners and all children involved - is indeed the fundamental issue. 
Intestate succession 
The system of intestate succession introduced by the Administration of Estates Act 1925 
provided that, where no valid will exists, the residuary estate of a person (after the 
payment of debts), should be distributed in accordance with certain rules. These rules 
were reformulated in the Intestate's Estates Act 1952. Based in part on statistical 
evidence drawn from the analysis of a large number of wills, they are designed to reflect 
the wishes of the average testator (Cretney and Masson, 1990: 292; Bum, 1994: 875). 
Unlike the Family Provision legislation outlined above, these rules have no flexibility or 
discretionary powers. But like that legislation, they too demonstrate the priority 
accorded to 'blood' relatives as well as the movement of the spousal relationship into 
the foreground of family relationships. 
Thus, one of the immediately apparent features of these rules is the generosity with 
which these rules treat a surviving spouse. A number of commentators have suggested 
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this may be a cause of injustice because where a surviving spouse with dependent 
children remarries, the new spouse will take to the prejudice of the children (Cretney 
and Masson, 1990: 294). Equally, it may also be argued that children whose parents 
remarry after divorce may also 'lose out' if a biological parent predeceases a stepparent. 
Following the Law Commission's review of Intestate distribution in 1989, it was 
recommended that the issue of former marriages should be included in the statutory 
distribution, but this was rejected on the grounds that it could adversely affect provision 
for the surviving spouse (who, arguably, may then require financial assistance from the 
state). It was also rejected on the grounds that to change the definition of 'issue' so that 
it includes 'children of the family' (which includes, among others, stepchildren and the 
issue of former marriages) would be too 'complicated' (Buck, 1990: 269). 
After the surviving spouse, then, it is relatives of the 'whole blood' who enjoy 
substantial priority - children first, then siblings. Under English law, where for example 
the intestate leaves a spouse but no issue, siblings of the whole blood are included; 
siblings of the half blood are entirely excluded. Yet, in many other jurisdictions, for 
example, the United States, Canada and New Zealand, these distinctions between 
collaterals have been abolished on the grounds that it is inappropriate given the 
frequency nowadays of divorce and remarriage, with the children of each union being 
brought up as one family (Wright, 1986: 124). It was seen in the preceding chapter on 
family relationships and will be seen in the analysis below, that these distinctions are 
similarly eschewed by many parents in this study. 
Finally, cohabiting partners have no automatic rights on intestacy and must seek 
provision under the family provision legislation outlined above. In this, they are in a 
much weaker position than those who are married. Proving actual contributions and 
joint intentions can be very difficult and, increasingly, judges and legislators are 
confronted with unsatisfactory situations facing long-term cohabiting partners when one 
of them dies (Hoggett and Pearl, 1991). These difficulties may be compounded if they 
have the interests of their partner's children to consider as well. A possible solution 
(apart from making a will) lies in making a cohabitation contract. 
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Overall, it emerges clearly from this discussion that, in the priority accorded to the 
surviving spouse and the significance attached to 'blood' ties, inheritance law functions 
to reinforce and promote that model of 'the family' referred to in earlier chapters - one 
that is built around a once-married, heterosexual couple and their own genetic children 
(VanEvery, 1991/2). By definition, any model of 'the inheritance family' (Finch, 
Mason, Masson et al, 1996) which assumes as its starting point one couple and a single 
line of descent, necessarily represents the steprelationship - with two or more couples 
and different lines of descent - as anomalous. And while there is some legal remedy for 
both stepchildren and cohabiting partners through family provision legislation, the fact 
that they have no automatic rights but must make costly and lengthy application 
(Jackson, 1990: 439) through the courts, renders these social ties secondary or 
peripheral to other family ties, namely those of blood and marriage. If the balance has 
shifted in where twentieth century inheritance law accords priority, what is in the 
balance has not. 
Parents' handling of inheritance: the importance of being fair 
It emerges unequivocally from these data that the question of fairness lies at the heart of 
all parents' discussions and decisions regarding inheritance. In this, writing a will is a 
morally reflexive act, an important means of moral self-representation (Hekman, 1995). 
In broad terms, two conceptual patterns emerge in relation to inheritance and the 
principle of fairness. In the first, fairness seeks to ensure equal outcomes; in the second, 
it does not. The salience of fairness as a principle of family life is widely acknowledged 
(Backett, 1982; Allatt and Yeandle, 1986; Allatt, 1996) and emerges too specifically in 
relation to stepfamily life (Burgoyne and Clark, 1982). It was argued in Chapter 4 that it 
is primarily through our family relationships, those 'ethical relationships in which we 
are always already immersed' (Benhabib, 1992), that we learn what morality is. If 
fairness may be understood as the familial face of distributive and social justice, it is 
through our everyday interactions with familiar others, through the actual experience of 
trying to live together, that our ideas and understandings about fair and unfair practices 
are shaped and realised, and that agreement, disagreement, or compromise is reached. 
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Early on, children develop sophisticated and nuanced understandings of what is fair. 
Thus, while quite young siblings may learn to accept the notion of age-dependent 
bedtimes or amounts of pocket money, they may be less willing to accept the 
distribution of sweets according to these criteria, or that the monetary value of their 
Christmas presents be assessed along similar lines. Such distinctions in children's 
understandings derive in part from their parents' understandings of the concept of 
fairness and how it is to be operationalised in specific contexts. In stepfamilies, where 
parents and children bring together different sets of 'ground rules', different histories 
and economic resources, fairness in relation to inheritance necessarily assumes a more 
complex and, possibly, a more contested shape. 
In my review of the research literature on stepfamilies it was precisely this issue - 
fairness in relation to inheritance - which led Noy (1991) to write about stepfamilies as 
'troublesome places. Firth, Hubert and Forge (1970) in their study of kinship in 
Britain, concluded that fairness in this context was so complex that it was impossible to 
make a definitive statement about what form it should take. Yet, a definitive statement 
is exactly what stepfwnilies have to achieve when writing a will. Interestingly, all 
parents, to varying degrees, were aware that inheritance in stepfamilies had the potential 
to be a contentious issue. This was reflected either through explicit knowledge of how 
the law in this context operates, or less commonly, through the telling of stories in 
which property had passed to a second spouse, thereby delaying or thwarting its passage 
to the children of a first or former relationship. 
It is almost certainly this awareness which accounts for the fact that (in contrast to what 
Finch, Mason, Masson et al (1996) found in their study), the majority of parents in this 
study, including those in their twenties and thirties, had already written a will, or, where 
they had not yet done so, intended to do it 'soon' and had worked out what they were 
going to do. In only one instance was it suggested that the interview had prompted 
action in this direction. While all those who had written a will had sought legal help or 
advice, they had clear ideas beforehand about what they wanted to do. Legal help was 
sought more in terms of how to implement parents' wishes and intentions in a valid will. 
Usually, this help or advice was sought from the same solicitor who had handled the 
financial aspects of their divorce or separation, and, in some cases, the subject of writing 
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a will had arisen during divorce proceedings. However, with one exception, 
respondents did not draw up a will until they moved into another significant 
relationship. 
in addition, given that all but one parent in this study who had already written a will had 
- as is typically the case between spouses or partners (Finch, Mason, Masson et al, 
1996) 'left everything to each other' in the first instance, trust between partners also 
emerges as an important principle in this context. In other words, since a second spouse 
has no restrictions imposed by law on how she or he can dispose of any property, and 
certainly has no legal obligation to bequeath to any stepchildren (Finch, 1994: 8), in 
leaving everything to each other, partners have to 'trust each other to supply their 
different families' and secure transmission of their property in ways that had already 
been agreed between them. That partners have no legal obligations to honour each 
other's wishes has important implications for children in stepfamilies given that after 
the surviving spouse, it is children who emerge from these data (as they do in other 
studies) as the major beneficiaries. This explains why the needs and interests of 
children from a former marriage have remained a focus of concern among some legal 
commentators. 
Fair means equal: immediate and emergent resolutions 
Immediate resolution: 'it's natural' 
By far the commonest finding to emerge from these data is the firm belief held by 
parents that children - both step- and biological - should be treated equally in matters of 
inheritance. By this, they meant primarily that financial gifts from parents should be 
equal, since it was recognised by many that equal outcomes could not, for reasons which 
will become clear, be guaranteed. Typically, these views were expressed in unequivocal 
terms, often given further emphasis in concluding comments such as 'And we're quite 
clear about that' or 'We both think that'. It was also noticeable that some parents who 
subscribed to this view implied that they thought the 'equal shares' solution was 
obvious. In other words, for them 'equal shares' represented a form of 'natural' justice, 
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one for which no justification is required. One man, who has a stepson and a biological 
daughter made this explicit: 
'I'd treat them as equal, fifty-fifty. We never talked about it 'cos I don't 
think it's interesting (laughter). It was just that the woman from the 
insurance was sat there and she said 'What are you going to doT And it 
was 'fifty-fifty'. Just like that. It's just natural. -I've always thought of 
splitting it down the middle' (Martin Hunt, aged thirty-one, emphasis in 
original). 
While another respondent, Dave Hughes (who has one biological son and one stepson), 
does not suggest his ideas on handling inheritance are self-evident, his views 
nonetheless reflect those of Martin Hunt above, as well as those of many other parents 
too: 
'They'd be treated the same. They'd be equal. I mean I would never -I 
mean I try my best not to differentiate between the two of them now. No 
way could I ever do anything like that in a will' (Dave Hughes, aged 
twenty-seven, emphasis in original). 
There is some suggestion in Dave Hughes' emphasis on the word 'will' that he does 
indeed regard it as an important means of communicating what he feels about his two 
sons - not only to them personally, but to others, too. Whereas the occasional 
differential treatment of his sons - which he tries to avoid anyway - represents, in his 
view, a fleeting or temporary aberration of his relationship with them, differential 
treatment in a will is more serious, representing as it does a permanent - and more 
public - statement about those relationships. It is therefore, as Finch, Mason, Masson et 
al (1996) suggest, precisely on account of the insights a will offers into family 
relationships that Dave Hughes and others may worry. 
Ken Phillips and his wife, Maýorie, also want their children to inherit 'equal amounts, 
equal shares' (see the opening comment to this chapter). Ken married Maýorie twenty- 
five years ago, at the same time becoming stepfather to her two sons (then aged six and 
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four) by a previous marriage. He and Majorie subsequently had a daughter, Helen. 
Helen has the same surname as her mother and father, while the boys have retained the 
surname of their biological father. What Ken says about inheritance reinforces what he 
has said earlier about his relationships with his biological daughter and two stepsons. 
The difficulties he has experienced with each of his children in the twenty-five years of 
being both a stepfather and a biological parent, are viewed by him as an inevitable part 
of parenting any child. Given the significance that Ken and many others attach to a day- 
to-day shared history, it is not surprising that he in no way distinguishes among them in 
terins of how close he feels towards them. 
Nor is it surprising - given the priority accorded to blood relatives under the intestacy 
rules and the fact that stepchildren have no automatic rights - that Ken and M, 31jorie 
were anxious about what would happen if they did not get it 'all written down' in a will. 
If neither of them had written a valid will (and assuming Maijorie had predeceased 
Ken), the intestacy rules would distinguish between Ken's biological and step- children, 
favouring the claims of the former over the latter, and would distribute his assets 
accordingly. Such an outcome would constitute a gross misrepresentation of their 
family relationships. For them, as for many parents in this study, the equal treatment of 
children is important, not only in relation to inheritance, but as a fundamental and 
guiding principle of family life more generally. This emerges clearly when talking to 
Ken's wife Maýorie. What she says about fairness offers considerable insights into 
some of the processes through which decisions about inheritance come to be made, and, 
since it reflects the views of a number of parents, is quoted at some length: 
'So the will's been made. And the house is to be divided between the 
three of the children. All three are the executors as well as the 
beneficiaries. So theyhave to sort it out too. And if anything happens to 
them, then their share goes to their children (respondent's biological and 
step- grandchildren) ... And both me and Ken have agreed on this. We 
didn't want any unpleasantness or anything. It was all to be shared, to be 
equal shares between the three of them ... It's the same, 
if ever I get 
anything for the grandchildren down here, I make sure that just because I 
don't see Liam (stepgrandson who lives two hundred miles away), that 
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eventually I must send him something too ... And if ever I get myself a tea 
towel or something, I get one for Shelley, too (older son's partner who 
lives locally). I see her quite a lot. But then I'm making up this pack for 
Emma (Liam's mother) as well (laughter). Because I do feel it's very 
important that everybody's treated the same. I don't like any different 
treatment at all ... And Ken's the same. 
Like, last week I got a pen for the 
two grandchildren down here. And he says 'Don't forget, you are going 
to get Liam a pen aren't you. You see, he won't forget him either' 
(Maijorie Phillips, aged fifly-six, emphasis in original). 
This passage illustrates a number of important points. First, it highlights how parents' 
reflections on the moral dimensions of stepfamily life - what in an earlier chapter I 
described as parents' moral reflexivity - have far-reaching implications, not only in 
terms of who is included or excluded as 'family', but also for the obligations and 
commitments - emotional, financial, and practical - these relationships build up over 
time (Finch and Mason, 1993). Thus, what Maijorie Phillips and many other parents 
say about inheritance follows directly from what they said about family relationships in 
the preceding chapter, where distinctions, if any, in how close theyfelt towards their 
biological and step- children were invariably followed by the qualification that their 
children should receive equal treatment. In the above example, this is illustrated in the 
way Madorie Phillips monitors fair practice within her family on both a small and grand 
scale - from the fair distribution of goods during her lifetime, to the fair distribution of 
material assets after her death. 
Secondly, in attending to the requirements of what she and her husband regard as fair 
practice, their thoughts and actions epitomise that imaginative 'reversal of perspective' 
and 'reciprocal recognition' (Benhabib, 1992) analysed in relation to 'contact' in 
Chapter 5. In other words, by putting themselves in the position of their stepgrandson, 
Liam, they reach the conclusion that he must be treated no differently from their other, 
geographically closer, grandchildren (a stepgrandson and a biological granddaughter). 
This is so whether it is a matter of sending him some small gift now, or considering his 
interests for the future as a beneficiary in their will. Similarly, their younger son's new 
partner, Emma, whom they see rarely and have known for only two years, must not be 
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treated differently from their elder son's partner, Shelley, whom they see regularly and 
have known for thirteen years or more. And interestingly, as both Ken and Maýorie 
insist elsewhere in their separate interviews, their commitment to their step- and 
biological grandchildren is in no way diminished by the fact that their sons are 
cohabiting with their respective partners (Shelley and Emma) rather than married to 
them. 
Finally, in designating their children as both executors and beneficiaries of their will, so 
that 'they have to sort it out too', it is clear that their children's presence at the 'moral 
party' (Bauman, 1993; 1995) and their participation in 'the moral conversation' 
(Benhabib, 1992) is actively required. Indeed, as her husband's comment at the 
beginning of this chapter indicates, their children have already been brought onto the 
moral stage by being told in advance what their parents' intentions and wishes are. In 
other words, in making her will, Maýorie Phillips, like her husband, bequeaths not only 
material assets but also a set of values. 
Implicit in their decisions about inheritance are the hopes and expectations that their 
children will act co-operatively to promote each other's interests. This hope was echoed 
in comments from other parents whose children were now adult. There is moreover, no 
ambiguity on the part of parents concerning the moral entitlement of stepchildren to a 
share in a stepparent's estate. Interestingly, these examples are at odds with Finch's 
(1994) claim, made on the basis of what adult stepchildren revealed in her study of 
inheritance, that 'the claims of stepchildren are ambiguous at best' (1994: 9). In the 
morally reflexive act of writing a will, Ken and Madorie Phillips, like many others in 
this study, subscribe to a broader, richer view of inheritance, one in which cultural and 
moral values (Gittens, 1993; Thompson, 1990) concerning stepfamily life are also made 
explicit and passed on. Exploration and development of this latter theme forms the 
basis of analysis in the following chapter. 
Emergent resolutions: 'We struggled... ' 
While some parents believed it was only 'natural' to treat children equally in relation to 
inheritance, or were able to reach this decision without undue difficulty, this was not so 
163 
for everyone. Some couples moved only gradually to this position. It emerges from 
these data that sonic of the most sensitive issues for parents in stepfamilies revolve 
around their differential access - both past and present - to economic resources. As has 
been noted a number of times, given that women are more likely to be the main or full- 
time carers of children after divorce, it is unsurprising that they are often economically 
more disadvantaged than men (see Maclean, 1991; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). 
This continues to be the case despite women's increased rates of participation in the 
labour market, and despite the continuing financial obligations some men have to their 
'first' families at the same time as they are contributing to the maintenance of 'second' 
ones. This disparity sometimes becomes problematic in relation to inheritance when 
each partner has children from a previous partnership whose interests they are keen to 
uphold. 
These tensions are highlighted in the following passage in which Charlie Summers gives 
a detailed description of how his and his partner's ideas on inheritance gradually shifted 
over time. Each had the interests of three adult children from a previous marriage to 
consider: 
'We struggled to find a way of making a will which would respect the 
proportions we were each bringing in (laughs). We were going to try and 
ensure that the children would get those disproportionate amounts. And 
we realised really that there were so many different stages in relation to 
our accumulated, shared wealth, that it actually wasn't feasible to do it. 
And for whatever reason, money, and who's spending it, is not an issue 
between us. And in effect, we changed our position. Maybe it's our 
confidence in each other. So we decided to just have a will in which we 
would leave everything to each other, trusting the other to behave 
responsibly. And our expectations of each other are that the one who 
survives will have a will which leaves it equally between our six 
children' (Charlie Summers, aged fifty-three). 
This passage articulates the different and more complex facets of faimess which may 
have to be considered in the context of stepfamilies and inheritance. Not only must 
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fairness among children be considered, the compounding factor of fairness between 
partners must also be addressed. In the search for shareable interpretations of 
responsibility (Walker, 1989: 20), their concept of fairness has shifted quite 
dramatically. This highlights how the principle of fairness cannot be conceived in rigid 
or static terms. Here, fairness is flexible and evolving, sensitive to the changes of 
context in which it is to be operationalised. Thus, what is particularly striking about this 
passage is the way in which it charts the shifts which may occur in people's thinking. 
In addition, as stated above, it demonstrates the salience of Giddens' (1991,1992) 
concepts of trust and risk as crucial factors in intimate relationships. As the above 
passage indicates - and this is endorsed by many other respondents - no less are these 
important factors when it comes to matters of inheritance. Given the emphasis in law 
on testamentary freedom, a second spouse can of course dispose of her or his property 
without obligation to any stepchildren (Finch, 1994: 8). People's decisions on how to 
handle inheritance may change alongside their altered perceptions and expectations of 
their relationships with partners. 
in the case of Charlie Summers, above, the perceived risks - namely, that if he dies his 
new partner may not honour his wishes - are outweighed by the trust which has 
developed between them. Further, as the balance between 'risk' and 'trust' shifts, a 
different outcome ensues, one in which the emphasis is less on a need to honour the 
disproportionate amounts of wealth each partner brought into the relationship, than on 
the equal and ongoing commitment each perceives the other to be bringing to that 
relationship now. Interestingly, for Charlie Summers and his partner, as for others in 
their position, this equality of commitment appears to imply an 'equal shares' approach 
to the division of assets after their deaths. A similar approach is slioNvn by Joan Harker 
who has two biological children from her first marriage and three stepchildren form her 
second one: 
'So the money was mine that we set up with, but obviously as the 
relationship goes on, the gap gets narrower between what you both put 
in ... So we decided that what we would do would be to split it equally 
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between the five children, whatever our estate was, even though I'd put 
more into it' (Jom Marker, aged forty-eiglit Z: ý 
In addition, it is worth noting the points of similarity between the career and relationship 
trajectories of Charlie Summers and his partner and those of other couples, including 
Joan Harker and her husband, for,, vhom tensions also surfaced in this regard. First, they 
were 'middle-class' in terms of their consumption and occupation. For example, all 
were in professional occupations; all of them had been home owners; all were car 
owners. Second, they had all moved into their current relationship at the age of fifly 
years or above. Third, by this age they had each reached what they considered to be 
their maximum earning potential and had each accurnulatedwhat they considered to be 
fairly substantial assets (through a combination of savings, redeemed mortgages, and 
wealth inherited from their own parents). Fourth, in addition to these personal 
characteristics, they usually had adult step- and biological children who were no longer 
living at home and who were geographically distant. This meant that the shared history 
between these stepparents and stepchildren had been brief or virtually non-existent. 
Given, as was argued in the previous chapter, that the quality and duration of shared 
history plays a significant role in determining the extent to which people are included or 
excluded as close family members, it is not surprising that these combined biographical 
factors create more uncertainties about inheritance than amongst those with longer 
histories and less accumulatcd wealth. Finally, in some cases where parents brought 
disparate amounts of wealth into their relationship, they decided to make unequal 
distributions amongst their children. These examples are explored in the final section 
on unequal outcomes. 
Confounding factors and unintended consequences 
Before considering unequal outcomes, there are two aspects of inheritance in 
stepfamilies which, given the different histories and different 'family assets' each 
partner and their children bring to the new family arrangement, make wholly equal 
outcomes undesirable or unlikely. They are therefore ambiguous and fit uneasily into 
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either of the broad categories of fairness. The first relates to personal possessions; the 
second relates to the possibility that any child in a stefflimily may also inherit from a 
non-resident biological parent. Thus, although many parents emphasise the importance 
of equal treatment for children, these aspects confound parents' intentions so that equal 
outcomes or distributions cannot be guaranteed. 
Personal possessions 
The two most common items to be mentioned in this context were photograph albums 
and jewellery, which in most cases had strong links with the respondents' previous 
relationship history. For this reason, these items also had strong links with any children 
from that relationship. It was therefore, to those children, that is, to respondents' 
biological children that these items would be passed on - either as a lifetime gift or, 
more frequently, in a will. In the following passage, Linda Townsend summarises what 
many people felt about the continuing signif g icance of photograph albums associated 
with a previous family history: 
'What we've done since Tom and me met, is we've got our own photo 
album of us two and our family as it is now. And Becky (respondent's 
three year old stepdaughter) has got a photo album with her Mum, and 
my two have got one with me and them and their Dad in it ... And they'll 
have it one day .. that's part of their life, and I think, they would want to 
see themselves as they were growing up. And although you want thern to 
think that this is our little family as it is now, I don't really want them to 
forget that they did have another one too ... You do know they have got 
another history. As we both have a history, Tom and me' (Linda 
Townsend, aged thirty-five, emphasis in original). 
Occasionally - and this followed from how inclusive or exclusive people had been in 
whom they counted as 'close family' - personal items were willed to members of their 
formerpartner's family, as occurs in the following example: 
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'I suppose (long pause) it makes some sort of sense all round if things 
like jewellery went to Lizzie. I would like to put Lizzie in the will, 
because she is my niece. By marriage she's my niece. I know I'm no 
longer married to Alan but I still think- of her as my niece. So I would 
like to give her an amount of money anyway, but also things like 
jewellery, she would be the person to give them to' (Marion Hughes, 
aged thirty-three). 
It is possible, although entirely speculative, that one of the reasons Marion Hughes 
intends to bequeath her jewcllery to her niece derives from the fact that she herself has 
two sons but no daughters. An additional significant factor may be the close 
relationship Marion Hughes has continued to share with Lizzie's mother, her first 
husband's sister. This friendship has continued through Marion's separation, divorce 
and remarriage, despite pressures from her former husband to end it. Her insistence that 
Lizzie is still her niece is interesting, given that Lizzie's mother, in legal terms, is now 
an 'out-law', an 'ex' sister-in-la-, v. If Marion Hughes' approach supports the view that 
individuality, diversity and choice are key features of English kinship (see Chapter 2), it 
also seriously challenges some of the key assumptions about family and kinship which 
lie behind inheritance law. 
It should be noted, however, that while jewellery was most often willed by female 
respondents to female relatives, possibly indicating gendered practices in bequeathing, 
there were exceptions to this. In the following example, Carol Thompson discusses 
what she intends to do with her jewellery. She has two biological sons, Dean and Gary, 
from her first marriage, and one biological son, Ryan, together with three adult 
stepchildren from hcr current one: 
'Dean mid Gary have both picked a ring each. Ryun will get my 
engagement ring because it's his father who gave it to me. These boys 0 
are mine, whereas the stepchildren are all much older. If they'd been 
young, too, then I couldn't discriminate. I would have to give them all 
the same because they're my husband's children. But they're adults and 
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they've got their oN, ý, n lives and we haven't been part of them. So it's 
different' (Carol Thompson, aged thirty-fivc). 
In another example, Jamie Singlcton, who has an eight year old biological son as well as 
being a stepfather to t-,, vo year old triplets and an cight year old stepson, thinks about 
what he may do with somc of his personal possessions: 
'I haven't made a will yet, but I have thought about that. It's purely sort 
of personal things. There are things (pause) that I suppose I would like 
certain people to have ... I've got this, my granddad's wedding ring and 
I've got a solid silver hand-engraved one put away upstairs. And I've 
been thinking about who ... So, the two older boys (his step- and his 
biological son) it's a case of each of them can have either' (Jamie 
Singleton, aged thirty). 
in addition to illustrating how jewellery is sometimes passed from female to male 
relatives as well as from male to male, the above passages are important, too, for their 
indication that the quality of relationship, as much as the genealogical position of 
beneficiaries, is a significant factor in people's decisions about inheritance. Thus, in the 
same way 'blood' relatives did not automatically assume a greater or lesser significance 
than step-relatives in people's definitions of 'close family' (see chapter 6), so, too, in 
relation to inheritance, no such automatic assumptions can be made. As the example of 
Jamie Singleton demonstrates, together with a number of others in these data, 
stepchildren are also singled out to be the recipients of personal possessions, particularly 
in the context of long and/or close association with that child. 
In addition to je-, vellery and photograph albums, 'house contents' and items of furniture 
were also mentioned as items that would be bequeathed to parents' biological children. 
Again, this decision was often explained in terms of family history. This is brought out 
in the following passage in which Joan Harker, who had used her own money to set up 
home in the initial stages of the relationship with her new p artner, nonetheless decides 
to divide hers and her partner's estate equally among their five children: 
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'And it would be balanccd by my children getting contents, because 
really it was their home. Now really, what difference contents makes is 
not that much. But, they arc five equal children. And I think the 
difference would be that Helen (respondent's biological daughter) would 
get my jewellery, and the contents would be split between her and 
Nicholas (respondent's biological son)' (Joan Harker, aged forty-eight). 
Non-resident biological parcnts: an unknoivn factor in the equation 
Only a small minority of parents raised, unprompted, the possibility or probability that 
their stepchildren would inherit too from a non-resident biological parent. In all other 
cases, the question was asked of parents whether that possibility had occurred to them, 
and whether, in the light of their response, it would make any difiference to what they 
had decided to do. In both situations, parents were unanimous and unequivocal. The 
following emphatic response by a father with one step- and one biological son 
surnmarises parents' positions well: 
'No, I hadn't thought about that. But that wouldn't affect what we would 
do. We would treat that as totally separate. It wouldn't affect us at all. 
And anyway, we don't know what Alan would do. But I don't think you 
could let it affect you ... As 
far as I'm concerned we'd treat them both the 
same because we don't see any difference bet-, veen them. I couldn't 
justify changing 'what we've done for Joseph in our will just because 
Alan might do something ... It's not as if Alan and Joe had a life together. 
I think it just wouldn't be right at all' (Dave Hughes, aged twenty-seven, 
emphasis in original). 
Again, another stepfather, for whom this possibility had not occurred and for -V'%, hom it 
appeared to come as a shock, made similar points: 
'Can't see it'd make any difference at all (long pause). Don't bear any 
relevance to anything I'd do ... I mean, what you trying to say? Are you 
170 
saying that because Paul's getting some off his biological parent, I should 0 
dock sorne of his? Should I say Sallie should get his shareT (Martin 
Hunt, aged thirty-one). 
There is a sense in what Martin Hunt says that, while lie knows what he intends to do, 
he is unsure about what, if any, expectations exist of him in this respect. What emerges 
forcefully from both these examples is the point made earlier that will writing is an 
important means of moral self-reprcseiitation, a final statement oil how parents view 
their relationships with their children. It is therefore entirely appropriate that what 
action other people may take has little impact on what parents have decided they will 
do. 
Fair means unequal outcomes 
It was far less common, occurring with only two couples in different and very specific 
circumstances, that decisions about what was fair could not be identified with equality 
of outcome for their children. In the first, this decision derived from consideration of 
the different economic resources each partner had brought, and continued to bring, into 
the relationship. In the second and more ambiguous example, it emerged following 
careful consideration of the interests of a former partner who had died. 
Fairness between currentpartners 
In the interests of what was deemed fair to each other as well as to their children, Deb 
Casson and her partner decided that the different amounts of accumulated wealth each 
one had brought, and indeed continues to bring, into the relationship should be reflected 
in similarly disproportionate bequests to their six adult children (Deb had two children; 
John had four). She describes the processes leading up to that decision: 
'We thought about it, what would happen, say if I died. Would John 
have my share of the house and all my things and what would happen to 
my children? And the same for him ... What would happen to his money 
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and his share of the house and things? So we tried to face that, have a 
look, even then, and I mean it's difficult. It"s different from when you 
marry the first time and you just accept that if you died, all your money 
and things would go to your husband or whatever. The conventions are 
there to deal with it ... Everything 
felt joint then and it was. You go into 
your second partnership with very different ideas. It's utterly different. 
You can't pretend that things go on for ever' (Deb Casson, aged forty- 
seven). 
Here, the reluctant recognition that things do not go on forever forces them to confront 
the financial 'risks' they take if they 'pretend' otherwise. What is crucial for Deb 
Casson and her partner is that the 'risks' at stake are not solely the financial and material 
interests of their respective children, but also those of themselves, too. Given the 
possibility that their relationship of eleven years standing may, as with each of their 
previous marriages, end in divorce rather than death, they are keen to maintain their 
separate financial interests. As Deb Casson indicates, this is not easy to acknowledge, 
particularly as there are no conventions for dealing with the situation. Unlike the 
situation described by Charlie Summers where the trajectory of his new relationship - 
and in particular the development of trust within it - led to the view that certain 
financial 'risks' could be taken and their disproportionate amounts of accumulated 
wealth be discounted, Deb and John. Casson reach the opposite conclusion: 
'The house is jointly owned by both of us, but if anything happened to 
either of us, the other one would have a lifetime's interest in the share of 
the one who had died. And the goods and things would go to the 0 
surviving one, too. When the other one dies, the possessions would be 
divided among the six children, my things going to my children, John's 
things to his. But John's money, half of it would go to his four children. 
And the other half would go to my two daughters and to me. So I would 
get less than half his money. We discussed it and came up with that' 
(Deb Casson, aged forty-seven) 
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Deb and John Casson's concept of fairness frames what Benhabib (1992) terms a 
contextually sensitive ethic, one with a 'shape' which can accommodate their different 
family histories and do justice to the 'differciit ideas' they now have about what the 
future may hold. Again, that John Casson's children were adult when lie remarried 
meant that the shared history between Deb Casson and them had been brief, with no 
day-to-day contact of 'living as a family'. For Deb Casson, this was an important (and 
in some ways regrettable) feature of their shared biographies, one to which she 
attributed not only their decisions about inlicritance, but also those concerning other 
financial arrangements, too. 
The situation facing Deb and John Casson is one addressed by a number of legal 
commentators. For example, Prime (1986) describes how second marriages can raise 
particular problems. Ile suggests that because in such situations, one or both partners 
may have children from a former partnership, the financial commitment of the partners 
to each other may be less. The survivor may then have inadequate means to provide 
alone for his or her needs. If the surviving spouse then applied to the court for 
provision, the deceased may be seen as having a moral responsibility to both the 
applicant spouse and the beneficiary children under the will. If the estate is large, these 
conflicting demands can be met. If it is modest, as is often the case, it is more difficult. 
Following the example of judgement in case law, Prime suggests a strict life-interest in 
the marital property as the optimum solution. In his view this achieves a fairer balance 
between the competing claims of the stepparent and stepchildren (Prime, 1986). It is 
interesting that, without prior legal help or advice, Deb and John Casson had reflected 
on precisely these issues - fairness and the parameters of moral responsibility to their 
own and each other's children - and had reached the same conclusion themselves 
regarding the optimum solution. 
Fairness to aformerpartner who has died 
The sensitivity of the issues surrounding new partners' disparate amounts of wealth are 
compounded, it seems, when a first or former partner of one of them has died. This is 
particularly so in relation to what in matrimonial property law is referred to as 'family 
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assets'. While the exact meaning of this terrn is the subject of some dispute, it is 
generally agreed that it refers to the 'matrimonial aggregate' (Kahn-Freund, 1955) or, 
more simply, to those things acquired by one or both parties to a marriage, with the 
intention that they should provide continuing support for them and their children during 
theirjoint lives (Ross Martyn, 1985: 4-9). 
Where a first marriage ends in death rather than divorce, it can be difficult, when it 
comes to making a will, for a remarried, surviving spouse to distinguish between the 
financial assets derived from the first marriage and those from the second. Where, for 
both partners a previous marriage has ended in divorce, these distinctions are not usually 
a pressing issue because the 'farnily assets' of the previous marriage are (with rare 
exception) dealt with and divided at the point of divorce. Again, it is the interests of any 
children of those former marriages which are at stake here. Arguably, these potential 
difficulties apply as much to cohabiting partners, and may in fact be exacerbated by the 
comparative lack of legal precedent for dealing with them. 
For Mary and George Gallagher, who had married seven years affter Mary's divorce and 
one year after the death of George's first wife, making these distinctions was an 0 
essential part of working out what was fair for themselves and their five adult children. 
As stated at the beginning of this section, this is an ambiguous example of unequal 
outcomes, one which in some respects could be classified as equal outcomes. Mary 
Gallagher gives some insights into this process: 
'We've gone into this in a great deal of detail ... We were trying to work- it 
out, to make sure everything was just right, for my girls and for his girls. 
Because obviously some of the money that had been tied up in George's 
house before we moved here was Pamela's, his first wife's, money .. So 
we decided, after a lot of thought, that with the money George got from 
selling his and Pamela's house, we would give something to his three 
girls in recognition of Pamela. I mean it wasn't the full amount, because 
we couldn't afford to do that at that point. But it was what we felt we 
wanted to do at that time, before we bought this house. So we've done 
Pamela's side of things, because she wouldn't have wanted her money to 
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come to me or my girls. And what's left we feel is George's and mine. I 
also want some of my money from selling my house to go to my girls 
now ... But whatever's left after we've 
both gone will then be divided 
equally between the five girls ... apart from things like our wedding rings 
and George has got some chairs (Mary Gallagher, aged fifty). 
Unequal outcomes are somewhat obscured here by George and Mary's decisions to 
make substantial lifetime gifts to their respective daughters, and then to divide 
'whatever's left' after their deaths equally between the five girls. In this way, the 
substantial disparity between the 'family assets' each derived from their first marriage is 
maintained, while at the same time attempts are made to convey to the five girls that 
they are equal. George Gallagher made it clear in his intervie'VN' that he had worked out 
very carefully the amount his three daughters would have received from his first wife's 
share of the marital home and had informed them that their lifetime gifts of several 
thousand pounds represented part of that inheritance. He also added that while the fact 
of these bequests was known to his stepdaughters, the precise amounts were not. This 
suggests there were tensions between the principle of fairness as it applied to the 
interests of George's deceased wife, Pamela, and fairness as it applied to Mary and 
George's 'new family' with 'five children'. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that for most people in this study, a will is, in Heknian's terms (1995: 24) an 
important means of moral self representation, in unequivocal and final statement on the 
quality of their relationships with their children. There is the concern - shared by many 
- that if they fail to make a will or fail to make detailed provisions in one, then the law 
will dispose of their assets in a way which would offer people the ivrong insights into 
how they view their relationships with their biological and step- children. Contrary to 
the basis on which family provision law operates, fairness, as shown above, is indeed 
the fundamental principle on which they operate. In addition, on the basis of these data 
at least, that the children of a former marriage should not 'lose out' is a major concern 
for all parents. 
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In working out what is fair, parents create a concept of fairness which is sensitive to the 
specificities of their own family arrangements. As suggested in Chapter 2, this is in 
keeping with key features of English kinship - individuality, choice and diversity. In 
this, it is clear that legal discourses on inheritance, assuming as they do a model of tile 
family with one couple and a single line of descent, prove especially unhelpful in 
meeting their requirements in this regard. That this is so raises the question of how far 
current inheritance law, with its (increasingly) unrepresentative model of 'the family', 
can be said to reject, rather then reflect, the wishes of an 'average testator'. It also 
indicates that in the way parents are left to work- out for themselves the handling of these 
complex situations - not only with regard to inheritance but also contact and family 
relationships more widely - certain skills and resources are required. It is to 
consideration of how these may develop to which the following chapter turns. 
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Chapter 8 
Stepfamilies of Origin: 
A Resource for Contemporary Family Relationships 
'I was six at the time Ken came. I referred to him as my stepdad then. 
But as the years have gone on (long pause) and I know a bit more now 
than what I did then, I refer to him as my dad. I suppose I was quite 
rebellious against him when I was younger. But now I've got older, I 
look back and I see that he was always there for me (pause). Whereas 
my biological father wasn't. And I do feel guilty of what I used to do, 
that I was bad ... And as a parent yourself, you 
look at it, and I mean I can 
see some things now in Jason (respondent's stepson) that used to be in 
me. He rebels against things I used to rebel against. And that's why I 
sort of deal with that differently, because I, I realise what I used to do' 
(Martin Hunt, aged thirty-one, emphasis in original). 
Introduction 
It was suggested in the preceding chapter that in the morally reflexive act of writing a 
will, parents in this study are not only, or even primarily, making a statement about their 
wishes and intentions in relation to material assets. They are, too, making a statement 
about certain values - fairness, equality, trust or com mitment - and how these inform 
many aspects of their stepfamily relationships, in particular those with their children. 
Thus, a central consideration in writing a will was the potential impact and long-term 
implications of any distinctions they chose to make between their biological and step- 
children, and how these may subsequently be interpreted. Safeguarding children's 
interests emerged as a preoccupying concern, as indeed it did in relation to contact 
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(Chapter 6) and the handling of othcr post-divorce family relationships (Chapter 5). In 
other words, some parents recognise that in addition to the material assets they 
bequeath, they also leave other legacies - moral, emotional, and psychological. 
It is of course the moral, emotional and psychological legacies of separation and divorce 
which remain the focus of much academic and political concern. It has been argued at a 
number of points in this thesis that many discourses on 'the family' tend still to promote 
the so-called traditional, nuclear, intact family as, the desirable cultural nonn, both 
morally and socially (Dennis and Erdos; 1993; Morgan, 1995; Phillips, 1997). This 
model, as many writers agree (VanEvcry, 1991/2; Walker, 1992a, 1992b; Rogers, 1996; 
Bourdieu, 1996; Smart and Neale, 1999), is the standard against which all other family 
forms have been measured. And, as much of the research in this area has been quick to 
point out, these 'other' family forms have been found wanting (see for example, 
Wallcrstein and Blakeslee, 1989; Segalman -and Marsland, 1989). Similarly, the 
research literature on repartnering and the transition of children into stepfamily life has 
little to say that is optimistic (see Kiernan, 1992; Cockett and Tripp, 1994). Yet, as 
Walker (1992a) rightly asks, how helpful is it to measure the psychological health and 
well-being of post-divorce families against that model (1992: 28)? 
In addition, any grounds for optimism regarding stepfamily life are likel to be further 0y 
undermined by niýths about stepRimilies, which run alongside and feed into these other 
forms of discourse. Giving m)Ih the broad inclusive meaning currently used by a 
number of oral historians (Samuel and Thompson, 1990; Tonkin, 1990; Thompson, 
1990), it may be understood not as a purely fictitious narrative, but as any narrative 
which has fictitious elements or is treated as if it were wholly true. As Samuel and 
Thompson (1990) go on to say - anti they cite the myth of 'wicked stepmothers' and 
'abusing stepfathers' as a prime example - in all cases figures of myth are creatures of 
excess. They are either idealiscd or demonised. Splitting the world into images of 
absolute good or evil, he notes, is a classic way of handling our own fears about 
ourselves. Thus, while we might not be 'ideal' parents, at least we are not as bad as 
stepparents. In the public arena, these stereotypes are often much more absolute. This 
in part explains their grip on our imagination. For these reasons, Samuel and Thompson 
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argue, myth remains a potent force in our collective unconscious, a fundamental 
constituent of human experience. (Samuel and Thompson, 1990: 1-16). 
In the light of so much that is negative, it is, then, surprising how often these 
experiences are more positively represented by parents in this study. It is clear that for 
some respondents, individual experience acts as a modifier of the absolutes of public 
myth and a qualifier of the cast-iron certainties of research findings, a means through 
which negative stereotypes lose some of their hold or purchase. There is evidence of 
this in Martin Hunt's comment at the beginiiing of this chapter. Of particular interest in 
this respect was the discovery during interview that ten out of thirty people had, in 
addition to their current experience of stepfamily life, lived too in a stepfamily of origin. 
In addition, a further two respondents had 'gained' a stepparent in the year prior to 
interview. 
In what must necessarily be a tentative analysis - given it is based almost entirely on a 
sample of ten - this chapter explores parents' perceptions of these key life events and 
transitions. Looking first at experiences of separation and divorce, it moves then to their 
reflections on the steprelationship, focusing particularly on that between stepparent and 
stepchild. It links these representations with other, more recent research into these 
processes, whose findings similarly suggest a more varied picture of their effects. 
Separation and divorce as knowledge and resource 
As indicated above, a number of influential studies in psychology and sociology (see 
also Wallerstein and Kelly, 1980; Lamb, 1982; Hetherington et al, 1982; Allison and 
Furstenberg, 1989; Goodyer, 1990) conclude that for the children with experience of 
parental separation and rcpartnering, their life chances in educational, social and 
psychological terms are below average or worse. In particular, it has been argued that 
these children are perceived as being at a greater 'risk' of reproducing these experiences 
in their own adult lives. Experiences of separation, divorce and repartnering are 
discursively constituted in terms of family dysfunction or breakdown and personal 
inadequac)4 failure or even, psychopathology (see Goodyer, 1990; Hewitt, 1996). As 
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stated in Chapter 2, rarely in the research literature - apart from notable exceptions 
(Stacey, 1991; Giddens, 1992; 'Morgan, 1996; Smart and Neale, 1999) - are these 
changes in 'family practices' (Morgan, 1996) framed in potentially more positive terms. 
Thus, Giddens (1992) suggests, one must turn to the 'self-help' manuals and therapeutic 
literature for more positive representations. However, that these texts, too, are explicitly 
aimed at an individual reader in personal crisis (see for example, Wallerstein and 
Blakeslee, 1989) obscures the fact, as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) point out that 
these experiences are routinely present in many societies and on a massive scale. As 
argued in Chapter 2, in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's (1995) terms, separation, divorce 
and repartnering are an inescapable feature of the 'contradictions of modernity', in 
which men's and women's expectations of (amongst other things) their intimate 
relationships are at odds, not only with each other, but with the possibilities realistically 
available to them. 
Arguably, from this perspective, relationship change can more usefully be characterised 
as afunction of the priorities and choices we have to make, and the 'opportunities, and 
'risks' associated with them. Notwithstanding the hopes, commitments and resolve 
people bring into relationships, relationship change is, then, a fundamental feature of 
contemporary intimacy. As argued in Chapters 4 and 6, it is increasingly likely 
(although not of course inevitable) that these experiences will form a significant part of 
each person's biography. That these shifis are discernible in both discourse and practice 
is evident in how one respondent, Maýoric Phillips, describes her own experience of 
divorce some thirty years ago: 
'I mean I did feel I was a failure then ... I don't feel like that now. But you 
see, this was all those years ago. It was dreadful when Keith left scos 
divorces weren't so frequent then. You didn't get divorced then, that's 
the thing ... I mean, you just never heard of it. I just didn't know how I 
was going to tell myparents. I mean I didn't tell them to start with, even 
though my husband had gone. I just couldn't and I felt awful ... Because I 
thought, 'we've never had a divorce in the family, never'... Now it 
happens all the time. So you see, things do change, you 
change ... (Maýorie Phillips, aged fifty-six, emphasis in original). 
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There is the suggestion here, as well as in the data more widely, that the increased 
prevalence of divorce is an important factor in effectina a shift in the meanings 
individuals are able to attach to these experiences. That divorce 'happens all the time 
now' allows Maýorie Phillips to move from a position in which she views divorce - and 
hersey- as 'failure', to one in which both are framed in wider, social change. This shift 
is critical. As Linde (1993), a contemporary writer on life stories argues, re-working 
key life events is an essential process in making our life stories 'coherent' and 
&acceptable' (1993: 3). Coherence, in that it provides an understanding of who we are 
and how we got there, is a particularly important feature of life stories. And since, 
culturally, these stories are 'social units' based on expectations of exchange, coherence 
is both a social and personal demand made on them. It is this quality in them which 
makes us 'acceptable' both to ourselves and others, and makes us appear as 'competent 
members of our culture' (Linde, 1993: 3-16). 
These ideas are supported in what Tvlaýorie Phillips says above. She has had to 're- 
work' certain parts of her life story in order to make coherent sense of them and 
integrate them comfortably into her biography. She has been married to Ken, her third 
husband, for twenty-five years. Ken is stepfather to her two sons, Roger and Martin 
(whose comments open this chapter). Her first husband died in a road accident when 
she was aged twenty. Her second husband left her when their two sons were aged six 
and two. Yet, as she has stated earlier (see her comments in Chapter 4), 'death is 
something you can understand'. For her, as for others in this study, it is the process of 
separation and divorce which proves a major stumbling-block to the achievement of 
coherence. 
Moreover, contrary to what one may expect, it does not follow - at least on the basis of 
these data - that those with more recent experience of relationship change are 
automatically able to view it in these wider, more positive terms from the outset. 
Another respondent, Linda Townsend, was married for twelve years. She separated in 
1994 and divorced in 1996. In the following passage, she recalls how she felt in those 
early months: 
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'It does change you, the divorce and everything, makes you better 
equipped. But there was a time when it wasn't so easy, when you think- 
you can't get through all this. I diLln't imagine mything like that would 
happen to me, and I did feel uncomfortablc at the beginning if I'm totally 
honest (laughs). It was hard on the street and telling our parents. I often 
used to wonder 'What must people be thinking? ' I really felt on 
show ... People must've 
been wondering what was going on. And then 
when Tom moved in, I didn't know anyone else who was cohabiting 
(laughter). I felt I was doing something very different. Obviously it's 
got better. Even before I met Tom, I was already OK, I was calm' (Linda 
Townsend, aged thirty-five). 
For both Linda Townsend and Maijoric Phillips, separation and divorce were 
experiences which, in their initial impact, seriously threatened to engulf them or 
overwhelm their basic trust and sense of security - what Giddens describes as our 
dontological security' (Giddens, 1991). It was, as Wallerstein and Blakeslee (1989) 
found in their research, only some considerable time 'after the event' that equilibrium 
returned and some form of resolution ensued. However, while a period of tw-enty-five 
years divides their experiences, an important factor which unites them is the complete 
absence of separation and divorce in their families of origin (that is, at the time they 
themselves were going through them). While they both make some connection between 
this factor and their own difficulties, its significance is not made explicit as it is by Deb 
Casson in the following extract: 
'My first marriage ended about 19S I and we were together for about ten 
years. I didn't really think that divorce was something you could do, that 
I could do. Because I hadn't got any divorce in my family at all, it didn't 
really occur to me that that was something you could do. So it took me 
quite a time to realise or to think- that's what I'm going to do. It was 
quite a hard decision to reach; I had to work- really hard at thinking that 
through ... And I'm sure my mother 
had some jealousy that I was able to 
leave my first marriage and that I decided to do that, a slight sense of 
envy, that I was privileged. She was just so lovely, but very restricted in 
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her life, not just because of my father but because of the conventions9 
(Deb Casson, aged forty-seven, emphasis in original). 
The crucial connection which Deb Casson makes is that the whole process of separation 
and divorce, in particular the decision-making process, would have been less arduous if 
it had already been 'familiar'. Quite simply, because there had never been any divorce 
in her own family, it didn't really occur to her that it was something she could do. 
Further, as Maijorie Phillips and Linda ToxNmsend make plain, it is not only, or even 
primarily, the practical aspects of divorce which are most daunting. The moral 
dimensions of divorce - its impact and repercussions for children, for wider family, and 
even neighbours and outsiders, are a preoccupying concern. For these three women, and 
indeed for Deb Casson's mother, the absence of separation and divorce in their families 
of origin is regarded not as enabling (as many would argue and suppose), but as 
disabling when it comes to making decisions about their own adult relationships. 
The observations of these three women are endorsed by other respondents who share 
similar backgrounds (see also Chapter 4). With no blueprint, no prior knowledge - 
moral, practical, financial or emotional - to fall back on, they perceived themselves to 
be ill-equipped for the situation confronting them. In particular, evaluating the 
potential, both positive and negative, of separation and divorce was 'hard'. If it is the 
case, as Linda Townsend claims, that one is 'better equipped' as a result of this process, 
there is the implication, too, that if the experience had been 'familiar', one would have 
been 'better equipped' to deal with it in the first place. 
In the light of these observations, it is unsurprising that in those cases where separation 
or divorce had featured in a person's family of origin, the issue of its unfamiliarity never 
arose. In other words, it obviously did occur to these people that this was something 
'you could do' in adult life should the circumstances require it. It is notable too that 
concerns about people 'finding out' - friends, neighbours and even family - were absent 
in all instances. That this is so suggests that prior, familial experience of divorce 
rendered its occurrence in their own lives in somc way as unremarkable. This is not to 
suggest that the process of relationship change was experienced as straightforward or 
painless. Nor is it to imply that it was a course of action embarked on easily or without 
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regret. But it may in part explain why these respondents did not talk about feeling 0 
'different' or stigmatised, or further, why divorce Ind relationship change were never 
articulated in tenns, of individual failure. 
These contrasts are nicely captured in tile following passage where Rachel Cunningham 0 
talks about divorce and the ending of hcr first marriage. Important for tile way it 
highlights the very different context in which her decisions were made, it is quoted at 
some length: 
'I was married in 1988 for five years ... It was through my first husband 
that I gained much more confidence, and that seems a bit unfair because 
in the end that convinced me it wasn't the right thing for me ... In a funny 
sort of way, there's a kind of subculture of divorce in my family. 
Because my grandparents were also remarried through divorce which 
was more unusual for that generation. And my Aunt Ellen, my mother's 
stepsister, was married twice ... And she was married to 
her first husband 
for a short time. And in fact there's a pattern in all these relationships - 
my grandparents and uncles and aunts who were divorced, my brother 
and myself, all marry young for about five years, then remarry quickly 
and live with another partner for the rest of their lives. It's strange but 
it's exactly the same in all the cases ... My parents iveren't divorced, so 
they were the exception in the family. They were regarded as odd for not 
being divorced' (laughter). (Rachel Cunningham, aged thirty-two, 
emphasis in original). 
Here, relationship change and the transitions associated with it are discursively 
constituted in very different wa)-. fi-om how they appear in much of the research 
literature or in some of the examples given earlier. It is not only after the occurrence of 
these 'events' that Rachel Cunningham is 'better equipped'. She is better equipped 
from the outset. The 'familiarity' of separation and divorce enables her to view 
relationship change as both possible and positive, a move which is undertaken from a 
position of confidence and self-esteem, not personal inadequacy or failure. As with 
Ma&rie Phillips and Linda Townsend, some of this confidence derives from the 
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difficulties encountered and overcome in connection with her first marriage, that is, 
from her personal experience. Arguably, some of it derives from her educational 
resources and other forms of 'cultural capital' (BouTdicu, 1984). But crucially, some of 
it comes from the knowledge she already has of how relationship change has been 
handled on many occasions in her oN,. m family. For Rachel Cunningham, these 
experiences alrcady'make sense'. They already have that personal and social coherence 
which Linde (1993) regards as the hallmark of an 'acceptable' life story, one which 
makes us appear - to ourselves and others - as competent members of our culture. 
From this perspective, the 'familiarity' of these experiences and the foresight it offers is 
useful, a resource on which she can draw. Unlike the pernicious 'cycle of deprivation' 
discourse, where relationship change and a range of evils associated with it are handed 
down through the generations, negatively predetermining each person's actions and life 
chances, the concept of resource implies something to be used, tapped and drawn upon 
as required. The experience of parental separation is something which is taken and 
shaped - reflexively - for the purposes of the user, not something which imposes itself 
on that person in any predetermined form. Importantly, as Kier and Lewis 
(forthcoming) have also noted, more recent research studies in this area (Amato and 
Keith, 1991; Kurdek, 1991; Olson and Haynes, 1993; Harding, 1993) are similarly 
questioning long-standing assumptions that parental separation per se has wholly and 
uniformly negative effects. Rather, they, too, point to tile diversity of post-separation or 
post-divorce experience and a range of contingent factors important in shaping or 
influencing this. 
Moreover, as a number of respondents indicated, their experience is a resource available 
not only to themselves, but to others, too. Typically, these included friends and adult 
siblings. On two occasions, it included respondents' parents who were in the process of 
remarrying following the death of a spouse. Difficulties associated with the divorce 
process, the transition into stepfamily life, and the handling of inheritance were 
mentioned as the issue or context in which help or advice was sought and provided. In 
addition, as the next section illustrates, separation and divorce in one's family of origin 
is a useful resource when it comes to clarifying or reformulating ideas about family 
relationships in the light of personal experience of these transitions. 
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Familial inj7uences on handling post-separation andpost-divorce relationships 
Another pattern which emerges among those with separation and divorce in their 
families of origin is the tendency to rcflcct critically on how their parents or other close 
relatives handled their family relationships after these transitions. The emphasis in what 
respondents say is on the importance of 'keeping things open' or flexible. For example, ZýI 
Rachel Cunningham, who continues to include her former partner as a close family 
member (see Chapter 6), implicitly acknowledges the significance of her mother's 
influence in this respect: 
'My brother divorced as well. Amd my mother's a very loyal person so 
she's still quite close to his first N,, rife. She wouldn't just drop someone. 
So the fact that they got divorced ... nevertheless, she felt she was part of 
the family, so that relationship would have to continue even though the 
marriage hadn't ... Yes, and she 
keeps in touch with my first husband as 
well. He goes to stay with her and brings his new partner too. They're 
quite close. Mike (respondent's current partner) thinks that's very odd. 
But my mother considers that once someone is part of the family, then 
they are, for good, whatever happens ' (Rachel Cunningham, aged 32, 
emphasis in original). 
It has been noted in the preceding section how Rachel Cunningham regards divorce in 
positive terms, as some kind of 'subculture' in her family. In the above passage, too, 
there is a similarly positive acknowledgement of how her mother handles certain post. 
divorce relationships, in this case those with her 'ex' son-in-law and 'ex' daughter-in- 
law. This situation illustrates the ways in which certain values - in this case loyalty and 
commitment - can be reformulated in ways appropriate to people's changing family 
structures. At the same time, as Stacey (1991) noted in her study of families in 
California, this may encourage the growth of what some may regard as 'odd branches' 
of relatives in divorce-extended families (Stacey, 1991: 61-89). And indeed, 'very odd' 
is the way Rachel Cunningham's second husband, Mike, describes this approach. He 
also thinks it 'odd' that Rachel maintains some forni of relationship with her ex- 
husband who continues to be a significant person in her life. 
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Viewing the issue of loyalty and post-separa-tion relationships from a very different 
perspective is Steve Thompson. As a young boy, lie lost contact with his biological 
father not long after his parents divorced. Soon after that, he lost contact with all other 
family members except his mother: 
'Loyalty is very, very important, with fiimily and with friends ... I haven't 
had a normal life. I've been in and out of prison right tip until I met 
Carol (his third wife) ... It's seven years I've been with her, the longest 
I've ever been with anyone. All my life, from the age of eight, when I 
was shoved in council care because I was unruly and unmanageable. 
Then approved school, then Borstal, then prison sentences ... I've spent a 
good twenty-three years in prison ... Loads of people leave you, don't stick 
by you ... That's why now 
I've got to get it, do it right' (Steve Thompson, 
aged fifty-one, emphasis in original). 
However, as the above example also shows, there is no easy or direct route between past 
events of negative significance and the building of current experiences which are more 
positive. The experience of loss of contact with his own father did not make Steve 
Thompson automatically 'better equipped' to deal with the issue of contact when his 
first marriage ended. Only some years later was that satisfactorily resolved. As argued 
in Chapter 5, a crucial factor in keeping contact irrangements open and flexible is the 
ability and willingness of all parties to co-operate in attaining that objective, often over a 
period of years. Tom O'Hare is another respondcnt who is also keen to keep contact 
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arrangements open and flexible, those between himself and his biological daughter as 
well as those between his three stepchildren and their non-resident, biological father. 
Again, he relates some of his motivation for doing this to what happeried in his family C) 
of origin: 
'About things being open. It's because I've experienced something 
similar .. I mean my 
dad had been married before and lie has a daughter 
by his first marriage. In fact she was herc this week ... But at the point my 
mum and dad got together, Dad had almost got custody of Helen. But his 
family, sort of his mum and sister, talked him out of it. And then, he had 
nothing to do with her for a number of years. But they did become 
reconnected again because I can remember going on holiday to Butlin's 
with Helen and her daughters. And they used to come and stay with us. 
We used to play together ... But I guess that was 
because of my mum. She 
must have been, she must have accepted Helen' (Tom O'Hare, aged 
thirty-three, emphasis in original). 
There is the suggestion in this passage that Tom O'llare believes his father was 'wrong' 
to have lost all contact with his daughter Helen for a number of years. Nonetheless, in 
his own case, too, despite the importance Tom O'llare attaches to contact, he himself 
has found this difficult to achieve in connection with his own biological daughter, aged 
two years. Although his daughter stays with him and his new partner (and her three 
children) every weekend, contact between them is currently subject to a court order. At 
the same time, he does remark - and this applies to a number of respondents - that his 
and his former partner's ability to co-operate has increased over time. 
By contrast, contact arrangements betwecii his three stcpchildren and their non-resident 
biological father have been open and flexible from the outset (see Chapter 5). And 
although he recognises that the 'easygoing nature' of his current partner is a key factor 
in facilitating this, he also states that contact arrangements are something 'you all have 
to work at'. Simply to regard contact as 'important' is not enough. This, he claims, is 
the 'mistake' his father made sonic years earlier. Finally, given the context of this 
discussion, it is interesting to note that in the case of both Steve Thompson and Tom 0' 
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Hare's father, it is the new partner, the 'wicked stepmother' of public myth, who is 
instnunental in 'reconnecting' father and adult child. 
Relationships between siblings in stepfamilies 
In addition to the issue of contact between father and child, Tom O'Hare's comments in 
the above passage suggest there is a second major issue over which he feels 'morally 
resentful' (Pritchard, 1991) towards his father. Not only did his father lose contact with 
a daughter, but in doing this he also deprived Tom of a fuller shared history with his 
half-sister. Implicit in this extract is the recognition that it was only through the efforts 
of Tom's mother, that is, Helen's stepmother, that some form of regular contact was 
maintained. This account of a thwarted relationship between half-siblings closely 
resembles that of another respondent whose (biological) father also lost contact with a 
child from a first marriage: 
'I've got a half-brother, Nick, on my dad's side ... And I managed to find 
him again and tried to sort of get to know him-With him being a blood 
relative, I thought, well, I've got to ... It felt like that particular relationship 
was important, with there being such a long break in the relationship on 0 
my dad's sidee-Nick never came to our house. There'd been no contact 
at all (Jamie Singleton, aged thirty). 
Again, there is a clear indication that the loss of contact between father and son is 
regrettable not only for its own sake, but also because it meant foreclosure on any 
relationship between the two sons. It is notable that among those whose families of 
origin were stepfamilies, the relationship between half-siblings consistently emerges as 
something of positive significance. Thus, if the above examples highlight the loss of 
this potentially rewarding relationship, there are others in which the potential is realised 
and its benefits affirmed. hi the following passage, Lesley Morrison talks C> 0 
enthusiastically about her relationship with lier half-sister with whom she continues to 
have a full and close relationship: 
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'Mary Jo's my younger sister, my (pause) haýr-sistcr. Like, she's got the 
same mum but a different dad. But I'm vety close to her. Well, we're 
like two peas in a pod ... I was eight when she was 
bom. It was nice. She 
lives with my mum, just across the road there. And like last night, Mary 
Jo had Amy (respondent's daughter, aged two) while me and Dave went 
out. And she comes down here about eight o'clock and she sleeps here if 
we've been out ... But she doesn't 
like taking money off me. But I think 
she should take money off me, know what I mean, 'cos I'm taking her 
time up. She's Amy's godmother anyway' (Lesley Morrison, aged 
twenty-one, emphasis in original). 
These examples also testify to the kinds of commitments and responsibilities built up 
over time. In the same way these are developed within intact families (Finch, 1989; 
Finch and Mason, 1990; Finch and. Nlason, 1993), they develop, too, in stepfam. ilies. As 
was shown in Chapter 6, these Commitments are an important factor in people's 
decisions about whom they include as close family. That this is so has a number of 
implications concerning who takes part in negotiations about family responsibilities, and 
who plays a major role in fulfilling them. On the basis of these data, it is likely that 
stepparents and adult stepchildren will increasingly play a major role in these kinds of 
family discussions. This point is well illustrated in another example in which Keith 
Chandler talks about his adopted daughter, now adult, from his first marriage. In tile 
following extract he provides some of the background to his and his first wife's decision 
to adopt the grandchild of one of his half-sisters: 
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'I've just realised (laughter) that I've forgotten to put Helen on (chart). 
She's my stepsister. I never think of her as my stepsister. Always my 
sister. I'm just saying that to you, just to clarify the fact that she is my 
stepsister' (Martin Hunt, aged thirty-one, emphasis in original). 
191 
In fact, Helen is Martin's half-sister, the daughter of his biological mother and 
stepfather. From this example and what people say elsewhere, this error occurs 
precisely because, as Keith Chandler says, 'you just thought, she's my sister'. For 
many, these technicalities are thus irrelevant or redundant. On the other hand, as 
De'Ath (1992b) complains, since these terms are clearly distinguished and set out in 
dictionaries, 'there is no excuse' for their misuse when this occurs - as it does - in public 
statements or policy documents (De'Athl, 1992b: 10). 
From this discussion of sonic of the more positive effects of relationship change, a 
number of important points emerge. First, it must be emphasiscd that no essentialist or 
simplistic claims are being made that separation or divorce is inherently a 'good thing'. 
While these examples do suggest - wid this is supported by what has emerged elsewhere 
in this study - that the experience of separation, divorce and repartnering can be 
something which 'changes things' or 'changes your expectations' in useful and positive 
ways and 'makes you better equipped', they do not deny the very real difficulties 
associated with negotiating these transitions and reaching some degree of resolution. 
This is evidenced in the way these experiences elicited contradictory and ambivalent 
responses in all cases. Second, and this relates to my first point, there is nothing in these 
examples (as there was nothing in the illustrative examples given in Chapter 4) which 
lends support to Bauman's claims that people enter marriage or other significant 
relationships anticipating separation and divorce, and that they regard these experiences 
as 'just a game' (Baum -an, 1995). 
Third, it appears that the extent to which these experlences are already 'familiar' is an 
important factor in how people come to terms with, or make 'coherent' sense (Linde, 
1993) of them when confronted with them in their own lives. Drawing again on 
Hekman's (1995) analogy of the 'toolbox' (a concept she borrows and develops from 
Wittgenstein and Foucault; see also Chapter 4), it may be argued that those who have 
none of these experiences in their families of origin have fewer discursive 'tools' 
available to them, fewer ways in which to frame or shape the changes they must 
undertake. By contrast, those who do have then,. have a broader range of tools at their 
disposal. Some of these they will wish to use, some, they will wish to reject. This 
knowledge - derived both fi-orn their parents' experience as well as their own - is a 
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resource on which they can draw, an aid in crafting discourses and practices which 
better fit the familial arrangements they are currently building. These ideas are carried 
into the following section where it is shown further how those whose families of origin 
were stepfamilies can use this broader picture of relationship change as a valuable 
resource in modelling their own vel-Sions of sterfartnily life. 
With the bencrit of foresight: the stepchild as stepparent 
It has been shown in earlier chapters that the legal, practical and financial implications 
of separation and divorce - contact, dual households and the movement of children 
between households - means that stepfamily life is structured differently from how it is 
in other families. Often, this occurs in ways which are not of parents' or children's 
choosing. Parents in stcpfamilies therefore have to reformulate certain key concepts 
relating to family life, including, it has been seen, the concepts of responsibility, 
stability, and faimess. Given the different histories and resources people bring to their 
new family arrangements, and the differem points in the life course at which they enter 
them, working out what to do in specific contexts may require complex and sensitive 
negotiating skills - not only among members of 'new' families, but between members 
of 'new' and 'old' families, too. It was suggested that in doing this, parents in 
stepfamilies have few, if any, guidelines. 
However, while this may be so for many parents in this study, a different picture 
emerges for those brought up in stepfamilies. These parents do have a working model 
which they can take and shape for the particular set of family arrangements they are 
building. For while these 'second generation' stepfamilies may structurally resemble 
the stepfamilies grew up in, they may diverge firom them in the kinds of 'family 
practices' (Morgan, 1996) they exhibit or which they wish to promote. Again, 
particularly apposite in this context is Morgan's point that family practices can hold a 
4negative significance' for people. It will be seen that respondents utilise both positive 
and negative experiences fi-om their stepfamilies of origin when it comes to handling 
those aspects of stepfamily life which most perplex or preoccupy them now. 
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Relationships between stepparents and stepchildren 
As stated in the introduction, myths are potent. In their tendencies to idealise or 
demonise, they exert powerfid in-fluences on our lives. More than that, as Burchardt 
(1990) points out and as my review of the research literature showed, a number of 
writers believe that these negative images of stepf. -mily life have the power to shape the 
experience of those who live in that context (Maddox, 1980; see also Robinson, 1980). 
In other words, m)Ihs which demonise stepmothers and stepfathers or depict 
stepfamilies as 'troublesome places' (Collilis, 1990), may lead people to regard 'trouble' 
as an essential or inescapable feature of the steprelationship. As a consequence, people 
life 'feazring tile worst'. may contemplate or enter stepfamily 1 
Arguably, if this promotes relationships which are excessively defensive, myth is not 
only a powerful form of discourse, it is a destructive one, too. As Giddens' (1991; 
1992) arguments imply, foreclosure on the risks of relationship means foreclosure on its 
opportunities. Expectation of 'trouble' can create the conditions for its own existence. 
From this perspective, myth becomes reality, a self-fulfilling prophecy. While not 
denying that 'trouble' may be a prominent feature olf some steprelationships (as indeed it 
may be of any family relationship), it is clear from what has emerged so far that 
important qualifications and counterclaims to this position can be made and defended. 
In this context, those whose lives have embodied the role of both stepchild and 
stepparent have an important role to play. Those whose families of origin were 
stepfamilies andwho are now stepparents themselves can use that experience to disrupt 
and destabilise these negative stereotypes and craft for themselves - and others - more 
congenial narratives of stepfamily life. In doing this, in rejecting wholly negative 
&scripts' and authorising more balanced or positive versions of stepfamily life, they not 
only use that expcrience -as a valuable tool or resource, but they engage too in those acts 
of 'discursive resistance' Ulekman, 1995) ftmdamental to human or moral agency (see 
Chapter 4). 
For a number of respondents, the process of becoming adults and stepparents 
themselves proNridcd them with valuable insights into the difficulties and ambiguities 
their own stepparents may have experienced in that role as well as the ongoing 
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commitment they brought to it. On a number of occasions this led to a new appreciation 
of the steprelationsbip and increased closeness between stepparent and adult stepchild. 
Part of this process is traced in the following passage, in which Lesley Morrison, now 
aged twenty-one, reflects on the changing nature of the relationship between herself and 
her stepfather, whom she calls 'Dad'. Her biological father died when she was four; her 
stepfather came onto the scene when she was seven: 
'I used to hate my dad. I used to slag him off no end and say 'You'll 
never be my dad'. I'd tell my mum he'd hit me and she'd to go off her 
head at him (laughter) ... I really disliked him. And I remember when we 
all first got together, we was all walking by the cainal. And my older 
sister was making out she didn't want to walk near my dad either. And 
she moved that far away from him that she fell in the canal. Then there 
was a right 'to-do'... How he put up with staying in that sort of family 
life, I don't know. Because he came into a family with three kids that 
weren't his, which I think for any man is extraordinary. But I didn't sort 
of think of that until I got to be about eighteen. I mean it's only been in 
the last three years tliat I've actually thought: He's my dad and I love 
him ... And he says to me now 
'You used to really treat me bad'. And I 
says 'Yeah, I know, but I was at that age, wasn't 1'... But like now, if he 
and my mum have a row, he comes down here for a fag and a brew. And 
like if I have a row with Dave, it's the same, I go up the road to my dad' 
(LesleylMorrison, aged twenty-one, emphasis in original). 
It is impossible to capture in one extract the various factors which over the years have 
led Lesley Morrison to regard her 'dad' in the way she now does. Of particular 
significance in this respect has been his continuing support to her - financial, practical 
and emotional - during her pregriancy at fhe age of eighteen, and beyond. Important to 
both of them is her dad's new role as 'granddad' to her daughter. In addition, Lesley 
Morrison and her stepfather share a singular interest in stock car racing. The 
combination of these qualitatively different interests has allowed the development of a 
close, day-to-day, shared history, something which in earlier years seemed less 
accessible to them. Again, there is evidence here of how commitments and 
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responsibilities between stepparents and stcpehildren develop and deepen over time as 
they do between biological parents and chil ulen. 0 
As Lesley Morrison goes on to say, these changes have also made her reflect on how 
best to approach related issues in her own flunily, specifically her new partner's 
involvement in bringing up her daughter, and her own involvement in helping to bring 
up his children. She aclmowledges similar difficulties to those her own mother 
experienced in this respect: 
'It's really hard, getting that balance, knowing what to say and when to 
say it with other people's kids.. And like Dave says about his two when 
they're playing up 'My kids, they're bloody awful sometimes aren't 
they'. And like I remember how I was and I says 'They're only kids, 
Dave ... They've 
had enough. Have a bit of patience' (Lesley Morrison, 
aged twenty-one, emphasis in origin. al). 
As this passage indicates, not only is it hard for parents to find the right balance in 
sharing responsibility for each other's children, it is also difficult to know what 
expectations they may legitimately have about their children's capacities to adjust to 
new family arrangements. Here, it is her own memory of movement into the role of 
stepchild at the age of seven which enables her now, in her role as part-time stepparent 
to her partner's two children (aged seven and five years), to reverse perspective 
(Benhabib, 1992) and see things from their point of view. In this, Lesley Morrison's 
reflections on these issues have many features in common with the concerns expressed 
by Martin Ifunt (see again his opening comment to this chapter). In particular, the most 
striking - and important - resemblance between these two accounts is their authors' 
ease of movement from the perspective of stepparent to that of stepchild, and back 
again. For both Lesley Morrison and Martin Hunt, it is their own experience of being a 
stepchild which elicits a thoughtful and perceptive reversal of perspective. It is these 
memories, together with the insights they offer, which lead them to deal with 
&rebellious' behaviour in their own stepchildren 'differently' from how they might 
otherwise have done. 
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A second concern these respondents share is their desire as adults to 'make things up' 
with their stepfathers. This is apparent in how Mm-tin Hunt continues: 
'Yeah, I remember being terrible towaýrds him. But as I say, it was not 
till I grew up that I recognised the fact that I shouldn't have done those 
things, said those things ... So now I try and make things up to him' 
(Martin Ifunt, aged thirty-one). 
Having also interviewed Martin Hunt's stepfather, Ken Phillips, it is interesting to note 
his perceptions of these changes, and how they substantiate his stepson's account. In 
the following extract, lie compares Martin's initial animosity towards him with the 
easygoing acceptance of his younger brother, Roger. At the same time, he contrasts 
these initial differences between the two boys with the situation now: 
'Martin was older than Roger, and so he'd got attached to his father 
more, and couldn't accept that he'd gone for quite a long time. Their 
grandfather told me that when their fiether first went, Martin used to look 
in all the cupboards for him. And so I can imagine (long pause). 
Whereas Roger, being that bit younger, not yet. two, looked on me like 
'Well, he'll do, he's my dad' (laughter) ... And so, though I would have 
said when Ifirst got married to their mother that I got on better with 
Roger than I did with Martin ... actually, now (pause), I mean Martin is 
always turning up in his car and saying 'Let's go out for a ride', and he 
takes me miles (laughs). And so now I get on as well with him as with 
Roger' (Ken Phillips, aged fifty-eight, emphasis in original). Ll- 
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enlarged thinking and reversal of perspective Nvh;. ch has emerged in different contexts 
throughout this study. By attributing the different receptions his t-wo stepsons gave him 
to their different ages and life experience, Ken PhillEps implicitly rejects notions of the 
innate animosity of the steprelationsllip. 
It should be noted, more-over, that neither Lesley Morrison's nor Martin Hunt's 
stepfather had prior experience of stcpfamily life. This reinforces a similar point made 
earlier, namely that if being a child in a stepfannily can usefully provide a model for 
those who are currently stepparenting and can facilitate an insightful reversal of 
perspective with one's oNým-stepchildrcn, that prior experience is not essential. It has 
been demonstrated many times on the basis of these data that parents who do not have 
prior experience of stepfamily life but who are willing to engage in the practice 
(Benhabib, 1992) of reversing perspective, are able to be imaginative about a Z-1 
(step)child's point of view. 
These two cases raise another important issue. In these comparatively short extracts, 
Lesley Morrison and Martin Hunt contrast the quality of past and present relationships 
with their respective stepfathers in nottably stark terms. However, it should not be 
inferred from this that relationships with their stepfathers were wholly awful for the 
twenty or thirty years prior to reaching this point, nor that they have been wholly 
unproblematic since then. On the basis of what they say elsewhere in their interviews, 
this is clearly not the case. Rather - and here I follow Thompson's (1990) arguments 
about oral histories in general - it is that memory, like myth, tends to require a 
simplification of its subject matter (Thompson, 1990: S). In this way people make sense 
of disparate and untidy memories from various points in their lives. 
Similarly, as another contemporary oral historian, Elizabeth Tonkin (1990) insists, it is 
vacuous in this context to juxtapose myth against 'real' history or truth against 
falsehood. Life stories, or what she prefers to call 'representations of pastness', are 
precisely that. They are accounts of NvIiat we unde? -stand our past experience to have 
been (Tonkin, 1990: 27). As such, they cannot be crudely weighed against some prior 
'truth' or 'reality'. As statcd in the preceding section, these representations are crucial 
to making 'coherent' sense (Linde, 1993) of who we are and how we got there. It is 
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focus almost entirely on its importance for biological parents and children. Since, 
currently, there is no automatic legal relationship between stepparents and stepchildren, 
the role and responsibilities of stepparcn*4s is, at, best, ambiguous. And while the 
Children Act 1989 does provide some rights and duties for stepparents, this is only at 
the point the stepfamily is actually breaking down (De'Ath, 1992a, 1992b). As the 
above example demonstrates - and there is evidence to support this more widely - the 
significance of the steprelationship in relation to stepparents and contact requires closer 
consideration and evaluation (Masson, 1992; James, 1992; Walker, 1992a, 1992b). 
importantly, in terms of myths about stepfafners, Joan Harker's account breaks through 
the 'mythical frame' (Passerini, 1990) and follows the thread in the other direction, 
asserting the significance of the steprelationship over t1hat of the 'blood' tie. 
However, on turning to the txvo accounts in this study which contain childhood 
recollections of a stepmother, it must be ownedthat the claims of myth appear to be 
substantiated. Interestingly, these two accounts are taken from interviews with two 
brothers. In the first of these, Roger Hunt gives a terse summary of his feelings: W 
'I remember visiting my biological father and his new partner when I was 01 
four. I did something and his new partner smacked me. That was it as 
far as I was concerned. I never went there again' (Roger Hunt, aged 
twenty-seven, emphasis in original). 
Turning to the second account of this rclatimnship by Roger's brother, Martin Hunt, a 
similar picture of his stepmother emerges: 
'I don't like 'er. I don't mind saying it. I can't stand her. I mean she 
wasn't too bad when I was growing up. I Could tolerate her then. But 
since I've had children, I've only took them over there once, when Katy 
was very young. And that last time my stepmother made a big song and 
dance because Katy broke something. And I said 'Well that's it. I'm not 
going back there again. If that's the way you fccl about it, I'll stay away'. 
My brother had an incident with her when lie was very young and he 
never got over it' (Martin Hunt, aged thirty-one). 
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Given the coincidence of tone, phraseology and sentiment in these two accounts, it 
seems likely that the two brothers have conferred with each other on a number of 
occasions regarding their stepmother. One may speculate that Roger's childhood 
recollections of his stepmother - which diverge froni Martin's more positive ones - 
have in the light of more recent experience, been relliew-sed between them and mutually 
confirmed. It should be noted, however, the, on retuming to the sub ect of his 
stepmother later in his interview, Martin Hunt. says 'she's probably not as bad as what I 
think she is'. In the light of what he has said earlier about her, his latter remark is 
evidence that some adult stepchildre-n reach for =,, understanding of their stepparents 
which some would regard as generous. Similarly, Burchardt (1990) speaks of adult 
stepchildren's ability to 'forgive' their stepparents (1990: 249). Arguably, what is 
(understandably) odious to Roger and Martin Hinit about their stepmother is less the fact 
of her steprelationship to them, than the fact that she smacks children on first 
acquaintance and makes 'a big song and dance' when they break something. 
While these different examples support what has been found elsewhere in this study, 
namely, that relationships between stepparents and stepchildren are likely to be easier 
when their shared history commences in the child's infancy, they show, as Natasha 
Burchardt (1990) also fourid, that there is no sirnple relationship between age and the 
quality of steprelationships. A range of factors is important. What they do illustrate is 
the force of Ochiltree's argument (raised earlier in Chapter 6), that it is unrealistic to 
expect 'instant love' between stepparents and stepchildren. While a number of 
therapists and practitioners have found these expectations do exist (see for example 
Visher and Visher, 1982; Walsh, 1982), data from this study suggest that those who 
have themselves been stepchildren have more realistic expectations in this regard. 
With the benefit of foresight as they move into the role of stepparent, they have a 
knowledge which enables them to take a long-terni view of the steprelationship, not 
only in terms of what is reasonable to expect from children, but crucially, too, in terms 
of what kind of 'staying power' may be required of thern as parents. For it is this latter 
quality, the ability to 'stick it out' and always be there, which, if it is present in a 
stepparent, adult stepchildren in this study most highly value and most readily recall. 
The importance of this is recognised by Maýorie Phillips in the following, final extract. 
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Talking about her third husband, Ken Phillips, stepfather to her two sons Rogcr and 
Martin Hunt, and the subject of Martin's reflections at the beginning of this chapter, shc 
says: 
'When you heard people say in the past 'Oh, stepparents, stepparents', I 
have always, always said 'Well, that doesn't apply to my family' ... To 
Ken, Roger and Martin are his sons and that's it ... It was Ken all the way 
through. He was the one that encouraged them, came to school meetings 
with us when they were young. Always him at parents' meetings, cubs, 
football, training, taking them out ... And I think, well, he can't have done 
such a bad job as a stepparent because both Roger and Martin, they're 
stepparents themselves now aren't they' (Maýorie Phillips, aged fifty- 
six, emphasis in original). 
In her final sentence, Maijorie Phillips asserts the full potential of the steprelationship 
for contemporary family relationships. That her two sons chose stcpparenthood before 
biological parenthood is for her significant. That those whose families of origin were 
stepfamilies are themselves prepared to move into the stepparenting role - with all the 
complexities and ambiguities it may entail - is not regarded as evidence of inadequacy 
or failure. Rather it testifies to the stable, dependable force such relationships have 
proved to be in their own lives. 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the negative orientation of much research literature in this field, the picture 
of relationship change which emerges in this chapter shows what Kicr and Lewis 
(forthcoming) describe as a subtle balance of gains and losses. Reflecting a shift in this 
direction in more recent research findings, these accounts seriously chalicngc 
assumptions that separation and divorce can be constituted solely or mainly in terms or 
negative effects and outcomes. Similarly, more positive representations are evident in 
respondents' memories of stepfamily life. They show the development of a morc 
balanced and authentic perspective on the steprelationship, one in which it is ncithcr 
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idealised nor demonised. Together, these accounts show how separation, divorcc and 
the experience of stepfamily life can be constituted as knowledge and resource. In the 
way this knowledge is passed down from parents to children, across the generations 
between siblings, and also pooled amongst friends, it feeds into and becomes part of our 
wider cultural knowledge or ways of life. 
203 
-- Chapter 9 
Parents in Stepfamilies: 
Learning New Idioms, Rewriting Scripts 
'This chart, I think doing concentric circles is very good. Because it 
shows what happens in family relationships. It's a bit like ripples on a 
pond. It's not until years later that you look back on it and you realise 
that the decisions you take when it comes to family break-up spread a 
long way out... ' (Sally Cousins, aged forty-three). 
Introduction 
In this concluding chapter I draw together some of the main themes which have emerged 
throughout the study, linking them to that wider theoretical universe (Mason, 1996) to 
which I referred in chapter 3. Taking the opening comment to this chapter as nly 
starting-point, it may be argued that it is not only the 'private' or personal decisions 
which people take that have important consequences and 'spread a long way out'. 
Public decisions and stories about separation, divorce and rcpartnering also have far. 
and wide-reaching repercussions. Related to this is a second fundamental point. As 
Schneider (1968) observed some thirty years ago and Finch (1989) reiterated in her 
review of the research evidence on family relationships, what we believe about family 
and kin relationship is important, not because it is true, but because of the meaning this 
gives certain relationships. If we believe that a certain model of family is 'natural' or 
that blood ties are special, then these beliefs will have real consequences and affect flow 
we view and treat these and other ties (Schneider, 1968; Finch, 1989: 221-2). 
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Public 'decisions' about stepfamily life 
As I argued in the opening chapter to this thesis, public stories and negativc imagcs 
around stepfamilies abound, and in political discourse at least, appear to marry well with 
certain interpretations of statistical and research evidence on divorce, re-divorcc, and 
their short and long-term effects on children. Political discourse has its ow-n mythical 
selections or versions of 'family values' which in turn imply a mythical consensus on 
family life. As argued throughout this study, this tends to construct relationship change 
in negative terms, as evidence of a moral downturn, instability, irresponsibility and lack 
of solidarity and commitment. Following a number of writers (Maddox, 1975,1980; 
Samuel and Thompson, 1990) 1 have argued in preceding chapters that the most 
powerful myths are those which are internalised and passed on consciously or 
unconsciously to children and kin. From a different perspective Bourdicu (1996) argucs 
that public or state versions of 'family' are the most powerful in this respect. 
From his perspective Bourdieu (1996) claims that 'the family, is part of our 'habitus', 
one of our most fundamental mental categories, a concept to which we are socialised at 
the individual and collective level. In the ways we describe 'family' or specify certain 
clusters of relationships as the 'natural' elements of family life, the family as a category 
is 'realised' and the social order reproduced. State action - the work of statisticians, 
judges and social workers for example - is particularly important in the ways it 
constitutes family identity. Taking issue with ethnomethodological claims that the 
family is 'only a word', he rightly insists that it is not 'only a word a socia rction. 
Rather 'words make things' (1996: 19-26). Moreover, as he goes on to say, conformity 
to the model of the 'intact' family presupposes access to a range of resources and social 
conditions - income, living space, a partner - which as I have shown in my study arc not 
universally available on demand. 
However, the problem with Bourdieu's account is that it renders people curiously 
passive in how they respond to or act against this 'powerful, perforinativc discoursc, 
(Bourdieu, 1996). 1 have shown in earlier chapters that this is at odds with findings 
which emerge from my study. As Giddens (1991,1992) argues, social activity - 
including family practices - is susceptible to continuous revision in the light of ncw 
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information, knowledge and practice. This revised knowledge in turn bccomcs a 
constitutive element of that social activity. As Giddens himself suggests, novel ways of 
stepparenting can be understood as one example of these processes. From this 
perspective, the 'doing' of (step)family life - and giving an account of it - also 
constitutes a performative, if yet less powerful, discourse. 
Personal 'decisions' about relationship change and stepfamily life 
Arguably, those with the requisite resources to live an 'intact' family life will not be 
overly concerned with how those whose family arrangements are 'other' resist or 
intemalise negative versions of their lives. While I have distanced myself in preceding 
chapters from any essentialist ideas that experience of relationship change is inlicrcntly a 
'good thing', I have on the basis of data generated through my own research, moved 
towards a position which argues that these experiences can constitute a range or 
resources - moral, cultural, personal and social - for people to draw on. In this sense, 
parents craft a 'transgressive' discourse (Hekman, 1995) which rewrites public scripts 
and versions of their lives. As I have also shown, a similar shift is discernible in the 
work of a number of contemporary writers in related fields of family studies - 
sociology, psychology, ethics and moral philosophy. There are a number of ways in 
which the family practices (Morgan, 1996) of parents in this study are transformativc in 
this respect. 
The moral imperative of stepkinship 
Most importantly, this was seen in parents' moral thinking around their stcpfamily 
relationships. As a wide range of empirical studies on family relationships have found 
(see especially Firth et al, 1970; Finch, 1989; Finch and Mason, 1993), the single most 
distinctive feature of family relationships is their 'peculiar inescapable moral quality, 
(Finch, 1989: 236). Similarly, this is the most striking feature of stcpfaMily 
relationships in this study. If, as increasing numbers of writers are arguing, moral 
practices are inextricably linked to family practices more generally (Benhabib, 1992; 
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Hekman, 1995; Sevenhuijsen, 1998) then this finding is unsurprising. Moral identity is 
unlikely to be suddenly and inexplicably suspended (Bauman, 1993,1995) as a person 
moves from an 'intact' family into a stepfamily. Rather, as I have argued, there is clear 
evidence from my study that through the processes of separation, divorce and 
repartnering, parents are 'forced' to be morally reflexive about a number of issues. 
Given the close relationships many stepparents shared with younger and adult 
stepchildren, it is unsurprising that the moral imperative of their kin relationships was 
rarely understood in ternis of 'given' features of the blood relationship. Most ofIcn the 
moral quality of stepkinship was understood to derive from the quality and history of a 
relationship, specifically from the sense of commitments that had accumulated over time 
(Finch, 1989; Finch and Mason, 1993). Shared, day-to-day history was perceived to be 
a key factor in building commitment and 'enduring diffuse solidarity' (Schneider, 1968). 
This explains in part why people included their stepchildren and their biological 
children as equally close members of their family, and also why these ties held an equal 
moral weight in their eyes. For similar reasons, those who included friends as close 
family were emphatic that these ties were not conditional or contingent. 
The moral imperative of stepkinship was carried through and made particularly evident 
in the ability and willingness of some parents (although not all) to practice that $reversal 
of perspective' (Benhabib, 1992) which enabled them to be imaginative about their 
children's wants, needs and interests in relation to the issue of contact with a non- 
resident biological parent. Some parents practised this to a degree that many of their 
friends and/or former partners found unthinkable or 'odd'. As noted in Chapter 2, a 
similar kind of 'oddness' featured among biological and stepparents in Stacey's (199 1) 
study of post-divorce kinship in California. 
On a number of occasions parents in my study told me that although taking a reasonably 
open, co-operative attitude towards contact had initially been very costly in emotional 
terms, this 'risk' or 'recklessness' in relation to their children and former partners had 
'paid off. Specifically, it had enhanced their moral reputations and standing, not only 
in the eyes of their 'new' family members, but also in the eyes of former partners and 
their families. Unexpectedly, some parents found that they had gradually assumed sonic 
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form of a 'moral high ground', even though initially other people had been critical or 
them for taking this attitude. As one man said, over a period of several months he - and 
arguably his moral reputation - shifted from being perceived as 'daft' to 'cool,. In these 
ways as suggested above, the 'doing' or practice of stepkinship can be a pcrfi rm o ativc 
and transformative discourse. 
It was shown that the morally binding nature of parents' relationships with step- and 
biological children was carried through and reflected in their handling of inheritance. 
As many of them realised, making a will provided a permanent insight or statement or 
their relationships with children. More than that, as I argued in Chapter 7, wills arc also 
public documents. In this respect, they document private decisions about the rcalitics or 
relationship change and stepfamily life in a publicly accessible form. flere too it was 
seen that parents' decisions transgressed normative assumptions or inheritance law 
which ascribe overriding significance to blood ties. What emerged as especially striking 
was their contextually sensitive articulations of the principle of fairness. 
In most cases, these contextually sensitive moral practices had as their primary objcctivc 
(step)children's interests. Specifically equal treatment of children in most aspccts of 
family life was regarded as essential - even where parents admitted to uncqualfcclings 
for them. This was especially marked in relation to younger children. As childrcn 
became adults, elements of the 'pure relationship' came into play (Giddens, 1991, 
1992). In other words, reciprocity and some mutual support were rcgardcd as important 
in most cases. It was notable that parents who had more than one biological child had 
more confidence in voicing distinctions between any of their childrcn, biological or 
step-. 
Because these parents had experienced transient feelings of (intense) dislike for a 
biological child as she or he went, for example, through a trying and difficult 
adolescence, distinctions in how they felt towards their biological and step- children 
were understood in similar terms. In other words, emotional closeness and distance 
(with one exception) were not based on the grounds that one child was a stcprclativc and 
one was a blood relative, but on the grounds that the quality of these relationships was 
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different. This also explains why in some cases parents placed their stepchildren as 
closer to them than their biological children. 
In these different ways and different contexts parents in stepfamilies reformulate a 
number of familiar concerns. It requires them to take seriously a number of symbolic 
bases for kinship - blood, shared history, choice and necessity. In so doing they crcatc a 
moral practice or imperative around kinship which is appropriate to their needs. This, 
as I have argued in a number of chapters is, according to a number of contemporary 
moral philosophers (Benhabib, 1992; Bauman, 1993,1995; Hckman, 1995; 
Scvenhuijsen, 1998) the hallmark of moral agency. 
Time 
One of the most important findings to emerge from my study is the significancc of timc 
in stepfamily relationships. In Chapter 2,1 drew attention to Strathern's point that in 
kinship idiom, children are future to their parents' past and that stepfamily formation 
reverses the processes of partner formation and the arrival of children. In doing this 
parents in stepfamilies are forced to learn another kinship script idiom, one in which 
they must take on board their stepchildren's histories in a former family life. Often the 
reality of this other life makes routine intrusions into the 'new' family as its history 
starts its course. History implies expanses of time and long durations. flowcvcr, 
parents in stepfamilies must learn at a run the intricacies of their children's histories 
their peculiarities and idiosyncrasies. 
It is evident from some accounts in this study that what must be learned at a run by 
parents can appear to be as quickly undone by their stepchildren. The building work 
entailed in establishing close ties and solidarities is often obscured from vicw. Tlicir 
reality may only be apparent ten or fifteen years after stepfamily formation as 
stepchildren moving into adulthood recognise or acknowledge the significance of flicir 
existence in their lives. 
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Conclusion 
On the basis of data generated through my study, many public decisions about how to 
understand and re-present relationship change fit awkwardly with the accounts of 
stepfamily life presented here. The latter fit better with sociological explanations 
(Stacey, 1991; Giddens 1991,1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995) which view tllcsc 
changes as a function of wider social change and, crucially, which allow for individual 
agency in contributing to that change (Morgan, 1996). Notwithstanding the powcr of 
public decisions about what properly constitutes family identity and relationships, what 
each of us selects and absorbs from these publicly offered stories is influenced and 
mediated through our individual experience and what we make of it (Samuel and 
Thompson, 1990). 1 have argued that parents in this study have shown they have a wide 
range of 'tools' (Hekman, 1995) with which to reformulate familiar concerns and craft 
more enabling and authentic versions of stepfamily life relationships. 
As the opening comment to this chapter suggests - and my data more widely support - 
parents in stepfamilies try to understand the upheavals and changes that shape their 
futures in the light of past experience (Tonkin, 1990). Accounts in this study, in 
particular those from parents whose families of origin were stepfamilies, suggest that 
'familiar' experience of relationship change can be a resource, an enabling factor in 
dealing with their own stepfamily situations. If Bourdieu is right and 'words make 
things', then there is a need to re-edit or re-write disabling public scripts of stcpramily 
life by drawing on transformative narratives and accounts such as those offered by 




I envisaged four 'sections' to each interview, not necessarily in the order which 
follows. 
Section 1: Household 
1) Would you begin by telling me who lives in your household? 
2) Are there any other family members who regularly spend time here? E. g. weekends, 
school holidays, vacations, Christmas etc.? 
3) What did you do last Christmas? Did you spend it here? Did you have members of 
your family visiting? 
4) Do you imagine next Christmas will be the same? 
5) Do you have a photograph album? 
If so, who keeps it? 
If you do, who is in it? 
Do you have more than one album? 
Section 2: Partnership History 
1) When we first spoke, you mentioned that this isn't your first marriage/partncrship. 
Could you tell me a little more about your partnership history, that is, previous 
relationships you regard as significant - whether married, cohabiting, or living 
separately? 
2) Can you remember how long you were in those relationships for? (Dates, including 
periods living without a partner). 
3) Do you have children from those relationships? 
4) Do you still have contact with them? (Frequency, duration, location, type, and 
changes in any of latter) How do you organise it? 
5) Do you still have contact with your ex-partner? ( ditto GA 
6) Do you still have contact with your ex-partner's family9 (" ditto 11 
7) Who initiates that contact? 
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8) How is this done? (When, how often, on what occasions, by 'phone, visits, cards, 
letters, etc. )? 
9) Why do you maintain contact? 
10) Does your (current) partner get involved? How does s/he feel about you 
maintaining contact with your ex-partner and/or her/his family? 
11) Have there been any changes in the frequency or type of contact with your ex- 
partner and/or her/his family9 
12) What prompted those changes? 
13) Do you have contact with your current partner's family? (Frequency, duration, 
location, type). 
14) Do they consider you to be 'one of them' do you think? 
15) Do you describe yourselves or think of yourselves as a 'stepfamily'? 
Section 3: Visual Chart (10 concentric circles on A3 paper). 
1) Could you use this chart as a way of showing whom you include as your family and 
relatives? I would like you to include anyone you think of as family. 
2) If you put yourself at the centre, where would you place each person in terms of 
how close you feel they are to you? You don't need to fill in each circle. You may 
wish to leave some circles empty if that shows more clearly the different degrees of 
closeness you feel. Can you tell me what you mean by 'close'? 
3) Could you write their names in the circles, and next to each name the way you refcr 
to them or talk about them? For example, if you are introducing your ex-partncr's 
mother to someone, what do you call her? 
4) If there is anyone you feel ambiguous about, or unsure about where to place, just 
write their names down somewhere else on the sheet. You may decide later on that 
you wish to place them in the circles, or, you may feel you want to leave them as ihcy 
are. Either way, that's fine. 
5) Could you tell me why you found it difficult to place these people? 
6) (Where someone has not talked about/written down their ex-partncr). So, you 
would not include your ex-partner as family? 
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Section 4: Inheritance 
1) Have you made a will? Have you had any contact with a solicitor or bank in 
relation to inheritance and making a will? Is this the first time you've made one? 
2) What prompted you to do it? 
3) Have you discussed inheritance with your current partner? (Context oo 
4) Have you decided what you will actually do/write in your will? 
5) Have you talked about inheritance with other members of your family, e. g your 
children and/or stepchildren? If yes: What issues did you discuss? What were their 
views? 
6) Do you think your stepchildren may inherit from their (biological) parents? 
Would this affect your own arrangements? 
If so, how? 
If not, why not? 
7) Have you discussed inheritance with your cx-partner and/or her/his family? 
8) Are there any items in your home which you particularly associate with yours or 
your partner's previous marriage/partnership/relationship? 
9) Have you decided what you would like to do with those things? 
11) Had you decided how you wanted to write your will/bequeath your property 
before approaching your solicitor, or did you approach your solicitor with a view to 
seeking her/his advice? 
12) What has been your experience of solicitors in this respect? 
13) You said you made your will 'x' number of months/years ago. Hasanything 
happened since that time which has led you to reconsider your will? 
14) How did you decide who would get what? 
15) Have you done anything about guardianship? 
16) Have you made any arrangements, either formal or informal, in relation to that 
possibility9 
17) Why did you choose that particular person? 
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